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SEVENTH ANNUAL SURVEY OF NORTH
CAROLINA CASE LAW*
The Seventh Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law is designed
to review cases decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court during
the period covered and to supplement past and future Surveys in pre-
senting developments in North Carolina case law over a period of time.
It is not the purpose of the Survey to discuss all the cases that were
decided during the period of its coverage. It is intended to discuss only
those decisions which are of particular importance--cases regarded
as being of significance and interest to those concerned with the work
of the Court, and decisions which reflect substantial changes and matters
of first impression in North Carolina. Where a case embraced within
the period covered by the Survey has been the subject of a note in this
Law Review, the holding is briefly stated and the note is cited.
Most of the research for and writing of this Survey was accomplished
by selected members of the Student Board of Editors of the Law Review,
working under the supervision of the Faculty of the School of Law of
the University of North Carolina. Some sections, however, represent
the individual work of a faculty member.
Student members of the Law Review or candidates for membership
and the sections for which they are responsible are: Oliver W. Alphin
(Business Associations, Insurance, and Negotiable Instruments) ; Robert
B. Blythe (Constitutional Law); Louis J. Fisher III (Domestic Rela-
tions); Jack W. Floyd (Criminal Law and Procedure); Raymond A.
Jolly, Jr. (Damages and Wills) ; John H. Kerr III (Agency and Work-
men's Compensation, Public Utilities (in part), and Sales) ; Howard A.
Knox, Jr. (Contracts); Robert L. Lindsey, Jr. (Administrative Law,
Public Utilities (in part), and Taxation) ; William H. McNair (Torts) ;
Thomas L. Norris, Jr. (Equitable Remedies, Municipal Corporations,
and Trusts) ; Kenneth L. Penegar (Personal Property and Real Prop-
erty); James Y. Preston (Labor Law); Robert N. Randall (Credit
Transactions); John G. Shaw (Civil Procedure (Pleading and Par-
ties)) ; Richard von Biberstein, Jr. (Evidence).
Throughout this Survey the North Carolina Supreme Court will be
referred to as the "Court" unless it appears by its full title. The United
States Supreme Court will be designated only by its full name. North
Carolina General Statutes will be signified in text and textual footnotes
by "G.S."
* The period covered embraces the decisions of the North Carolina Supreme
Court reported in 249 N.C. 490 through 251 N.C. 642.
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
In G.S. § 20-16(a) (5) the Department of Motor Vehicles was given
purported authority to suspend a driver's license without a preliminary
hearing when there was satisfactory evidence that the licensee was "an
habitual violator of the traffic laws." In Harvell v. Scheidt1 petitioner's
license had been suspended after six traffic convictions. The trial
examiner, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, and the superior court
had found as a fact that petitioner was an habitual violator.
On appeal the Court reversed, holding that G.S. § 20-16 (a) (5)
contained an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, and was
therefore invalid. The Court said that the legislature had failed to
enact a statutory standard to guide the Department in determining when
a licensee was an habitual violator.
This holding is in accord with earlier decisions of the Court where
substantial rights were involved.2 In the principal case the Court cited
authority to the effect that a license to drive is "a privilege in the nature
of a right. . ... 8
As a result of the decision in the principal case the 1959 General
Assembly amended G.S. § 20-16 (a) (5), providing statutory criteria for
determining when violation of traffic laws has become habitual.4
PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN -ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
In Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Wilson County Bd. of Educ.5
plaintiff sued the defendant school board under the State Tort Claims
Act for the wrongful death of its intestate. The allegations before the
Industrial Commission were to the effect that the school board's agent,
a school bus driver, was negligent in the way he discharged the intestate
from a school bus, causing the child to be struck and killed by a passing
automobile. Plaintiff alleged that the bus driver had violated rules
promulgated by the defendant designed to protect children alighting
from school busses. Defendant moved to dismiss the action on the
ground that plaintiff's affidavit and a stipulation between the parties
affirmatively showed that the negligence of the driver of the automobile
insulated any negligence on the part of the defendant. The motion was
1249 N.C. 699, 107 S.E.2d 549 (1959), also discussed in CoNsrn'uoNoAL LAW,
Delegation of Authority--Driver's License Revocation, infra.
2 See, e.g., State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1939); Bizzell v. Golds-
boro, 192 N.C. 348, 135 S.E. 50 (1926).
21249 N.C. at 706, 107 S.E.2d at 533, citing In re Wright, 228 N.C. 584, 46
S.E.2d 696 (1948).
' The statute is discussed at length in Motor Vehicles, Comments on North
Carolina 1959 Session Laws, 38 N.C.L. REv. 200-05 (1960).
251 N.C. 603, 111 S.E.2d 844 (1959), also discussed in ToRTs, Tort Clains
Act, infra.
1960]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
granted. The full Commission upheld the dismissal and the superior
court affirmed.
On appeal the Court held that plaintiff should have been allowed to
put on its evidence. The Court pointed out the informal nature of the
proceedings before the Industrial Commission and the fact that G.S.
§ 143-297 only requires a "brief statement of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the injury and giving rise to the claim." The Court im-
plied that if the rules of the school board had been introduced into evi-
dence they might have furnished enough evidence to allow a recovery on
the ground that the negligence of the defendant and that of the third
party were joint and concurring proximate causes.
The Court finally said that "in an informal proceeding like that pro-
vided in our Tort Claims Act, the plaintiff is entitled to have its evidence
heard, and the evidence, together with the informal pleadings, considered
by the hearing commissioner in making his findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law."" Turner v. Gastonia Bd. of EduC.7 was distinguished
because in that case there could have been no recovery even if evidence
had been heard since the accident allegedly occurred on a date prior to
the enactment of the statutory waiver of governmental immunity.
AGENCY AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AGENCY
"Employee" Under State Tort Claims Act
G.S. § 143-291 permits tort claims to be filed before the Industrial
Commission against "the State Board of Education, the State Highway
Commission, and all other departments, institutions and agencies of the
State." Turner v. Gastonia City Bd. of Educ.' presented for the first
time the issue of whether a janitor, an employee of the city school trus-
tees, was also an employee of the State Board of Education. The Court
held that the Tort Claims Act, while applicable to the state departments
and agencies, does not include local units such as county and city boards
of education. "[T]he city boards [of education] ... were given general
control and supervision of all matters pertaining to the public schools in
their respective units, except as to such matters as the law assigned to
the State Board of Education or other authorized agency. The duty of
selecting janitors was not so assigned and consequently remained with
6Id. at 608, 111 S.E.2d at 848.
1250 N.C. 456, 109 S.E.2d 211 (1959).
1250 N.C. 456, 109 S.E.2d 211 (1959), also discussed in CIVIL PROCEnuRE, Plead-
ing, Demurrer, infra.
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the local boards."'2 Since lower school boards and officials are primarily
responsible for the selection and control of this kind of employee, it
would be a strained construction to find an employer-employee relation-
ship between the State Board of Education and the janitor of a local
school.
Proof of Ownership and Agency
G.S. § 20-71.1 creates a rule of evidence that proof of ownership or
registration of a motor vehicle is regarded as prima facie evidence that
it was being operated by and under the control of a person for whose
conduct the owner is legally responsible. In Fox v. Albea3 the automo-
bile causing the injury was driven by one of two co-registrants. In an
action against the non-driver co-registrant the Court held defendant was
entitled to peremptory instructions in his favor since G.S. § 20-71.1 is
applicable only when one other than an owner is driving the vehicle.
This conclusion seems proper, for on several occasions the Court has
stated that the purpose of this statute "is to establish a ready means of
proving agency in any case where it is charged that the negligence of
a non-owner operator causes damage. .. . It does not have, and was
not intended to have, any other or further force or effect."4
The most interesting case to arise under this statute during the last
year was Rick v. Murphy.5 This action arose out of a collision between
the plaintiff's automobile and a "hybrid" automobile driven by one
Froneberger. Froneberger's original automobile had been demolished.
The defendant had rebuilt Froneberger's automobile by using a body
that belonged to Murphy and the motor of the original car. The plain-
tiff attempted to use G.S. § 20-71.1 to hold Murphy vicariously liable
for Froneberger's alleged negligence. At the time of the collision the
"hybrid" vehicle carried the license plates issued to Froneberger for
use on the original automobile and the registration card showing owner-
ship of the original automobile. The Court held that Murphy was not
the owner, and his motion for nonsuit should have been granted. "True
the body was not the same as the body described on the registration
card, but the body is merely part of the motor vehicle referred to in G.S.
20-71.1 .... [This statute] does not make the merchant who supplies
parts or the mechanic who performs work and supplies parts responsible
for the operation of a repaired or rebuilt motor vehicle."6
2Id. at 462, 109 S.E.2d at 215, discussing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-35 (Supp.
1959).
1250 N.C. 445, 109 S.E.2d 197 (1959).
' Hartley v. Smith, 239 N.C. 170, 177, 79 S.E.2d 767, 772 (1954); accord,
Roberts v. Hill, 240 N.C. 373, 379, 82 S.E.2d 373, 378 (1954).
5251 N.C. 162, 110 S.E.2d 815 (1959), also discussed in Civm PRocEDURE
Pleading-Ultimate Facts, infra.
Old. at 164, 110 S.E2d at 817.
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Family Purpose Doctrine
The person upon whom it is sought to fasten liability under the
family purpose doctrine must own or maintain an automobile for the
general use, pleasure and convenience of the family.7 In Small v.
Mallory8 the wife initially financed the automobile from her separate
earnings. Notwithstanding the evidence that the wife had not worked
for some three years prior to the accident and that all the recent install-
ment payments for the financing and refinancing of the vehicle were
furnished by the husband, the Court held that there was sufficient evi-
dence to be submitted to the jury under the family purpose doctrine on
the question of the wife's liability for the negligent operation of the
automobile by the husband. The dissent seems to have taken a more
realistic view of the ownership and concludes that, irrespective of tech-
nical ownership, the wife here should not be liable under the family
purpose doctrine. The instant case is the subject of a Note in this
volume.9
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Accident on the Employer's Premises
In Davis v. Devil Dog Mfg. Co.Y0 the claimant had parked in the
company parking lot, and while walking from the lot to the part of the
employer's premises where she actually worked, she fell and was in-
jured. The Court, adopting the widely accepted "on the premises
rule," affirmed the award of compensation. It reasoned that going from
the parking lot to claimant's work area was a necessary incident of her
employment, and the injury therefore arose out of and in the course
and scope of the claimant's employment."
'Matthews v. Cheatham, 210 N.C. 592, 188 S.E. 87 (1936).S250 N.C. 570, 108 S.E.2d 852 (1959).
S38 N.C.L. REv. 249 (1960).
0249 N.C. 543, 107 S.E.2d 102 (1959).
"
1Accord, Hughes v. American Brass Co., 141 Conn. 231, 104 A.2d 896 (1952);
Federal Ins. Co. v. Coram, 95 Ga. App. 622, 98 S.E.2d 214 (1957) ; John Roger'sCase, 318 Mass. 308, 61 N.E.2d 341 (1945).; 58 Am. JuR. Worknes Compensation§ 217 (1943); 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 234f (1958); 1 LARSON,WoaRxmm's COMPENSATION § 15.14 (1952). See also Morgan v. Cleveland ClothMills, 207 N.C. 317, 177 S.E. 165 (1934). Compare Hardy v. Small, 246 N.C. 581,
99 S.E.2d 862 (1957), where the employee was killed while crossing a public road
which traversed the employer's land and the Court awarded compensation. Travelbetween two parts of the premises is another well recognized exception to the
"going-to-and-from-work rule." See 1 LARSON, Woax K N's COMPENSATION § 15.14
(1952).
The "on the premises rule" is applicable to lunch-time travel. The basic rule
is that a journey to and from meals, on the premises of the employer, is in the
course of the employment. I LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 15.51 (1952).Contra, Matthews v. Carolina Standard Corp., 232 N.C. 229, 60 S.E.2d 93 (1950)(employee not paid during his lunch break, but accident occurred while he was
leaving the employer's premises). Compare Horn v. Sandhill Furniture Co., 245
N.C. 173, 95 S.E.2d 521 (1956) (no compensation where employee was not paid
during his lunch break, and the accident occurred on a public road while the em-
ployee was crossing to the company parking lot).
[Vol. 38
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The "on the premises rule" is a compromise of the usual rule of no
employer liability for accidents which occur while going to and from
work. "As to employees having fixed hours and places of work, injuries
occurring on the premises while they are going to and from work before
or after working hours or at lunchtime are compensable, but if the
injury occurs off the premises, it is not compensable .... ,"12 Although
justification for this compromise can be found in the close proximity-
both in time and place-of the accident and the employee's employment,
it would seem that the real explanation can perhaps be found in the
general tendency to extend coverage of the act.
The Dual Purpose Doctrine
As a general rule the employer is not liable for injuries to the em-
ployee while the latter is going to and from work.13 When an employee,
in the course of his journey off the premises to and from work, per-
forms some concurrent service for his employer, the question whether
the trip becomes an exception to the usual rule is determined by the
application of the dual purpose doctrine. This doctrine qualifiedly
allows a trip serving both business and personal purposes to be classified
as within the course of the employment.' 4 "The test in brief is this:
If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, such is in
the course of his employment, though he is serving at the same time some
purpose of his own . . .. If however, the work has had no part in
creating the necessity for travel, if the journey would have gone forward
though the business errand had been dropped . . . the travel is then
personal, and personal the risk."'15
In Humphrey v. Quality Cleaners & Laundry'6 compensation was
sought for the death of a dry cleaning delivery man who was killed
while driving his own car to work. The peculiar fact the claimant relied
on to justify an award was that his decedent was transporting some items
of cleaning as well as cash collections belonging to the employer. Ap-
plying the aforementioned test, the Court held this only incidental to the
decedent's trip so that it would not warrant the finding that it arose
"out of and in the course of the employment."'1
Injury by Accident
North Carolina has for some time adhered to the view that in order
for internal injuries to be classified as "injury by accident"' 8 within the
121 LARSON, WOrKmEN'S COMPFNSATION § 15 (1952).
"Ellis v. American Serv. Co., 240 N.C. 453, 82 S.E.2d 419 (1954) ; Bryan v.
T. A. Loving Co., 222 N.C. 724, 24 S.E.2d 751 (1943) ; Bray v. Weatherly & Co.,
203 N.C. 160, 165 S.E. 332 (1932).
1 See 1 LARSON, WORK MEN's Co!pENsAxiO § 18.21 (1952).15Marks' Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90, 93, 167 N.E. 181, 183 (1929).
16 251 N.C. 47, 110 S.E.2d 467 (1959).
"Accord, Ridout v. Rose's Stores, 205 N.C. 423, 171 S.E. 642 (1933).
"' An accident within the meaning of the act is an unlooked-for and untoward
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contemplation of the Workmen's Compensation Act they must have
arisen from an unusual strain. Reaching the Court this year were two
cases which amply illustrate the rigidity of this view. In Faires v.
McDevitt & Street Co.' 9 the claimant and other employees were en-
gaged in the lifting of heavy concrete forms. The other workers
momentarily withdrew from this job. However, the claimant attempted
to perform the task without assistance, and as a result he strained and
ruptured his groin. The Court held that since the injury resulted from
an unusual and fortuitious occurrence, and not from part of his normal
work, the claimant could recover. In Turner v. Burke Hosiery Mill20
a knitter experienced pain and stinging sensations in his back while
leaning over the machine he was operating to make an adjustment. The
Court held that since the claimant had been doing this identical task
twelve to fifteen times per day for four years he did not suffer an acci-
dent as defined by the act.
As illustrated by the instant cases, strains from lifting or moving
heavy objects are a common source of injury to the body tissues. The
North Carolina Court has adopted a criterion which makes questionable
any distinctions based on magnifying slight differences in the weight
lifted or the strain experienced or the circumstances which brought
about the strain. "Whether a workman has been subjected to a heavy
lift where his employment requires lifting, or to a severe strain, is re-
lated to his individual strength and condition and not to any standard
of huskiness, which cannot be defined, is impossible of application, and
has no real existence in actual experience. Employers take workmen
'as is,' that is, without any warranty as to any state of health known or
unknown. . . . Insurance carriers know this fact and we may safely
assume that it is reflected in their actuarial tables and in the rates which
are ultimately absorbed either by the employee or the consumer."' '
Neutral Risks
"All risks causing injury to a claimant can be brought within three
categories: risks distinctly associated with the employment, risks personal
to the claimant, and 'neutral' risks-i.e., risks having no particular em-
ployment or personal character. Harms from the first are universally
event which is not expected or designed by the injured employee. Gabriel v. Town
of Newton, 227 N.C. 314, 42 S.E.2d 96 (1947) ; Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing
Co., 227 N.C. 184, 41 S.E.2d 592 (1947); Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co.,
198 N.C. 723, 153 S.E. 266 (1930). But see Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing Co.,
supra at 187, 41 S.E.2d at 594 (Seawell, J., concurring in result), where a strong
plea was made to include strains and other internal injuries caused by the load of
usual employment as "injury by accident" within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
19 251 N.C 194 110 S.E.2d 898 (1959).
20 251 NC. 325, 111 S.E.2d 185 (1959).
2- Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 227 N.C. 184, 191, 41 S.E.2d 592, 596
(1947).
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compensated, those from the second are universally non-compensable.
It is within the third category that most controversy in modern compen-
sation law occurs."'22 In Pope v. Goodson23 lightning caused the death
of a carpenter who had taken shelter from a storm in a partially com-
pleted house. The carpenter's clothing was wet, and he wore a nail
apron. Lightning, after striking the house, entered the carpenter's body
at this point. In sustaining the award of compensation the Court rea-
soned that the circumstances of the carpenter's employment peculiarly
exposed him to a risk of injury from lightning greater than that to
others in the community in general. The holding in the principal case
brings North Carolina in line with the majority view that injury due
to lightning and other neutral risks is compensable when within the
"increased risk" rule mentioned above.
Occupational Diseases
Hartsell v. Thermoid Co.24 presented a novel situation in the area
of insurer's liability for asbestosis during the period of "last injurious
exposure." The claimant was employed by the defendant from 1919
through January 11, 1957 and at all times was exposed to inhalation of
asbestos dust. The last thirty days, or parts thereof, within seven con-
secutive calendar months are deemed to be the last injurious exposure
period under the statute,25 and the insurance carrier covering the risk
during this period is made liable. In the instant case, however, different
carriers were on the risk during the last period of injurious exposure,
one for twenty-five days and the other for the remaining five. The
former had been on the risk for some fifteen years. In applying G.S.
§ 97-57 as then written, the Court held the last carrier solely liable for
compensation.
The General Assembly, recognizing the inequity of such a situation
had, in 1957, enacted an amendment to G.S. § 97-57 making any carrier
which has been on a risk for one or more periods of injurious exposure
and any part of the last period of exposure liable for compensation even
though it goes off the risk before completion of the last period.26 This
proviso was not in effect when the instant case arose, but it should now
correct the hardship evident in Hartsell.
An employee is capable of further injury from asbestosis and silicosis
as long as there is any sound tissue in the lungs to be scarred by the
dust.2 7  The final thirty days of exposure being the period of last in-
jurious exposure the Commission may not arbitrarily select any thirty
'21 LARsON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 7 (1952).
23 249 N.C. 690, 107 S.E.2d 524 (1959).
2 249 N.C. 527, 107 S.E.2d 115 (1959).
2
-N.C. GEN.- STAT. § 97-57 -(1958).
. Ibid.
Haynes v. Feldspar Producing Co., 222 N.C. 163, 22 S.E.2d 275 (1942).
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days within the seven month period for the convenience or protection
of any one of the litigants. 28 Therefore, because the claimant had worked
and was exposed fifty-two full days after the carrier had gone off the
risk, the Court in Fetner v. Rocky Mount Marble & Granite Works
29
held that the carrier was not on the risk during the period of the em-
ployee's last injurious exposure. This result was reached in spite of
the facts that the claimant had developed the third stage of silicosis a
year before the carrier had gone off the risk and that the claimant's
doctor had testified that he was incapacitated from performing any
normal stone cutting labor while the carrier was still on the risk.
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
COPORATON S
Effect of Dissolution
In Steadman v. Town of Pinetops' the Court held that for purposes
of G.S. § 136-96, providing for the withdrawal of street dedication, a cor-
poration ceased existence when its charter expired by its own limitation.
The statute provides:
[W]here any corporation has dedicated any strip . .. of land...
and said dedicating corporation is not now in existence, it shall
be conclusively presumed that the said corporation has no further
right, title or interest in said strip.., the right, title, and interest
... to be vested in those persons, firms or corporations owning
lots or parcels of land adjacent thereto .... 2
The dedication in question was made in 1917 by a corporation char-
tered on June 21, 1898, which corporation, though it was to exist for
thirty years, actually operated until 1934 when it went bankrupt and
was placed in the hands of a receiver. The defendant town did not
attempt to accept the dedication until 1958 when it attempted to open
the streets. The adjoining landowners, relying on G.S. § 136-96, ini-
tiated this action to enjoin the defendant from using the property. The
trial court held that the receiver of the corporation was entitled to the
property. On appeal, the Court reversed the trial court. It held that
the corporation ceased to exist as of June 21, 1929, and that the appoint-
"Hartsell v. Thermoid Co., 249 N.C. 527, 107 S.E.2d 115 (1959); Mayberry
v. Oakboro Granite & Marble Co., 243 N.C. 281, 90 S.E.2d 511 (1955); Haynes v.
Feldspar Producing Co., 222 N.C. 163, 22 S.E.2d 275 (1942).
251 N.C. 296, 111 S.E.2d 324 (1959).
1251 N.C. 509, 112 S.E.2d 102 (1960), also discussed in REAL PROPE.TY, Dedi-
cation, infra.IN.C. GEx. STAT. § 136-96 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
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ment of a receiver to wind up its affairs after the corporate existence
had expired did not prevent the adjacent landowners from withdrawing
the dedication, since the property had vested in them in 1929 under the
terms of the statute.
This holding appears to be in direct conflict with the provision of the
Business Corporation Act which provides that a corporation, however
dissolved, continues to exist for the purpose of winding up its affairs,
including disposal of any property interest it might have.3 This cer-
tainly seems to mean any property interest, whether contingent or other-
wise, that the corporation might have. The Court did not discuss this
point, but it is submitted that the dissolution provision of the corporation
statute should have been deemed controlling as to the definition of
"existence" in the dedication statute so that the corporation receiver
could have gotten the property.
Jurisdiction Over Internal Affairs of Foreign Corporations
A policy against judicial interference in the internal affairs of a for-
eign corporation is no longer clear grounds for dismissal of an action
brought in North Carolina. The legislature and the Court have both
approved another rule which appears to be better adapted to modern
conditions.
The new corporation code provides:
No action in the courts of this State shall be dismissed solely on
the ground that it involves the internal affairs of a foreign cor-
poration but the court may in its discretion dismiss such an action
if it appears that more adequate relief can be granted or that the
convenience of the parties would be better served by an action
brought in the jurisdiction of its incorporation or in the juris-
diction where the corporation has its executive or managerial
headquarters or, because of the circumstances, in some other
jurisdiction.4
In Belk v. Belk's Dep't Store5 the Court applied the above section.
A minority stockholder brought the action against the defendant South
Carolina corporation, its directors, and principal executive officers to
force payment of dividends. The defendant corporation moved for
dismissal on two grounds: first, that the court had no jurisdiction over
'N.C. GEx. STAT. § 55-114 (Supp. 1959). "Dissolution and its effect.-(a) A
corporation may be dissolved in any of the following ways: (1) Automatically by
expiration of any period of duration to which the corporation is limited by its
charter; . . . . (b) A dissolved corporation, however dissolved, nevertheless
continues to exist for the purpose of winding up its affairs, prosecuting and de-
fending actions by or against it, and enabling it to collect and discharge obligations,
dispose of and convey its property, and collect and distribute its assets, but not for
purpose of continuing business except so far as necessary for winding up its
affairs . . . "
'N N.C. Gm. STAT. § 55-133 (Supp. 1959).
1250 N.C. 99, 108 S.E.2d 131 (1959).
19601
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the corporation because it was not doing business in North Carolina;
and second, that the court had no jurisdiction, or should not exercise
jurisdiction, over the cause of action since the internal affairs of a for-
eign corporation were involved. The trial court found that all stock-
holders meetings, except one each year as required by South Carolina
law, were held in Charlotte, North Carolina; that the individual de-
fendant corporate executives had their offices in Charlotte and normally
transacted much of the corporate business there; that the directors
meetings were regularly held there; that all the books were kept there;
that the decisions to declare dividends were made there; and that most
of the purchases for the corporation were made from Charlotte. Accord-
ingly, the trial court held that it had jurisdiction over the corporation
and the cause of action and refused the motion to dismiss.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the judgment in personam
could be rendered against the corporation since it was doing business
in North Carolina and since there was local jurisdiction over the cause
of action.
The statute and the decision are contrary to the general rule which
normally leaves the internal affairs of a corporation exclusively to the
domiciliary jurisdiction. An old North Carolina decision approves this
rule.7 It has been said that local courts have no visitorial jurisdiction
over foreign corporations." Some courts do not deny the existence of
the jurisdiction but decline to exercise it because it would involve the
interpretation of foreign statutes or because of the possible difficulty of
enforcing a decree. 9
In considering the problem our Court quoted the statutory section
set out above, and quoted also the following comment submitted to the
legislature by the drafters of the code in explanation of the theory be-
hind this section:
While the doctrine of nonintervention in the internal affairs of
a foreign corporation is still frequently asserted, the courts have
increasingly taken jurisdiction in cases which that doctrine would
seem to deny. At this date it is believed that a test more nearly
approaching "forum non-conveniens" should govern the court's
decision and that a statute making that apparent would represent
a sound innovation. 10
The statute refers to adequacy of relief and convenience of the parties
as criteria to be considered. This means that important factors in
o Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933); 20 CJ.S. Corporations
§ 1879 (1940).
" Howard v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 125 N.C. 49, 34 S.E. 199 (1899).
' Fuller v. Ostruske, 48 Wash. 2d 802, 296 P.2d 996 (1956).
'Healey v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco .Co., 48 F. Supp. 207 (M.D.N.C. 1942);
State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa So. Util. Co., 231 Iowa 784, 2 N.W.2d 372 (1942);
Sternfield v. Toxaway Tanning Co., 290 N.Y. 294, 49 N.E.2d 145 (1943).10250 N.C. at 105, 108 S.E.2d at 136.
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deciding whether to exercise such jurisdiction would normally be acces-
sibility in the local jurisdiction of that evidence which should be used in
determining the facts, and enforcibility of a final judgment against the
corporation by the local court. In the Belk case the corporate records
were in North Carolina, the executive officers lived and supervised
corporate business from North Carolina, and the decision-making by
directors was normally carried on in this state. There can be little doubt
that the exercise of jurisdiction by the court was a reasonable application
of the new statute.
Separate Entity
In the case of Troy Lumber Co. v. Hunt" the separate legal entity
of a closely held family corporation was upheld. One Taylor, while
operating a vehicle owned by the plaintiff corporation in the scope of
his employment, collided with the defendant's vehicle. The facts showed
that Taylor was the controlling stockholder, chairman of the board of
directors, and president, and that he was in complete charge of the plain-
tiff corporation.
Taylor brought an action against the defendant to recover damages
for his personal injuries arising out of the collision. The issue of neg-
ligence was answered against Taylor and judgment was entered for the
defendant. Plaintiff corporation then brought this action to recover for
property damage to its vehicle arising out of the said collision. De-
fendant entered a plea of res judicata and estoppel by judgment in bar
of this action by the corporation. Plaintiff demurred to these pleas
and moved to dismiss them. Held: Demurrer sustained. There was
no identity of parties or privity among the parties in this suit and the
individual suit of Taylor against the defendant. The Court stated that
a corporation is a separate legal entity, distinct from its shareholders,
even though all of its stock is owned by a single individual or corporation.
This decision is adequately justified under the North Carolina corpora-
tion statute. 12
The case of Lester Bros., Inc. v. Pope Realty & Ins. Co.,13 holding
that G.S. § 55-3.1 cannot apply retroactively to validate a one or two man
corporation where vested rights would be impaired thereby, is the subject
of a Note in this volume. 14
11251 N.C. 624, 112 S.E.2d 132 (1960).
12 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-3.1 (Supp. 1959) : "Effect of acquisition of all shares by
less than three persons-(a) No provision in this chapter . . . shall be construed
as an indication of any legislative intention that the existence of a corporation...
is in any respect impaired by the acquisition of all of the shares by one person ....(b) The acquisition, heretofore or hereafter, of all of the shares of a corporation
by one person or by two persons is hereby declared to violate no policy or provi-
sion of the laws of this State."1250 N.C. 565, 109 S.E.2d 263 (1959).
1438 N.C.L. Ray. 270 (1960).
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Ultra Vires Act
The ultra vires provision'5 of the North Carolina Business Corpora-
tion Act was in question in Everette v. D. 0. Briggs Lumber Co."0 The
defendant was a South Carolina corporation whose president, who owned
ninety per cent of the outstanding stock, contracted with the plaintiff in
the name of the defendant corporation for the transportation of lumber
for an independent lumber company in North Carolina. The plaintiff
performed the services and when the defendant corporation refused to
compensate the plaintiff suit was brought. The defendant raised the
defense of ultra vires on the grounds that it had not authorized such a
contract with the plaintiff and had no interest in the transaction, that it
did not benefit from it, and that in reality it was for the benefit of its
president as an individual since he was a stockholder of the North
Carolina firm. The Court applied the provisions of the statute literally
and held that the defense of ultra vires was not available to the corpora-
tion in a suit between it and a third party contractor. Quaere as to
what the Court would have done to avoid injustice to other stockholders
had the president been only a minor stockholder in the instant case. It
is submitted that the proper procedure would be to construe the statute
as the Court did and allow the shareholders to bring a derivative suit
against its president taking advantage of G.S. § 55-18(a) (2).
CIVIL PROCEDURE (PLEADING AND
PARTIES)
PLEADING
Amendment
In Mica Indust., Inc. v. Penland' plaintiff sought damages and the
return of personal property taken under an execution. The defendant
had obtained a judgment in a previous suit, but the plaintiff alleged
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-18 (Supp. 1959) : "Defense of ultra vires.-(a) No act
of a corporation ... shall be invalid by reason of the fact that the corporation was
without capacity or power to do such act ... but such lack of capacity or power
may be asserted:
(1) In an action by a shareholder against the corporation ....(2) In an action by the corporation or by its receiver, trustee or other legal repre-
sentative, or by its shareholders in a derivative suit, against the incumbent or
former officers or directors of the corporation.
(3) In an action by the Attorney General . . . to dissolve the corporation ....
(b) This section applies to acts . . . done or made by a foreign corporation in
this state."
250 N.C. 688, 110 S.E.2d 288 (1959), also discussed in EvIDENCE, Identifica-
tion of Antiphonal Party, infra.
1249 N.C. 602, 107 S.E.2d 120 (1959), also discussed in PERsoNAL PRoPERv,
Wrongful Execution, infra.
[Vol. 38
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
that the execution was wrongfully levied upon his property and not
upon that of the true judgment debtor. The allegation of damages was
inserted by amendment; defendant demurred, claiming that a new, sepa-
rate, and distinct cause of action was alleged by the amendment, which
cause of action substantially changed the plaintiff's claim. The Court,
in reversing the trial court, overruled the demurrer. The opinion stated
that whether or not the amendment constituted a new cause of action
was immaterial, for absent the bar of the statute of limitations such an
amendment would be permissible,2 provided the facts constituting this
new cause arose out of or were connected with the transaction upon
which the original complaint was based.3
In Dudley v. Dudley4 the trial court sustained a demurrer to the
complaint but retained the cause on the docket. The plaintiff did not
except or appeal, but a week later filed an amendment without notice and
without leave of court. The defendant moved to dismiss the amendment
for failure to comply with G.S. § 1-131, 5 and the trial court granted
the motion. The Court affirmed and also suggested that the defendant
could move to have the action dismissed for failure to meet the statutory
requirement.6
Stathopoulos v. Shook7 involved a car wreck at an intersection. The
plaintiff failed to plead a city ordinance authorizing a stop light. Plain-
tiff offered the ordinance in evidence at trial; defendant objected and
was overruled. There was no amendment or motion for amendment.
The plaintiff moved in the Supreme Court for leave to amend his com-
plaint and the motion was granted, the Court allowing amendment under
G.S. § 7-13 and Rule 20(4), Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court.
The Court stated that there was no surprise and plaintiff's claim would
not be substantially changed. Although amendment in the Supreme
The statute allowing such amendment is G.S. § 1-163.
' The Court cited the leading case of Perkins v. Langdon, 233 N.C. 240, 63
S.E.2d 565 (1951), which set out these rules: (1) "A litigant may not set up by
amendment a wholly different cause of action, i.e., one which does not arise out
of or connect itself in a material aspect with the transaction set out in the original
complaint." (2) "Inconsistent causes of action may not be joined in the same
complaint." (3) "Where a related 'new cause of action may be introduced by way
of amendment . . . if the amendment introduce a new matter . . . such defense
[statute of limitations] or plea will have the same force and effect as if the amend-
ment were a new and independent suit."' Id. at 245, 63 S.E.2d at 570.
'250 N.C. 95, 107 S.E.2d 918 (1959).
This statute states that: "Within thirty days after the return of the judgment
upon the demurrer, if there is no appeal, or within thirty days after the receipt of
the certificate from the Supreme Court, if there is an appeal, if the demurrer is
sustained the plaintiff may move, upon three days' notice, for leave to amend the
complaint...
'It is doubtful that the mere filing without notice and without leave would
have caused a dismissal had the plaintiff subsequently followed the correct pro-
cedure within the thirty-day time limit. As the case stood on appeal the plaintiff
not only chose the wrong method originally but was confronted by his failure to
meet the thirty-day limitation.
7251 N.C. 33, 110 S.E2d 452 (1959).
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Court is a practice not much used, this case demonstrates that the Court
will allow the amendment when justice so requires.
Burden of Proof
In Slaughter v. State Capital Life Ins. Co.8 the plaintiff sought
recovery on an insurance contract whereby, as beneficiary thereunder,
she would receive 2,500 dollars for the loss of life of insured when
sustained through external, violent and accidental means. The contract
had an exclusion clause which exempted the insurer from liability if
the insured were killed by his own intentional act or that of any other
person. The evidence showed that deceased, a taxi operator, was found
dead from bullet wounds in a deserted location and that his money, pistol
and car were taken. In sustaining defendant's motion for nonsuit the
Court held that the plaintiff, in order to recover, must establish that the
insured's death was within the coverage provisions of the policy; if this
were established, the defendant could relieve itself of liability by showing
that the particular injury was excluded from the coverage. 9 The Court
found that the plaintiff had not shown coverage in that she had failed to
show death by accidental means; in fact, the plaintiff's evidence showed
an intentional killing which placed the case within the exclusion clause. 10
Counterclaim
In Durham Lumber Co. v. Wrenn-Wilson Constr. Co." plaintiff sub-
contractor sought to recover from defendant contractor the unpaid balance
due on a contract. The defendant filed a counterclaim which exceeded
in amount the claim of the plaintiff, the defendant alleging plaintiff's
failure to perform six items of the contract and defendant's resulting
damage. The Court, stating that clearly the burden would not lie on the
plaintiff until the amount of his claim was reached and then shift to the
defendant for any excess, held the defendant had the burden of proof
for the full counterclaim. Earlier in the opinion the court had stated in
a dictum that the defendant could deny plaintiff's performance and then
show under the denial any defects or omissions which would lessen
plaintiff's claim.12 Thus the same matter might be used by a defendant
* 250 N.C. 265, 108 S.E.2d 438 (1959).
* The Court stated that the insurer would have the burden of proving that the
death came within the exclusion clause.
" The Court stated it would make no attempt to reconcile divergent views and
opinions with respect to coverage provisions in accident policies. The holding was
merely to apply to the evidence and policy provisions involved. For discussion of
related aspects of this problem see Note, 37 N.C.L. REv. 92 (1958) ; Insurance,
Fifth Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 36 N.C.L. Rzv. 429-30 (1958).249 N.C. 680, 107 S.E.2d 538 (1959).
1- The Court did not say where the burden of proof would then lie, and later in
the opinion specifically declined to state the applicable rule. We may nonetheless
take for granted that plaintiff would have the burden, as the plaintiff must allege
and prove the contract and his performance or tender of performance.
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to counterclaim or to deny the performance of the contract, and the use
would determine who carried the burden of proof on the issue.13
In Southern Box & Lumber Co. v. Home Chair Co.'4 plaintiff sued
to collect for plywood sold to the defendant. The wood was to be used
by the defendant to manufacture chair seats. The defendant filed a
counterclaim alleging damages for breach of express and implied war-
ranties. The Court held that the defendant had the burden of proof to
show, by the greater weight of evidence, the warranties, the breach
thereof, and the resulting damages. Where the person relying on the
warranty is the defendant, placing the burden of proof on him seems
inconsistent with the principle that a plaintiff must allege and prove the
contract and his performance or excuse for nonperformance.' 5
In General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Distributors, Inc.'6 plaintiff sought
recovery of personal property defendant allegedly held wrongfully. In
July 1956 plaintiff and defendant entered into a warehouse agreement
whereby defendant agreed to hold goods of the plaintiff on a consignment
basis. It was provided that either party could cancel the agreement upon
three days notice, and in such event the defendant was to deliver imme-
diately to the plaintiff all consigned goods. The plaintiff alleged that not-
withstanding its demand for the goods on March 6, 1958, the defendant
refused to deliver them. The defendant admitted plaintiff's ownership
but in a counterclaim denied that plaintiff was entitled to immediate
possession, alleging that plaintiff had agreed in July 1957 that the ware-
house agreement would continue in effect until July 31, 1960. The
plaintiff's demurrer to the counterclaim was sustained. The Supreme
Court in reversing held that a valid counterclaim existed under both
subsections of G.S. § 1-137.17 There was a valid counterclaim in con-
tract, as the defendant alleged that an integral part of the agreement was
its extension until July 31, 1960. The Court felt that such allegation by
the defendant alleged a breach of contract which occurred prior to the
commencement of the action. The fact that plaintiff relied solely upon
the contract of July 30, 1956, was immaterial. Also, the allegation of
" This situation might present the defendant with a dilemma in the event that
he desired to bring a counterclaim but not to carry the burden of proof. The prob-
lem would probably be of practical significance only where there was but little
evidence for either party, or, more especially, where there was not enough evidence
to go to the jury.
250 N.C. 71, 108 S.E.2d 70 (1959), also discussed in SALES, Implied Warran-
ties, infra.
"5 Accord, Furst v. Taylor, 204 N.C. 603, 169 S.E. 185 (1933).
1-251 N.C. 406, Ill S.E.2d 614 (1959).m
" G.S. § 1-137 reads: "The counterclaim ...must be one existing in favor
of a defendant.., and arising out of one of the following causes of action:
1. A cause of action arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the
complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or connected with the subject
of the action.
2. In an action arising on contract, any other cause of action arising also on
contract, and existing at the commencement of the action."
1960]
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an agreement to extend the contract until July 31, 1960, related directly
to the subject of the plaintiff's action-his right to immediate possession
of the consigned goods.1 s
Demurrer
The plaintiffs in Elliott v. Goss 9 claimed, as heirs of William Elliott,
certain lands recorded in the name of Sam McCall and claimed by de-
fendants, McCall's heirs. Plaintiffs alleged that a deed had been executed
with Elliott as grantee, that the grantor was to keep the deed until full
payment, and that before full payment was made Elliott died. The
complaint went on to allege that Elliott's widow married McCall, that
they paid the remaining twenty-three dollars owed, and that upon de-
livery of the deed to Elliott's widow, McCall substituted his name for
that of Elliott and recorded the instrument. The plaintiffs sought to
have Elliott's name put back in the instrument and themselves put in
possession; they also prayed for any other relief available in law or
equity. The Court held that no cause of action for reformation was
stated and affirmed defendants' demurrer, but left open the possibility
of amendment. The deed never having been delivered to the deceased,
no title could have passed to him and the reformation would have been
futile. The Court gave citations which indicated relief might be obtained
on the basis of a resulting or a constructive trust.20 This being true, it
would seem that by changing the prayer for relief the plaintiff would
originally have stated a cause of action.21
In McLaughlin v. Beasley2 2 plaintiffs as taxpayers sought to enjoin
the purchase of a lot and the erection of a school thereon. The trial
court sustained a demurrer ore tenus on the ground that insufficient
facts were alleged to constitute a cause of action. The Court upheld
the demurrer, but on another basis, stating that the summons and com-
plaint showed that plaintiffs were suing the individual members of the
Board of Education instead of the Board itself, a corporate entity and
the proper defendant. There was, however, an answer filed by the
Board. The Court said this had no "bearing on the sufficiency of the
1" The Court further stated that if plaintiff were given recovery of the property
in this action, such a finding would probably preclude the defendant from asserting
in an independant action what was here asserted as a counterclaim. Thus we see
North Carolina, in a dictum, finding this counterclaim compulsory; this follows the
holding in Savage v. McGlawhorn, 199 N.C. 427, 154 S.E. 673 (1930).
1l250 N.C. 185, 108 S.E.2d 475 (1959), also discussed in REAL PROPERTY, De-
livery, infra.
"Although the citations cover both types of trusts, it would seem that in order
to prevent unjust enrichment the constructive trust would be the proper form of
relief in this case.
"The trial court or the Supreme Court might have noticed ex inero motu that
the facts pleaded alleged a valid cause of action for a constructive (or resulting)
trust, and the demurrer could have been overruled.22 250 N.C. 221, 108 S.E.2d 226 (1959).
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complaint" and thereby designated this situation as one where aider by
answer was inapplicable.
23
The case of Turner v. Gastonia City Bd. of Educ.2 4 apparently raised
a question of first impression in North Carolina.25 Plaintiff sued the
Gastonia and the State Boards of Education for an injury his daughter
received while attending school. The action was brought before the
North Carolina Industrial Commission. Both defendants demurred to
the claim. The Industrial Commission and the superior court sustained
the demurrers. When the case reached the Supreme Court, the first
issue decided was whether the defendants in a proceeding before the
Industrial Commission could challenge the claim by demurrer. The
Supreme Court held that such procedure was a proper method to take
advantage of a defect in a plaintiff's claim.
Joinder of Causes and Parties
In Darroch v. Johnson26 the situation again arose where the plaintiff
was struck in close succession by two moving vehicles.2 7  The plaintiff
rounded a curve and was sideswiped by the first car and'then hit head
on by the second. Plaintiff alleged joint and concurrent negligence and
this issue was submitted. One of the defendants claimed error in the
failure to submit an issue on his individual liability. The Court found
no error, stating that the pleadings presented the issue of concurrent
negligence and that to return a verdict for the plaintiff the individual
defendant would first have to be found negligent.
Judgment on the Pleadings
In Good Will Distribs. (Northern), Inc. v. Currie28 plaintiff sought
a refund of taxes paid under protest. There had been a merger of two
other corporations with and into the plaintiff corporation, and plaintiff
sought to deduct from its taxable income the loss sustained by one of
these during its previous fiscal year. When the case originally was
heard plaintiff obtained at trial a judgment on the pleadings. The de-
fendant appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed the lower court but
" For a case where aider by answer was used in such a situation see Cox v.
Hennis Freight Lines, Inc., 236 N.C. 72, 79, 72 S.E.2d 25, 30 (1952).24250 N.C. 456, 109 S.E.2d 211 (1959), also discussed in AGENcY AND WORK-
mEN's COMPExsATION, "Employee" Under State Tort Claims Act, supra.
" The Court cited authority for its position, but none of it was from North
Carolina.
26250 N.C. 307, 108 S.E.2d 589 (1959). There were actually three actions, con-
solidated for trial. All three plaintiffs were passengers in the same car.
" There are prior North Carolina cases very similar to the present one. For
treatment of prior cases in this area see Brandis, Permissive Joinder of Parties
and Causes in North Carolina, 25 N.C.L. Rtv, 1, 41 (1946) ; Brandis & Graham,
Recent Developments in the Field of Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes in
North Carolina, 34 N.C.L. Rnv. 405, 416 (1956).28251 N.C. 120, 110 S.E2d 880 (1959), also discussed in TAXATION, Loss
Carry-over, infra.
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did not dismiss the action. The case went back to the trial court and
there was no amendment or motion to amend; when the case was next
called the defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that under the
previous opinion of the Court the plaintiff was not entitled to relief on
his complaint. The plaintiff claimed that the former opinion left the
case open for him to present evidence. The trial court overruled de-
fendant's motion; the Supreme Court held this was error, as the former
opinion had considered the motion for judgment on the pleadings as a
demurrer ore tenus and found the complaint insufficient to state a cause
of action.2 9 Nonetheless, the Court said that it would accept the plain-
tiff's interpretation and look at facts stipulated by defendant dehors the
complaint. Having done this the Court reached the same conclusion,
i.e., that the plaintiff could not recover.
Prior Action Pending
The plaintiffs in Wallace v. Johnson30 sought to recover proceeds
from timber defendant had sold under a power of attorney. Plaintiffs
claimed ownership of part of the timber and alleged that they had not
received their distributive share of the proceeds of the sale. Defendant
answered that three prior actions were pending, and the trial court dis-
missed the case on defendant's motion.31 In reversing, the Court stated
that as to two of the alleged prior actions there had been nonsuits, and
this invalidated defendant's plea. As for the third alleged action pending,
the plaintiffs were the same but the defendants were different, as were
the basic facts upon which relief was sought; thus the two cases were
distinguishable and there could be no abatement.32
Reply
In Smith v. Smith33 plaintiff sought a partition sale of land allegedly
owned by herself and the defendants, her divorced husband and his
mother. In a prior alimony suit the husband had admitted by his answer
that he and the plaintiff held the property as tenants by the entirety, and
this part of his answer was offered in evidence by the plaintiff. The
"' No matter how defective the answer of the defendant, the plaintiff could not
obtain a judgment on the pleadings unless he had alleged a valid cause of action.80251 N.C. 11, 110 S.E.2d 488 (1959). Tillis v. Calvine Cotton Mills, 251
N.C. 359, 111 S.E.2d 606 (1959), which contains a plea of prior action pending
will be found under CIVIL PROCEDURE, Variance, infra.
"'The use of a plea of prior action pending followed by a motion to dismiss is
discussed and compared with the defense of res judicata in Civil Procedure, Third
Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 34 N.C.L. R!v. 21-22 (1955).
"This "third action" also went up on appeal in Wallace v. Johnson, 251 N.C.
18, 110 S.E.2d 493 (1959) ; the defendant wished to use one of the nonsuited cases
as the basis for his prior action pending claim, but the Court dismissed for the
reasons already given. In both these actions (the "third action" and the main
case discussed above) plaintiff alleged in his brief and defendant admitted the two
nonsuits, so the issue was clearly drawn.
83249 N.C. 669, 107 S.E.2d 530 (1959), also discussed in EQUITABLE REMEDIES,
Mistake, infra, and RAL PRoPERTY, Deeds-Exchange of Deeds by Tenants in
Common, infra.
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plaintiff "did not file a reply and did not plead as an estoppel" the
former admission by the defendant. The Court held that the estoppel
was new matter which generally had to be pleaded as a defense. Since
the plaintiff failed to plead it, the admission lost its conclusive effect
and was merely evidence to be considered with other evidence.3 4 This
holding is in direct conflict with G.S. § 1-159, which provides that new
matter in the answer, not relating to a counterclaim, is to be deemed
controverted by denial or avoidance, as the case requires. The defendant
had a "further answer," but no counterclaim. The only other place the
estoppel could have been pleaded was the complaint, but this clearly
would have been anticipatory pleading. A prudent attorney, in the
light of this case, should reply and allege the estoppel.
In Nowell v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.3 5 the plaintiff-owner of a
building and surrounding parking lot sought recovery against the Tea
Company and West Construction Company for certain alleged defects
in the building and lot. The Tea Company rented the premises and
had furnished the plans and specifications and supervised the construc-
tion done by West Company. The defendants pleaded the statute of
limitations and upon this basis the Tea Company obtained a nonsuit.
The trial court held, however, that West Company was estopped from
using this defense because of its representations in promising that the
defects would be corrected and its refusal to act after the statute had
run. On appeal the Court found no error. Two aspects of this decision
are worth noting. The Court stated that the plaintiff had pleaded facts
in his complaint showing the estoppel and having once so pleaded no
reply was necessary. This would leave us to infer that anticipatory
pleading is not undesirable and, secondly, that plaintiff might need to
reply to the affirmative defense of the statute of limitationsA6
Res Judicata
In Pack v. McCoy37 plaintiff sued Queen City Coach Company and
McCoy, one of its drivers, for personal injuries and damage resulting
"' The Court gave three citations to uphold its ruling. The first was I McIN-
TosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACrICE & PROCEDURE § 1236 (2d ed. 1956). This cita-
tion seems inappropriate as § 1236 is concerned with defendant's answer and affirm-
ative defenses. The other two citations were Miller v. New Amsterdam Cas.
Co., 245 N.C. 526, 96 S.E.2d 860 (1957) and Wilkins v. Suttles, 114 N.C. 550,
19 S.E. 606 (1894). The Miller case held that no question of estoppel was pre-
sented as the plaintiff had not specifically pleaded it and no facts appeared in the
pleadings on which to base such a claim. The Court stated that there was no
supporting evidence had estoppel been -pleaded, so the exact situation in the main
case was not presented. The Wilkins case does not uphold the viewpoint of the
Court, as there defendant had pleaded a counterclaim.
31'250 N.C. 575, 108 S.E2d 889 (1959).
" This is directly contrary to G.S. § 1-159. This case should be compared with
Smith; the two would lead one to believe that the safest procedure for a plaintiff
is to reply and allege an estoppel whether or not this should be necessary accord-
ing to the statutory rules of pleading.
7251 N.C. 590, 112 S.E.2d 118 (1960).
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from a collision with defendant's bus. Defendants pleaded res judicata
as an affirmative defense. The plea alleged as a bar a consent judgment
in a former action which arose out of the same collision and in which all
three of the present parties were defendants, the plaintiff in the former
suit alleging joint and concurrent negligence on the part of the three
defendants. The Supreme Court reversed an order striking the plea.
The Court said that a judgment against defendants jointly charged with
negligence necessarily establishes the negligence of all. Yet had there
been a settlement after the complaint was filed but before answer, and
had the plaintiff executed a release and taken a nonsuit, there would
have been no validity in a plea of res judicata.88
Hayes v. Richard"9 was an action in the nature of ejectment in which
a plaintiff, formerly nonsuited on the merits, sought to plead over,
under G.S. § 1-25.4o The lower court heard the defendant's plea in bar
before trial on the merits and held the plaintiff estopped by judgment.
The pleadings of the plaintiff and the parties plaintiff and defendant were
substantially the same as in the former action.41 However, the plaintiff
stated that he wished to present evidence not offered in the former suit.
The Court did not permit this, holding that a plea of res judicata covered
all matter pleaded in the former action, whether actually litigated or
not.4
Ultimate Facts
In Rick v. Murphy4U the complaint alleged violation of G.S § 20-140,
which prohibits the reckless operation of a vehicle; the complaint did not
allege a violation of G.S. § 20-138, which pertains to drunken driving.
The trial court allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of intoxication
" See Mercer v. Hilliard, 249 N.C. 725, 107 S.E2,d 554 (1959). It follows a
fortiori from the above that where there is a trial and judgment on the merits the
plea of res judicata will apply, and where there is an outside settlement before
complaint is filed the plea will not stand. In the Pack case Judge Bobbitt dis-
sented, stating that it was a misapprehension to consider a consent judgment ajudicial determination of negligence and that North Carolina is not supported in
this stand by the weight of authority.
0p251 N.C. 485, 112 S.E.2d 123 (1960).
,O This statute provides, inter alia, that a nonsuited plaintiff may begin a new
action within one year.
" The only change in the parties plaintiff was a child born subsequent to the
first action; his sister was represented in the prior suit and he was held in privity
with her. As for defendants, there had been a grant of some of the disputed land,
but these grantees were privies in estate with the former defendant because of
the grantor-grantee relationship. The pleadings rwere nearly the same, the differ-
ences being inconsequential.2 Previous North Carolina decisions have been conflicting as to the scope of
an estoppel by judgment. See Note, 34 N.C.L. Rnv. 458, 461-64 (1956). This
Note sets out three possibilities: (1) the estoppel will cover only matter pleaded
and tried, (2) the estoppel will cover all matters raised by the pleadings, and(3) the estoppel will cover all matters determined or which might properly have
been determined. The present case is in the second category.
" 251 N.C. 162, 110 S.E.2d 815 (1959), also discussed in AGaxcY ANDW ORX-
MxN'S CommnNsATIO, Proof of Ownership and Agency, supra.
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and the Supreme Court held this correct. The Court stated that a party
need not allege evidential facts which cause a person to act in a particular
manner, as an allegation of the ultimate facts suffices, and the ultimate
fact here was the reckless driving.4 4
Variance
In Tillis v. Calvine Cotton Mills45 plaintiff Tillis sought recovery
against the Cotton Mills and their president for an alleged breach of
contract. The evidence showed only a contract with the Cotton Mills
and defendant Cotton Mills claimed this was a fatal variance. The Court
disagreed, stating that there were no grounds for nonsuit as against the
Cotton Mills as the variance was not material. This was a consolidated
action, the other suit being Calvine Cotton Mills v. Tillis in which the
Cotton Mills sought possession of a truck allegedly wrongfully taken by
Tillis. Before answering the Cotton Mills, Tillis filed the independent
action discussed above. In the answer of Tillis was a counterclaim;
Cotton Mills replied with a plea of prior action pending. The Court
stated that the counterclaim should have been nonsuited, as it was the
same action alleged in the separate suit.
PARTIES
Necessary Parties
In Baker v. Murphrey46 the plaintiffs sought to have themselves de-
dared owners of a one-sixth interest in land formerly sold under a
mortgage foreclosure. The mortgagor had died before the commis-
sioner's sale and the decree of confirmation. The plaintiffs were heirs of
the mortgagor but were not made parties to the action. The Court stated
that since they had succeeded to his rights they were necessary parties
and were entitled to be heard as to whether the sale should be confirmed.
The decree of confirmation was held void as to the plaintiffs and the
Court declared them owners of a one-sixth interest in the land.
Real Party in Interest
In Southeastern Fire Ins. Co. v. Moore47 the Court held that pay-
ment to insured by an insurance company under a fifty dollar deductible
policy did not allow the company to sue the tort-feasor in its own name.
This case is the subject of a Note in this volume.48
" The Court did not consider this a case of variance, but rather one where the
issue was within the pleadings. No North Carolina case was cited as precedent
for the ruling, the decision apparently being one of first impression in this juris-
diction.
"251 N.C. 359, 111 S.E.2d 606 (1959).
"250 N.C. 346, 108 S.E.2d 644 (1959), also discussed in CREDIT TRANsAcTIo Ns,
Substituted Parties in Confirmation Proceedings, infra.
'7250 N.C. 351, 108 S.E.2d 618 (1959).
" 38 N.C.L. REv. 99 (1959).
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In Glover v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks40 plaintiff charged
defendant with failing in its contract obligation to bring suit in the dis-
trict court to compel his (plaintiff's) reinstatement by the Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad. The Railroad Adjustment Board had found that plain-
tiff had been wrongfully discharged and ordered the railroad to reemploy
him, which the railroad did not do. Plaintiff sought damages from the
Brotherhood, alleging that the action for reinstatement was now barred
by the statute of limitations. Defendant demurred, one ground being
that under the Railway Labor Act the plaintiff or defendant could bring
the action and defendant was under no obligation to start the suit. The
Court overruled the demurrer, stating that the cause of action was
grounded upon failure of the Brotherhood to carry out its contract. This
does not change the real parties in interest under the Railway Labor
Act, but holds that breach of a contract between the parties as to who
will bring suit will subject to an action for damages the party who
breached the contract.
In Godwin v. Vinson"° an action was brought in the name of the
plaintiff to recover on a claim actually belonging to a partnership in
which the plaintiff was a member. During the trial the evidence brought
out the true situation and the defendant moved to dismiss on the ground
that plaintiff was not the real party in interest. The plaintiff moved to
amend, but the trial court in its discretion denied plaintiff's motion and
dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed in a per curiam
opinion.
In White v. Osborne5' the plaintiff father had previously represented
his son as next friend in a personal injury action in which damages were
recovered. The former judgment had allowed the father to recover his
medical expenses out of the damages paid to the son and had given the
father priority in recovery; this was important as it was contemplated
that the whole judgment might not be collected. Part of the judgment
was paid to the clerk, Osborne, and the father then sought his allotted
share. The clerk refused to obey the lower court's order to give the
father the money and appealed this order to the Supreme Court. The
Court held that the father individually and the son were the real parties
in interest in the present controversy and that the son must be repre-
sented by a disinterested guardian before the issue could be decided.r 2
In view of the father's conflicting interests, the failure of the son to
appeal from the judgment in which the father was given priority in
recovery could not be held binding.
-- 250 N.C. 35, 108 S.E.2d 78 (1959), also discussed in LABOR LAW, Unio's
Liability to Member, infra.
°251 N.C. 326, 111 S.E.2d 180 (1959).
91251 N.C. 56, 110 S.E.2d 449 (1959).
r- The Court stated that brecause of conflicting interests when the original judg-
ment was entered, a question arose as to the jurisdiction of the judge in giving the
father priority, the son not being represented in the "conflict" for priority.
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Third Party Practice
lordan v. Blackwelder53 involved an automobile accident in which
the plaintiff, a passenger in one car, sued the driver and the owner of
another vehicle for injuries sustained when the two cars collided. The
driver of the car in which plaintiff rode was made an additional de-
fendant. The plaintiff recovered damages, the jury finding joint and
concurrent negligence. The additional defendant's insurance carrier
had paid nearly 700 dollars on hospital bills of the plaintiff; the Court
deducted this from the total amount given as damages5 4 and divided the
remaining amount, making the additional defendant liable for half of
what remained. The Supreme Court held this error, holding that the
recovery should have been halved and the additional defendant then
given the full deduction from his half.55
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY
Right of Milk Commission to Set Rates
The power of the North Carolina Milk Commission to fix the rates
for the hauling of milk was held to be a constitutional delegation of
authority in State ex rel. North Carolina Milk Comm'in v. Galloway.'
In upholding the validity of the Milk Commission Act,2 the Court
pointed to the similarity of this statute to that of Virginia 3 and to those
cases upholding the constitutionality of the Virginia statute.4  Since
Nebbia v. New York5 it has been firmly established that a state legisla-
ture, in the exercise of its police power, may regulate the price of milk
through an administrative agency. The powers given to the Commis-
sion under G.S. § 106-266.8 are quite broad,6 and the Court found that
8S250 N.C. 189, 108 S.E.2d 429 (1959).
5,There had been an agreement at trial that evidence of medical bills would be
admitted, but the amount already paid might "in the court's discretion" be de-
ducted from plaintiff's recovery.
" The Court stated that G.S. § 1-240 did not contemplate an additional defendant
paying more than his pro rata share of a judgment against the original defendant.
This interpretation appears to be both logical and just.
249 N.C. 658, 107 S.E.2d 631 (1959).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-266.6 to -266.21 (Supp. 1959).
'VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-346 to -383 (1950).
'Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 16 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Va. 1936),
aff'd, 300 U.S. 608 (1936) ; Reynolds v. Milk Comm'n, 163 Va. 957, 179 S.E. 507(19i) U.S. 502 (1933).
G.S. § 106-266.8(c) states in part that it is vested with the power "to super-
vise and regulate the transportation, processing, storage, distribution, delivery and
sale of milk for consumption." By the terms of G.S. § 106-266.8(j) "the Com-
mission, after public hearing and investigation, may fix prices to be paid producers
and/or associations of producers by distributors in any market or markets, and
may also fix different prices for different grades or classes of milk."
1960]
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it was within the Commission's power "fairly implied from the language
of the Act and essential to putting into effect its declared purposes and
objects, to regulate and to fix transportation rates . . .7
This case also involves the possible delegation of non-judicial power
to the North Carolina Superior Court under the de novo appeal provision
of the Milk Commission Act. This problem is discussed in a Note in
this volume.8
Driver's License Revocation
In Harvell v. Scheidt9 G.S. § 20-16(a) (5) was declared to be an
unconstitutional grant of legislative authority to an administrative body.
This section of the statute provided for the suspension of driver's
licenses by the Motor Vehicles Commission upon a satisfactory showing
that the licensee was an habitual violator of the traffic laws. Pursuant
to this section the Director of the Driver's License Division had estab-
lished a set of criteria, weighting principal traffic offenses, to be used
in determining those classified as habitual violators. The Director fur-
ther provided that other standards such as age, experience and attitude
were to be considered in determining whether the license should be
revoked.
It is a well-established rule that the legislature may not delegate
the power to make laws to a governmental agency.10 Certain regulations
may be promulgated by these agencies, however, to carry out the en-
forcement and operation of a statute. As these regulations can exist only
by reason of the statute, they must be confined within statutory limits;
and there must be an adequate guide in the language of the statute so
that these limits are thoroughly defined. Legislation which grants an
official the power to revoke a license is invalid unless it prescribes rules
to guide the official in exercising his discretion." The Court in the
principal case found that the Driver's License Examiner was not guided
by any statutory set of standards. Rather, the agency had provided its
own independent criteria to determine whether a license was to be sus-
pended, and the Court quite properly held this section of the statute to
be invalid.
Following this decision G.S. § 20-16 was amended12 to provide a
fixed schedule of points to be assigned for convictions of violating the
'249 N.C. at 667, 107 S.E.2d at 638.
838 N.C.L. REv. 380 (1960).
249 N.C. 699, 107 S.E.2d 549 (1959), also discussed in ADmixisTRATivE LAw,
Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative Power, supra.
" United States v. Shreveport Grain Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77 (1932).
"State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1939); Thompson v. Smith,
155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579 (1930).
2 This amendment is discussed at length in Motor Vehicles, Comments on NorthCarolina 1959 Session Laws, 38 N.C.L. Rav. 200-05 (1960).
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Motor Vehicle Laws, and further providing the criteria to which the
Department must adhere.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Issuing of Warrants by Recorder's Court Solicitor
The power of the prosecuting attorney of a recorder's court to issue
warrants was upheld in State v. Furnmge.13  In a trial before the re-
corder's court the defendant moved to quash two warrants issued by the
solicitor of that court charging the defendant with certain misdemeanors;
the motion was overruled. On a trial de novo in the Superior Court,
however, this motion was granted, the court holding that the laws' 4
conferring authority on the solicitor to issue warrants were invalid and
violated the separation of powers provision of the State Constitution.' 5
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed and held that the legislature
did have the power to delegate this authority to a solicitor of the re-
corder's court. The Court recognized that there is a division of opinion
as to whether the issuance of a warrant is a judicial or ministerial act,
but it did not rule on this question. Neither did the Court give approval
to the contention of the State that article I, section 8 of the North Caro-
lina Constitution provides only for the separation of the Supreme Court
and not of the entire judicial system. It held, rather, that the issuance
of a warrant does not involve the "exercise of the supreme judicial power
within the meaning of that term as used in Article I, Section 8."' 6 Thus
the applicable laws conferring the authority upon the solicitor were held
not to violate that constitutional provision, and it was declared error to
quash the warrants.
The Court did not discuss the problem of whether a determination
of probable cause upon which a warrant is to be issued should be made
only by a judicial officer. The Court had declared in a previous case'7
that the issuance of an arrest warrant is a "judicial act" without com-
menting on whether determining probable cause is exclusively a judicial
function. In Ocampo v. United States,'8 where the information upon
which the defendants were arrested had been signed by the prosecuting
18250 N.C. 616, 109 S.E2d 563 (1959), also discussed in CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE, Criminal Procedure-Warrants and Indictments, infra.
"' The court was established by N.C. Public-Local Laws 1915, ch. 634, and
amended by N.C. Public-Local Laws 1927, ch. 333 and N.C. Public-Local Laws
1937, ch. 22, the pertinent part of the latter two providing "that the prosecuting
attorneys of the recorder's courts ... shall have full power and authority to issue
warrants, summons, subpoenas, commitments, and administer oaths, and all other
papers incident to the dispatch of business in said courts ... "1 N.C. CONST. art. I, §8. "The legislative, executive, and supreme judicial
powers of the government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each
other."
18250 N.C. at 627, 109 S.E.2d at 571.
State v. McGowan, 243 N.C. 431, 90 S.E.2d 703 (1956).
18234 U.S. 91 (1913).
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attorney, the United States Supreme Court stated that "the function of
determining that probable cause exists for the arrest of a person accused
is only quasi judicial and not such that, because of its nature, it must
necessarily be confided to a strictly judicial officer or tribunal."", In
the Ocampo case, reliance was placed on the proposition that the finding
of probable cause and the issuance of an arrest warrant are not a final
determination of the case. This view tends to overlook the fact that a
person arrested and subsequently found innocent has nevertheless been
deprived of some measure of his liberty during the interim.
While other courts have stated that a prosecuting attorney is a
judicial20 or quasi-judicial officer,2 ' the North Carolina Court has de-
clared him not to be a judicial officer.22 As the Court in the principal
case points out, however, these North Carolina cases concerned the per-
formance by the prosecuting attorney of a truly judicial function, i.e., that
of instructing a grand jury and examining witnesses before such jury.
There appears to have been sufficient precedent from which the Court
could have found in the Furmage case that a non-judicial officer was
delegated the power to perform a judicial act. It is submitted that any
adjudication of probable cause for arrest should come only from the
judicial branch of the government, that branch traditionally entrusted
with the determination of an individual's rights.
DUE PRocEss
Right of Confrontation
After weeks of strife during a labor dispute the superior court had
issued an order restraining defendants from interfering with the opera-
tion of a textile plant and from impeding other persons seeking to enter
and leave the premises. The plaintiff subsequently filed a petition with
the court alleging that the defendants had violated the restraining order.
To support the contempt of court charges affidavits of witnesses con-
cerning the occurrence were offered into evidence, and at the contempt
hearing no objection was made to their introduction. In Harriet Cotton
Mills v. Local 578, Textile Workers of America,23 the Court held that
the defendants had waived the right to object to these affidavits by
failing to make a timely assertion of their privilege to confront the wit-
nesses against them.
'°Id. at 100.20 Cawley v. Warren, 216 F.2d 74 (7th Cir. 1954).
Commonwealth v. Ragone, 317 Pa. 113, 176 A. 454 (1935).
22 State v. Crowder, 193 N.C. 130, 136 S.E. 337 (1927); Lewis v. Board of
Comm'rs, 74 N.C. 194 (1875).
2-3251 N.C. 218, 111 S.E.2d 457 (1959). The other cases arising from this
restraining order and the contempt thereof will not be dealt with separately. The
same problem is dealt with in all of these cases, and the same result was reached.
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There is a conflict of authority on whether such affidavits may be
introduced into evidence, 24 but they apparently have been used in North
Carolina to establish the commission of alleged acts.2 5 Nevertheless the
Court in the Harriet case stated that in cases of indirect contempt the
defendant is entitled under "the law of the land" provision2 6 of the North
Carolina Constitution to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him. This appears to be the first instance in which our Court
has stated specifically that the right of confrontation and cross-examina-
tion extends to hearings on contempt alleged to have been committed
out of the presence of the court.2 7  It is settled, however, that the right
of confrontation may be waived, and waiver may be effected by the
failure to make a timely assertion of that right.28 Since the defendants
failed to make a request to the court that the witnesses against them be
produced for cross-examination, the court properly held that there had
been a valid waiver.
Right To Prepare for Trial
In an action brought under the Post Conviction Hearing Act 29 the
Court in State v. Graves3" held that the petitioners had been deprived
of their opportunity to prepare for trial. It was found that the peti-
tioners had been arrested on a charge of robbery with firearms and
placed on trial within a period of only two days. At the time of the
arrest no warrant was issued, and no bail had been set for the prisoners.
No evidence was presented that anyone had told the petitioners or the
members of their families when the trial was to be held, nor were the
petitioners represented by counsel. The petitioners claimed that they
were thereby deprived of the constitutional right to confront their ac-
cusers and to have counsel in all criminal prosecutions.3 '
The Court reversed the decision of the superior court denying a new
trial and found that failure to observe the provisions of G.S. § 15-46
and G.S. § 154732 deprived defendants of constitutional rights when the
2 Allowing introduction: Bowden v. Bowden, 198 Tenn. 143, 278 S.W.2d 670
(1955). Contra, NLRB v. Path Packing Co., 123 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1941).
"
5See In re Deaton, 105 N.C. 59, 11 S.E. 244 (1890).
"N.C. CONST. art. I, § 17 provides "No person ought to be taken, imprisoned,
or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or in any
manner deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the law of the land."
2? For a case which is contra see State v. Harris, 14 N.D. 501, 105 N.W. 621(1905), where the court said in a case of indirect contempt: "The defendant has
no constitutional right to be confronted by witnesses against him."
2" State v. Mitchell, 119 N.C. 784, 786, 25 S.E. 783, 784 (1896). "The right
[of cross-examination] may be waived either by express consent, by failure to assert
it in apt time, or by conduct inconsistent with a purpose to insist upon it."
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (1953).
20251 N.C. 550, 112 S.E.2d 85 (1960).
"N.C. CONST. art. I, § 11.
'2 G.S. § 15-46 specifies that on an arrest without a warrant the prisoner must
be taken before a magistrate either straightway or as soon as possible after being
taken to jail, and have that magistrate issue a warrant. G.S. § 15-47 requires that
1960]
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offense charged was of such a serious nature. It is a fundamental rule
that due process includes the right of the defendant to prepare his de-
fenses adequately and to confront those who accuse him. The Court
held that failure to complain of these abuses at the time of the arraign-
ment did not constitute a waiver of these rights. Here there had been
no indication that the case was more than a matter of investigation up
until the very moment of trial. The evidence shows that the families of
the prisoners had reason to believe that bail would be arranged for them,
and that they would be allowed to employ counsel to prepare fully for the
trial. The Court stated that the mere fact that the trial occurred only
two days after arrest does not of itself show a deprivation of rights, yet
"the more speedily a case is brought to trial ... the greater the duty of
the courts to determine whether or not the accused has had a fair oppor-
tunity to prepare for trial."88
Systematic Exclusion of Negroes From Grand Jury
In State v. Perry8 4 the Court found that there had been no evidence
of systematic exclusion of Negroes from the grand jury of Union County.
The defendant, a Negro on trial for performing an abortion, had made
a motion to quash the indictment on the ground that there had been
such exclusion in violation of his rights to due process of law. The evi-
dence showed that Negroes constituted approximately twelve and one-
half per cent of the total adult population of Union County; that for
at least eight years prior to 1958 one or two Negroes had been on every
jury panel; and that the grand jury had been selected by having a child
under ten years of age draw the names from this jury panel. Although
there had been during that eight year period before this indictment only
one Negro on the grand jury, the Court reiterated that the fourteenth
amendment does not guarantee to a defendant a proportional representa-
tion of his race on the jury.8 5 The Court distinguished Eubanks v.
Louisiana,"8 where only one Negro (from a total population almost one-
third Negro) had ever served on a jury, and the jury members were
selected by interviewing those on the panel.
bail be fixed in non-capital cases, and that the prisoner be allowed to communicate
with family and friends.
I' 251 N.C. at 559, 112 S.E.2d at 92.
,250 N.C. 119, 108 S.E.2d 447 (1959). The prior case of State v. Perry, 248
N.C. 334, 103 S.E.2d 404 (1958), resulted in a reversal of the superior court's
refusal to hear evidence of systematic exclusion of Negroes from the grand jury.
"SAtkins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945); Miller v. State, 237 N.C. 29, 74
S.E.2d 513 (1953).
356 U.S. 584 (1957). From a jury panel of seventy-five, the lower courtjudges held interviews to determine which of the seventy-five would serve on ajury of twelve. It is apparent that there is a vast difference, on the surface, be-
tween this method and that of allowing a small child to draw the names of thejurors.
[Vol. 38
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The charge of denial of equal protection through a systematic exclu-
sion from jury duty has been a fertile source of litigation in the United
States Supreme Court.37 The present case would seem to be analogous
to Brown v. Allen,38 another case arising in this state in which the
United States Supreme Court held that the petitioner had not shown that
he had been denied equal protection by establishing only that there had
been proportionately fewer Negroes than whites on the jury. Yet, the
United States Supreme Court in other cases 9 has been careful to insure
that there is no systematic exclusion, and these other decisions have
indicated a willingness to find such exclusion on the basis of a dispro-
portionate representation of the accused's race on the grand jury which
indicted him. An examination of these latter cases, however, reveal
the presence of other factors 40 besides a gross disproportion in numbers
which indicated that the jurors had been selected on a partial basis. No
such additional factors were shown to be present in Brown v. Allen,
and none appear present in the Perry case.
EMINENT DOMAIN
Diversion of Waters
In Braswell v. State Highway Pub. Works Comm'n 41 there was an
allegation that in the construction of a highway the Commission had
caused a diversion of waters causing a creek to overflow and flood plain-
tiff's property. The Commission contended that no liability existed
unless there had been negligence on its part, and the petition did not
allege negligence. The Court held that this was a taking of private
property42 within the meaning of the North Carolina Constitution,
43
which must be compensated regardless of whether or not there had been
87Although the vast majority of the cases deal with the exclusion of Negroes
from the jury, the charge has been brought by members of other races as well.
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
88 344 U.S. 443 (1953). Only one Negro had served on the grand jury of a
county whose population was one-third Negro. The method for selection was to
have a child draw the names gathered from the tax list. The case was decided
by a divided court.
" Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1957) ; Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282
(1949).
(0 In Cassell v. Texas, supra note 39, the jury commissioners, charged with
the responsibility of selecting the individual jurors, indicated that they selected
only those citizens with whom they were acquainted. The use of the personal in-
terview in Eubanks v. Louisiana, supra note 39, was an added factor allowing
individual discretion in choosing the jurors.
250 N.C. 508, 108 S.E.2d 912 (1959).
The Court said that prior decisions indicated the benefit accruing to prop-
erty through having water continue its natural course is a property right. E.g.,
Pernell v. City of Henderson, 220 N.C. 79, 16 S.E.2d 449 (1941), where the Court
stated that the right to have a natural water course continue its existence on one's
land is property.8 N.C. CONST. art. I, § 17. Further, it is a principle so "grounded in natural
equity that it has never been denied to be a part of the law of North Carolina."
Yancey v. Highway Comun'n, 222 N.C. 106, 22 S.E.2d 256 (1942).
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negligence. "If the right to have water flow in the direction provided
by nature is a property right, it follows that the owner of the property
is protected by the constitutional guarantee and must be compensated
when he has been damaged by the destruction of that right. ' 44 Although
an earlier North Carolina case45 had held that where the obstruction
causes surface water to damage the plaintiff's property there is taking,
the Braswell case is in line with United States Supreme Court decisions
on this point.46
POLICE POWER
Regulation for Aesthetic Purposes
In State v. Brown47 the Court held that G.S. § 14-399, regulating
the storage of junk, constituted a deprivation of property in violation of
"the law of the land" provision of the North Carolina Constitution.48
This statute forbade the placing of junk and other trash within 150
yards of a hard surfaced highway where the highway was outside the
corporate limits of a town, unless the trash was concealed from the view
of persons on the highway. The Court pointed out that the police power
of the General Assembly may be exercised only as it relates to health,
safety, morals or general welfare-the traditionally recognized police
power considerations. In the Brown case the Court found that the
statute was enacted purely for aesthetic considerations.
A long established principle has been that the uses to which a person
may put his property may not be limited by the exercise of the police
power of the state for reasons solely aesthetic. 40 It has been stated,
however, that aesthetic factors may be weighed in connection with the
recognized police power considerations,"0 and some courts ostensibly
have relied on traditional purposes to uphold ordinances obviously de-
signed to promote aesthetic betterment.51  A New York court5 2 has
"250 N.C. at 511, 108 S.E.2d at 915.
"'Bell v. Norfolk So. R.R., 101 N.C. 21, 7 S.E. 467 (1888).
"United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 470 (1903) states: "It is clear ...
that where the government by construction of a dam or other public works so floods
lands belonging to an individual as to substantially destroy their value there is a
taking within the scope of the Fifth Amendment." See also Jacobs v. United
States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
"1250 N.C. 54, 108 S.E.2d 74 (1959), also commented on in Criminal Law, Col-
vients on North Carolina 1959 Session Laws, 38 N.C.L. REV. 173 (1960).
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 17.
"Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909); Murphy v. Town of Westport, 131
Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944).
" New Orleans v. Southern Auto Wreckers, 193 La. 895, 192 So. 523 (1939);
Vestal v. Bennet, 199 Misc. 41, 104 N.Y.S.2d 830 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Criterion
Services, Inc. v. East Cleveland, 55 Ohio L. Abs. 90, 88 N.E.2d 300 (1940).
( 1 E.g., Simpson v. Los Angeles, 38 P.2d 174, rev'd 4 Cal. 2d 60, 47 P.2d 474
(1935), where a city-granted license provided for the closing of a street so that
a "Mexican Village" could be opened as a tourist attraction. The court held it
valid, finding that its purpose was to improve traffic conditions.
" Preferred Tires v. Hempstead, 173 Misc. 1017, 19 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct.
1940).
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sustained the validity of an ordinance prohibiting overhanging signs on
the basis on both aesthetic and recognized considerations; this court
stated that it would not hesitate to sustain it on solely aesthetic grounds
if necessary. The United States Supreme Court in Bermn v. Parker53
held that in redeveloping the District of Columbia there could be a
taking of private property for aesthetic purposes, even though the par-
ticular property was not substandard, if it did not fit into the overall
plan. The Court in the Bermn case stated that "the concept of public
welfare is broad and inclusive .... The values it represents are spiritual
as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary."54 This statement
represented a far-reaching extension of the exercise of the police power;
nevertheless at least some elements of the traditional welfare considera-
tions were present in the overall redevelopment program. There appears
to be a growing trend, which North Carolina has not followed, toward
allowing aesthetic motives to be a primary consideration in the exercise
of the police power. There can be no doubt that the primary considera-
tion of the statute in the Brown case was aesthetic, as is evidenced by
the fact that the statute was not to apply to junk yards "which are
properly screened or fenced from the view of persons on the highway."55
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND AsSEMBLY
Conflict With State's Interest in Preserving Order
A conviction on a charge of inciting to riot was upheld in State v.
Cole.56 The defendant, a leader of the Ku Klux Klan, had publicized an
outdoor meeting to be held by the Klan. As a result the Indians in the
area against whom Klan activity had been directed arrived at the gather-
ing and broke up the meeting with gun fire. The inciting to riot aspect
of this case is discussed in a Note in this volume.5 7
The Cole case presented the problem of determining where a person's
constitutional rights of freedom of assembly and speech yield to the in-
terest of the state in preserving order. It was not denied that the de-
fendant had the right to espouse his cause and that, at least initially, the
assembly of the Klan may have been a lawful one. A person's freedom
to speak is not dependent on the will of his audience, and the fact that
his words and actions may invoke emotions will not deprive him of it.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut5 the defendant had played a record advo-
cating his own religion and degrading the religion of those who listened.
There was no violent reaction, although the audience was incensed and
51 348 U.S. 26 (1954).5 Id. at 33.
5 G.S. § 14-399 was amended in 1959 to delete the offending portions.
249 N.C. 733, 107 S.E.2d 732 (1959).
-7 38 N.C.L. REv. 274 (1960).8 310 U.S. 296 (1939).
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was tempted to strike the defendant. A conviction of inciting others to a
breach of the peace was reversed by the United States Supreme Court on
the ground that the defendant had been deprived of his freedom of speech
and religion.
An anti-Semitic speech which attracted an openly hostile throng was
protected by the United States Supreme Court in Terminiello v. City of
Chicago.5 9 In a five-to-four decision the Court stated that a city ordi-
nance which, as construed by the trial court, permitted conviction if the
defendant's speech "stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or
brought about a condition of unrest" was unconstitutional.
There is some point beyond which free speech is not permitted. As
the Court stated in the Cantwell case, "No one would have the hardihood
to suggest that the principles of freedom of speech sanctions incitement
to riot . . . .When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, inter-
ference with traffic on public streets, or other immediate threat to public
safety, peace, or order appears, the power of the state to prevent or
punish is obvious." 60 On these grounds, a conviction of breach of the
peace was upheld in Feiner v. New York,61 where the defendant was in
a public park advertising a meeting of the Young Progressives. There
were mutterings of disapproval and one threat of action if the haranguing
did not cease. The defendant failed to heed several requests of a police-
man that he stop, and was thereupon arrested. In sustaining the con-
viction the Court stated that "it is one thing to say that the police cannot
be used as an instrument for the suppression of unpopular views, and
another to say that, when as here the speaker passes the bound of argu-
ment or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot, they are powerless
to prevent a breach of the peace." 62 Justice Douglas, dissenting in the
Feiner case, agreed that "a speaker may not, of course, incite a riot any
more than he may incite a breach of the peace by use of fighting words."0
Douglas argued, however, that there had been no showing of such an
extreme occurrence, and indeed, the evidence only showed a threat made
by one person. Another vigorous dissent by Justice Black reiterated the
holding of prior cases64 that if the authorities are to interfere with a law-
ful public speech, all reasonable efforts must first be made to protect the
speaker.
It is apparent that the defendant's rights of freedom of speech and
assembly do not allow him to incite others to riot. If in the Cole case
the only way for the state to preserve order and prevent a riot was to
-9 337 U.S. 1 (1948).80 310 U.S. at 308.
01340 U.S. 315 (1950).
62 Id. at 321.03Id. at 331.
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1948); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1938).
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arrest the defendant, it had the right to do so. The question which re-
mained unanswered in the North Carolina Court's decision was whether
the authorities there had first taken all reasonable measures to protect
the defendant's right to speak.
CONTRACTS
AccoPI) AND SATISFACTION
In Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Nello L. Teer Co.1 the defendant and its
insurer were in disagreement over the amount of unpaid premiums due
the insurer. Following some inconclusive negotiations as to whether
defendant was entitled to a 12,500 dollar credit for overpayment of pre-
miums, the defendant mailed a letter and a check to the insurance com-
pany. Both the letter and the check indicated that 12,500 dollars had
been deducted from the amount of unpaid premiums due and that the
check was intended to be in full payment and satisfaction of all amounts
owing the insurer. The insurance company endorsed and deposited the
check but then sued to collect the 12,500 dollars previously in dispute.
Jury trial was waived and the court rendered judgment for the de-
fendant. The important issue on appeal was whether there was a bona
fide dispute between the parties as to the credit when the check was sent.
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding that there was such
a dispute in that since the beginning of their negotiations in 1953 the
defendant had insisted he was entitled to such a credit while the insurer
denied this.
The language of G.S. § 1-5402 would appear to discharge completely
the alleged obligation where part payment was accepted in satisfaction
of the whole debt, even though the amount was not in dispute; however,
the North Carolina Court in 1915, having had the earlier common law
rule in mind rather than this statute, held that the element of dispute
was necessary.3 Thus the Court in the principal case was in accord
with precedent in requiring that the amount be in dispute.
In holding the endorsement and deposit to be acceptance of the
amount tendered the Court said that not only did the language in the
letter clearly state that the check was offered in full satisfaction of all
debts owing the insurance company, but the check specifically showed the
12,500 dollars as a credit. The Court added that the intent with which
1250 N.C. 547, 109 S.E.2d 171 (1959).
2 G.S. § 1-540 provides that where an agreement is made to accept a less amount
than that claimed to be due, the payment of the less amount in compromise of the
whole is a complete discharge of the obligation whether the sum was liquidated or
in dispute.
'Rosser v. Bynum, 168 N.C. 340, 84 S.E. 393 (1915).
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the plaintiff accepted the check was immaterial. This decision is in
accord with a number of North Carolina cases 4 as to the effect of accept-
ance of a check plainly labeled "payment in full" as accord and satis-
faction.
CONTRACTS OF EmPLOYMENT
In Briggs v. American & Efird Mills, Inc.5 the plaintiff had procured
a three year employment contract with American & Efird as Vice-
President and Director of Manufacturing. His contract contained the
following language: "Briggs shall be in exclusive charge of manufactur-
ing operations of American and Efird." (Emphasis added.) Another
part of the contract read: "If for any other reason, whether because of
disagreement with his policies and methods or sale of its properties or
other cause, American and Efird terminates Briggs' services during the
term of the contract, then American and Efird shall be liable to Briggs
for compensation of a minimum of two years base pay." (Emphasis
added.) Six months before the contract was to expire, the corporation
relieved Briggs of his duties with respect to manufacturing in the Spun
Fibers Division. Briggs brought an action for the damages stipulated
in the contract contending that the action of the corporation was "termi-
nation" within the meaning of the contract.
The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer for failure to state a
cause of action, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court stated that
"termination" as used here means a complete discontinuance of services
and that the plaintiff did not allege that he had been removed from all
supervision and control of manufacturing.
It is submitted that the Court regarded the act of the defendant sim-
ply as an exercise of the inherent right of a corporate employer to
decrease the duties of an executive and vary his responsibility within
the corporation without terminating his services, notwithstanding lan-
guage in his contract that he shall have exclusive charge of certain
operations.
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
Bank of Varina v. Slaughter was an action by the payee to collect
the unpaid balance on a note signed by Tri-County Farm Center, Inc.
and the defendants, stockholders in the corporate maker. According to
defendants' evidence, part of the 25,000 dollar loan secured by the note
was for the use of the corporation, and the balance was to be used by
'Jordan Motor Lines v. McIntyre, 157 F. Supp. 475 (M.D.N.C. 1957); Moore
v. Greene, 237 N.C. 614, 75 S.E.2d 649 (1953) ; DeLoache v. DeLoache, 189 N.C.
394, 127 S.E. 419 (1925) ; Blanchard v. Edenton Peanut Co., 182 N.C. 20, 108 S.E.332 (1921) ; Mercer v. Frank Hitch Lumber Co., 173 N.C. 49, 91 S.E. 588 (1917).
251 N.C. 642, 111 S.E.2d 841 (1960).
6250 N.C. 355, 108 S.E.2d 594 (1959), also discussed in CRwvIT TRANSACTIONS,
Inadmissibility of Contemporaneous Parol Agreement, infra.
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the individual makers, the defendants. They offered parol evidence of
an agreement with the bank, prior to the execution of the note, that the
liability of the defendants should be limited to that portion of the note
proceeds which was loaned to the defendants individually and that the
corporation alone would be liable for the share which was loaned to Farm
Center, Inc. This evidence was excluded by the trial court, and the
Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that the written promise "could
not be contradicted or destroyed by parol testimony that the makers
would not be called upon to pay monies loaned pursuant to the contract.
The very purpose of reducing it to writing was to avoid any controversy
as to the terms of the contract."'7 The decision cites a group of North
Carolina cases which clearly support this holding and follow the parol
evidence rule.8 The rule stated by the Court, however, has not been
consistently applied in North Carolina; in another group of cases (which
were cited by the defendant) the makers of promissory notes have been
allowed, on the basis of parol evidence, to escape the obligation clearly
stated in the signed instrument. 9 If there is a distinction between these
two groups of cases, the Court has not pointed it out. The fact that the
parol agreement was made prior to the written instrument may possibly
distinguish the principal case from the latter group, but otherwise no
reason appears why the result should be different from that reached in the
long line of cases relied on by the defendant. The Court here, as usual,
cited one group of cases only, and made no reference to the cases relied
on by the unsuccessful litigant.
7250 N.C. at 357-58, 108 S.E.2d at 596-97.
'Bost v. Bost, 234 N.C. 554, 67 S.E.2d 745 (1951) ; Williams v. McLean, 220
N.C. 504, 17 S.E.2d 644 (1941); Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Ford, 212 N.C.
324, 193 S.E. 279 (1937).
'Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Morehead, 209 N.C. 174, 183 S.E. 606
(1936) (parol evidence admitted to establish an agreement that a note was not to
be delivered until twenty-five members of a fraternity also signed as makers, and
this in spite of language in the note that endorsers should be bound regardless of
who did or who did not sign the note.) ; Hunter v. Sherron, 176 N.C. 226, 97 S.E. 5(1918) (parol evidence admissible to show an agreement that each maker was to
be liable only to the extent of his individual charges where, for the convenience
of a carrier, two shippers signed one note for the sum of freight charges owed by
both) ; Martin v. Mask, 158 N.C. 436, 74 S.E. 343 (1912) (parol evidence admitted
to show agreement that a note given for rent was to be paid only if the maker
continued to reside at the payee's premises.) ; Evans v. Freeman, 142 N.C. 61, 54
S.E. 847 (1906) (parol evidence admitted to show that note was to be paid only
to the extent of proceeds received from the sale of patent rights in the maker's
stockfeeder) ; Quin v. Sexton, 125 N.C. 447, 34 S.E. 542 (1899) (parol evidence
admitted to show that maker's liability was contingent upon his collection of an-
other note); Carrington & Co. v. E. F. Waft, 112 N.C. 115, 16 S.E. 1008 (1893)
(parol evidence admitted to show that payment of note was contingent upon the
maker's selling the payee's products).
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CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
SERVICE ON REMAINDERMEN IN FORECLOSURE ACTION
In Bolton v. Harrison1 the Court said that it was debatable whether
in a foreclosure action service of process upon the life tenant also consti-
tuted service upon remaindermen who would take at the termination of
the life estate. Since the case is not a holding on the question, the issue
alluded to remains open. As to remaindermen who were in esse at the
commencement of the foreclosure action, the Court held that the return
of the sheriff showing service upon them raised a presumption in law that
they were properly served. This presumption could be, but was not
here, rebutted by proper evidence. As to the one remainderman who
was not in esse at the time the foreclosure action was begun, the Court
held that he was, under the doctrine of virtual representation, 2 repre-
sented and bound by the living persons of his own class who had been
parties to the action.
There is some support for the proposition that service on the life
tenant is service on the remaindermen where the remaindermen are not
in esse at the time of the action.3 However, no case has been found which
holds that such service is sufficient to cut off the interests of the re-
maindermen who are in being at the commencement of the action. A
negative answer was implied by dictum in a New York case4 where the
issue of the children of the testator-mortgagor were said to be necessary
parties to a foreclosure action if, under the will, they received an interest
or future estate in testator's real property which could not be divested
by a decree against their ancestors.
SUBSTITUTED PARTIES IN CONFIRMATION PROCEEDINGS
In Baker v. Murphrey5 the Court held that in a foreclosure action
where the mortgagor had died after judgment, but before sale and con-
firmation of the sale by the Court, the sale could not be valid without
making the heirs of the mortgagor parties to the confirmation proceeding
1250 N.C. 290, 108 S.E.2d 666 (1959).
2 The doctrine of virtual representation is an exception to the general rule that
no person can be bound by a judgment without having been before the court.
Under this doctrine, the unborn remaindermen, or the member of any class who isin posse but not in esse, is represented by th6se members of his class who are before
the court, and a judgment against those who are properly before the court is bind-ing upon a later-born member of the class. 33 Am. Jura. Life Estates, Remainders
& Reversions § 180 (1941).
Carraway v. Lassiter, 139 N.C. 145, 51 S.E. 968 (1905), holding that remain-
dermen who were not in esse at the time of the action were bound by a judgment
against their mother who was life tenant. There, the Court theorized that the life
tenant represented the entire title for purposes of the proceedings.
' Dunkel v. Homindustries, Inc., 275 N.Y. 327, 9 N.E2d 949 (1937).
v-250 N.C. 346, 108 S.E2d 644 (1959), also discussed in CIVIL PROCEDURnE,
Parties-Necessary Parties, supra.
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and thereby allowing them a chance to be heard as to whether or not the
sale should be confirmed.
As a general rule, the heirs of a deceased mortgagor of real property
should be made parties in an action to foreclose the mortgage.6 Simi-
larly, it has been held that where the mortgagor dies during the pendency
of the action, his heirs are indispensable parties.7 Under a 1929 Florida
decision,8 which involved the same question as that presented in the
principal case, it was held that the sale was valid, even though no one
had been substituted as party defendant. In that case the court bolstered
an otherwise unsupported holding by saying that no attempt was made
to show that the confirmation was unjust, irregular, illegal, or that it
deprived appellant of any legal right. The Florida decision is directly
contra to the Murphrey decision, and is the only other case found which
directly presented this problem. In view of the general rule that upon
the death of an intestate his real property descends directly to his heirs
at law,9 the North Carolina Court seems to have reached a justifiable
result by preserving to the heirs a chance to have their day in court as
to the merits of the sale. 10
INADMISSIBILITY OF CONTEMPORANEOUS PAROL AGREEMENT To
VARY TERMS OF LOAN
In Bank of Varina v. Slaughter" the Court refused to admit parol
evidence to show that defendants had agreed with the bank president at
the time the loan in question was made that the defendants would be
liable for money loaned to them personally and that Tri-County Farm
Center, Inc., a corporation solely owned and controlled by the defendants,
would alone be liable for credits extended to it. The same note, secured
by deed of trust, evidenced the debts of defendants and of Farm Center.
The rule of law applied in this case seems irreconcilable with the rule
laid down by the Court in previous cases. In Bank of Chapel Hill v.
Rosenstein12 there was an action by payee against makers and endorsers
of a note secured by a deed of trust on lands. One maker defended on
the ground that he had agreed with payee, contemporaneously to the
making of the note, that his liability on the note should be limited to the
value of the lands covered by the deed of trust. In that case the Court
said that a contemporaneous parol agreement as to mode of payment is
6 Phillips v. Parker, 148 Kan. 474 83 P.2d 709 (1938) ; Chadbourn v. Johnston,
119 N.C. 282, 25 S.E. 705 (1896) ; 37 AM. Jum. Mortgages § 1129 (1941) ; Annot.,
119 A.L.R. 807 (1939).
'Phillips v. Parker, supra note 6; Annot., 119 A.L.R. 807 (1939).
' Davis v. Scott, 97 Fla. 148, 120 So. 1 (1929).
'Alexander v. Galloway, 239 N.C. 554, 80 S.E.2d 369 (1954).10See 37 AM. JuR. Mortgages § 1129 (1941).
11250 N.C. 355, 108 S.E.2d 594 (1959), also discussed in CoNTRAcrs, Parol
Evidence Rule, supra.12207 N.C. 529, 177 S.E. 643 (1935).
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competent as between the parties. Although the specific circumstances
vary in the two cases, there is no apparent justification for the difference
in result as to the rule of law to be applied. Also, in Wilson v. Alls-
brook13 the Court held, after a referee had failed to find whether the
note had been paid or was to be paid out of a particular fund, that the
maker was entitled to such a finding. In both the Rosenstein and
Allsbrook cases, the Court allowed parol agreements to be shown which
affected the mode of payment and liability of the maker. 14
SUBSTITUTED NOTE AS PAYMENT OF ORIGINAL NOTE
In F. D. Cline Paving Co. v. Southland Speedways, Inc.", the plain-
tiff had done work for the corporate defendant, valued at 43,342 dollars,
15,000 dollars of which was evidenced by a promissory note. The indi-
vidual defendants were endorsers of the note. Receivers were appointed
for Speedways, the corporate defendant, in an action by its creditors.
The individual defendants participated in the receivership proceedings.
The receiver, with the approval of all the creditors, and on court order,
sold the properties of Speedways to Chesnutt, who gave notes to plaintiff
and certain other secured creditors to the full value of their claims.
Plaintiff's lien against Speedways was cancelled of record, but the note of
Speedways was not surrendered. The Chesnutt notes were secured by
a deed of trust on the properties formerly owned by Speedways. Ches-
nutt defaulted in payment of his notes, and the deed of trust was fore-
closed and the properties were bid in at sale by Capital Investment Co.,
a corporation formed by holders of the Chesnutt notes. This left plain-
tiff holding stock in a corporation which had succeeded to the property
on which plaintiff originally had a lien. Plaintiff sold the stock in Capital
for one-half of the amount of its claim, and in the present action was
suing on the note given by Speedways, and endorsed by the individual
defendants for the balance due. The lower court found no evidence that
plaintiff had intended the transactions, in taking the Chestnutt notes, to
be payment of the original note, and entered judgment for the plaintiff
for the balance due on the note. The Supreme Court, in affirming, laid
down the rule that acceptance of the other notes would not be payment
unless the plaintiff had agreed to accept them as payment. The Court
said: "A receipt in full of an account does not establish an agreement on
18203 N.C. 498, 166 S.E. 313 (1932).
"
4 Accord, Ripple v. Stevenson, 223 N.C. 284, 25 S.E.2d 836 (1943), where the
Court said that it is permissible for the parties to agree that a note shall be paid
in a certain manner, i.e., out of a particular fund, by the foreclosure of collateral,
or from rents collected, and that this agreement may be shown though it rest inparol.18250 N.C. 358, 108 S.E.2d 641 (1959), also discussed in NEGoTIA nL INSTRU-
MENTs, Note of Third Person as Payment of Original Note, infra.
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the part of the creditor to accept as absolute payment at his own risk the
note of a third person for the debt."'-
Generally, unless it is otherwise specially agreed, when the holder of
a promissory note takes a new note for the original debt, it is prima facie
a conditional payment only.'7 The original debt will be extinguished
only upon payment of the substituted note.' 8 In other words, receipt
of a promissory note of the maker or of a third party will be deemed only
a conditional satisfaction of the original debt or note unless otherwise
specially agreed between the parties.
Also worthy of mention in this case is the holding of the Court that
the amount received by the plaintiff on sale of the stock of Capital, which
was accepted in discharge of the lien against Speedways, was not a volun-
tary payment by the debtor, and, therefore, the debtor was not entitled
to direct application of the payment to a particular debt. 19 The Court
said that the creditor could not apply the proceeds to his best advantage,
but had to apply them equally to the payment of all debts secured by the
lien, i.e., the portion of the debt evidenced by the note with endorsers
and the portion of the debt not so evidenced. In support of this holding
the Court cites Damai v. Tart20 which has no application to the principal
case. That case dealt with the application of proceeds of foreclosure to
a note after action on the note is barred by the statute of limitations,
and the Court held that such application by the creditor did not toll the
statute and that there could be no further action on the note.
The principal case should be contrasted with the general rule re-
garding application of proceeds by the creditor where the debtor has
failed to direct specifically application of the payment. As a rule, the
creditor can apply proceeds of a voluntary payment to any debt owed
by the debtor where debtor has not directed the payment to be applied
to a particular debt. 21  In the principal case the Court theorized that
since the payment was involuntary, the debtor had no right to direct
application of the proceeds, and thus the failure to so direct would not
leave the creditor free to apply the payment to his best advantage. This
" Id. at 361-62, 108 S.E.2d at 644.17 First Natl Bank of Graham v. Hall, 174 N.C. 477, 93 S.E. 981 (1917);
Terry v. Robbins, 128 N.C. 140, 38 S.E. 470 (1901).
10 Ibid.1 See Madison Nat'l Bank of London v. Weber, 117 Ohio 287, 158 N.E. 543
(1927), wherein the court held that where a solvent debtor would have the right
to direct the application of payment and in the event of his failure to so direct, the
creditor could apply the payment as he wished. In insolvency proceedings, or
where a general judgment has been rendered covering secured and unsecured claims
and there is a fund for distribution, such fund becomes a trust fund, and every debt
and every part of every debt is a lien on the fund. Both the debtor and the creditor
have lost the right to direct application of the payment and it is to be applied
ratably to each debt.
0 221 N.C. 106, 19 S.E.2d 130 (1942).
Security Trust & Savings Bank v. June, 38 Ariz. 513, 1 P.2d 970 (1931);
Sanders v. Hamilton, 233 N.C. 175, 63 S.E.2d 187 (1951).
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distinction between the application of proceeds resulting from voluntary
and involuntary payments appears to be in accord with other authorities.22
INAPPLICABILITY OF DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT STATUTE To ACTION
ON AN UNSECURED NOTE
In Brown v. Owens23 the Court held that where a note is given for
the balance of the purchase price of realty and is not accompanied by
any security the statute precluding deficiency judgments on purchase
money mortgages is not applicable.2 4
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL LAW
Motor Vehicles
In State v. Brown' the court charged that if the jury found that de-
fendant was driving a motor vehicle on the highway at a speed faster
than fifty-five miles per hour, it would be their duty to convict him of
a misdemeanor. Defendant excepted to this charge on the ground that
G.S. § 20-141(b) (5) provides for a maximum speed of sixty miles per
hour when the Highway Commission posts signs to that effect. The
Court held that the general speed limit is fifty-five miles per hour and
that the higher provision is an exception. Thus to bring himself within
the exception defendant must show that it is applicable to his case, 2 and
here he had failed to do so.
In State v. Green3 the Court held that a farm tractor is a vehicle
within the meaning of G.S. § 20-138, and the conviction of defendant
for driving a tractor while intoxicated was therefore affirmed.
Aiding and Abetting
In State v. Hamilton4 defendants were tried on separate indictments
charging each with the crime of assault with a deadly weapon with
intent to kill, resulting in serious injury. The State's evidence tended
to show that defendant A shot the victim, while defendant B aided and
22 Ohio Elec. Car Co. v. Le Sage, 198 Cal. 705, 247 Pac. 190 (1926). See also
Annot., 49 A.L.R. 952 (1927).28251 N.C. 348, 111 S.E.2d 705 (1959).
"
4 For general discussion of deficiency judgments, see Note, 35 N.C.L. RV.
492 (1957).
*250 N.C. 209, 108 S.E.2d 233 (1959).
2 State v. Johnson, 229 N.C. 701, 51 S.E.2d 186 (1949). See generally 22 C.J.S.
Criminal Law § 572 (1940).
8251 N.C. 141, 110 S.E.2d 805 (1959). The procedural aspects of this case are
discussed in CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, Sentencing Problems, infra.
'250 N.C. 85, 108 S.E.2d 46 (1959).
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abetted in the shooting. The trial court instructed the jury that it could
find each defendant guilty of "(1) ... assault with a deadly weapon with
intent to kill, inflicting serious injury, (2) or ... assault with a deadly
weapon, that is without the elements of intent to kill and serious injury,
or (3) ... not guilty in each case." 5 The verdict found A guilty of the
lesser offense of assault with a deadly weapon (without intent to kill)
and B guilty of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill. The
judge sent the jury back to reconsider the verdict as to both defendants
stating that B could not be found guilty of aiding and abetting A in the
greater offense while A was found guilty of the lesser only.0 The second
verdict convicted both defendants of assault with a deadly weapon with
intent to kill, recommending mercy on behalf of A. On appeal the Court
ruled that the judge had no basis for refusing the first verdict against A.
Thus as to A the cause was remanded for judgment on the first verdict.
B's case was remanded for a new trial on the ground that if the first
verdict as to A was good and the first verdict as to B was inconsistent
and incomplete, then the further instructions of the trial judge given
before the second verdict was returned were erroneous. 7
In State v. Whitt8 the Court sustained a judgment of guilty of mur-
der in the second degree against the aider (principal in the second de-
gree), although the alleged principal in the first degree had been acquitted
at a previous trial. State v. Worley" presented a reverse situation where
in a joint trial the defendant who actually did the killing was convicted
of second degree murder while the aider was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter. Although North Carolina has apparently never squarely
held that a principal in the second degree could be found guilty of a
higher degree of the crime than the principal in the first degree, this
result necessarily would seem to follow from the decision in State v.
Whitt. Yet State v. Hamilton seems to preclude such a result. Since
5 250 N.C. at 86, 108 S.E2d at 47.
'The facts at trial showed that the victim had been paralyzed. In view of
this it appears that the trial judge considered the first verdict against B to be
guilty of the felony of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill resulting
in serious bodily harm, even though the jury's verdict contained no finding of
bodily harm. Otherwise there would have been no inconsistency between the ver-
dicts as first returned, since assault with a deadly weapon and assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill are both general misdemeanors. The inference that the
trial judge drew such a conclusion is strengthened by the fact that although the
second verdict found both defendants guilty of assault with intent to kill, the
judge sentenced both to central prison, a punishment reserved for those convicted
of felonies. This he could not do without assuming that the jury had found that
the assault resulted in serious bodily injury.
7Apparently this instruction was erroneous in that it permitted the jury to
raise or lower the verdicts against A and B. This would have permitted a raising
of the verdict against A which, as noted, the Supreme Court held not to be per-
missible. Since the verdict against A could not be changed the only acceptable
verdict against B, at least in the view of the trial judge, would have been a lower
one, i.e., guilty of the same offence as A, or not guilty.
'113 N.C. 716, 18 S.E. 715 (1893).
141 N.C. 764, 53 S.E. 128 (1906).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the trial judge in the Hamilton case could not refuse to accept the proper
verdict in A's case, the remand for retrial in B's case on the basis of
instructions given for a second verdict indicates that the Court con-
sidered that a second verdict was required as to B. This assumes that
the first verdict convicting B of a more serious offense than his principal
was improper. In fact, the trial judge so stated, and the Supreme Court
took no issue with his position.
The great weight of authority is to the effect that an aider (principal
in the second degree) who is convicted of a higher degree of the crime
than the principal in the first degree cannot complain that for some rea-
son the principal in the first degree has been acquitted or has escaped
his full reckoning for the crime of which the aider has been convicted.10
This is unlike the case where one is charged as an accessory before the
fact to a felony. An accessory may assert the acquittal of his principal
as a defense in his prosecution. It may be that the Hamilton case merely
represents a confusion of the rule as to aiders with that as to accessories.
In any event, the case renders the law on aiders and abbettors rather
uncertain.
Self-Defense
In State v. Goode" the Court reversed a conviction of manslaughter
when the trial judge charged that as an essential element of self-defense
defendant must show that a felonious assault was being made upon him.
Another separate ground for reversal was the trial court's exclusion of
a threat on defendant's life made to a third party, but uncommunicated
to defendant prior to the fatal shooting. The Court reaffirmed its posi-
tion that a reasonable belief that the victim was about to inflict great
bodily harm is all that is required before one may invoke self-defense,
while holding that threats not within the knowledge of defendant are
admissible as evidence for the purpose of explaining the situation as it
actually existed.
In State v. Sandlin'2 the Court reaffirmed its somewhat anomalous
position that a defendant who claims self-defense in a homicide case car-
ries the burden of proving the defense, while in a trial for assault with a
deadly weapon the burden remains on the State to negative the defense.
This inconsistency is explained by the Court on the ground that in a
homicide case malice is presumed upon a showing that the victim was
killed with a deadly weapon, whereas, in an assault case no such pre-
sumption arises.
1o Anot., 24 A.L.R. 603 (1923). But see 90 IRIsH L.T. 59 (1956) where it is
said that in England the trend of the decisions in misdemeanor cases (where an
aider is considered a co-principal) is to the effect that if the only person who could
have committed the crime is acquitted on the merits, then a person charged with
aiding must also be acquitted.11249 N.C. 632, 107 S.E.2d 70 (1959).
2251 N.C. 81, 110 S.E.2d 481 (1959).
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In State v. Wagoner13 the Court decided a question raised in a prior
issue of the Law Review.14 When some evidence in a case tends to
support the privilege of self-defense and other evidence supports the view
that the killing was accidental, will the defendant be forced to elect which
defense he will seek to establish, or may he rely on both? In an earlier
case 15 where the defendant had given testimony tending to establish that
the act causing death was accidental and not intentional, but leaving a
possible inference of self-defense, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's refusal to instruct on self-defense. In the Wagoner case the
defendant gave testimony to the effect that deceased had threatened him
and that a quarrel ensued which was followed by a scuffle. Defendant
stated that he did not know whether he or the deceased fired the gun,
that if he fired it, he did not mean to do so. The Court held it to be
reversible error for the trial court, even without a request from the
defendant, to fail to charge the jury on the law of accidental homicide,
as well as self-defense. The Court properly pointed out that a plea of
"not guilty" entitles a defendant to introduce evidence of both defenses
and that the uncertainty expressed in this defendant's testimony went
only to its evidentiary weight.
Conspiracy
In State v. Walker 16 the Court handed down a landmark decision
regarding the amount of evidence needed to convict one as a participant
in a criminal conspiracy. The State had offered evidence tending to
show that defendant Gore, a union agent, was involved in a conspiracy
to dynamite certain facilities of a plant against which his union was
striking. The State's witness, Aaron, called Gore's hotel room when
Gore failed to show up at a pre-arranged meeting, and defendant Payton
answered the telephone. Payton cautioned that the connection was
through the hotel switchboard, acknowledged to Aaron that he knew of
him and relayed Aaron's message to Gore. In this conversation the
alleged dynamite plot was not mentioned. The Court also admitted
telephone company records of calls by Payton to defendant Auslander, a
union official and the instigator of the plot. One call to Auslander
shortly followed the one from Aaron. Aaron was permitted to testify
concerning statements of Gore to the effect that Payton, who was the
union official in charge of the strike, would deliver twenty dollars to
Aaron, but that Gore and Payton did not like the fact that Aaron had
1-249 N.C. 637, 107 S.E.2d 83 (1959).Crimitnal Law, Survey of the Decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court
1953, 32 N.C.L. R1v. 379, 425 (1954).
"5 State v. Rawley, 237 N.C. 233, 74 S.E.2d 620 (1953).10251 N.C. 465, 112 S.E.2d 61 (1960).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
called the hotel and spoken to Payton. Although this was all the evi-
dence recited in the reported decision which tended to implicate Payton,
it was held, with one dissent, sufficient to take the case against him to
the jury.
Illegal Possession of Liquor
The cases of State v. Taylor17 and State v. Glenn'8 are illuminating
with regard to the North Carolina law of constructive possession of
nontaxpaid liquor. In the Taylor case the trial court instructed the
jury that "where liquor is on the premises of a person . ..with his
knowledge and consent, it is as a matter of law in his constructive pos-
session."' 9 On appeal this instruction was held to be proper. Subse-
quently in the Glenn case the Supreme Court reversed for failure to
enter a nonsuit under the following facts: The liquor was found buried
in front of defendant's pig pen on another's property just across the
road from defendant's house. Numerous paths were found to lead from
the pen to defendant's house and to the houses of others. Officers found
a jar smelling of whiskey in defendant's house. The defendant had been
discovered in possession of a jar of whiskey before but had not been
charged.
It appears that consent to having the whiskey on one's premises is
the key factor in constructive possession. Presumably if one knew of
the presence of illegal liquor, he would have it removed unless he con-
sented to its presence. Thus if the State can offer concrete proof of
knowledge on the part of defendant, the case should go to the jury. But
where, as in the Glenn case, the evidence is of such a nature as to be
consistent with the guilt of a number of persons--4.e., since the paths ran
to several different houses, the liquor could have been hidden unknown
to the defendant-it is not sufficient to withstand a motion for nonsuit.
Inciting To Riot
In State v. Cole20 the Court sustained defendant's conviction of in-
citing to riot when, after repeated warnings that the Indians of Robeson
County were likely to riot, he attended a meeting of armed members of
the Ku Klux Klan at which he was scheduled to speak. The criminal
aspect of this case is the subject of a Note in this volume.21 The freedom
of speech aspect is discussed in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Freedom of
Speech and Assembly, supra.
" 250 N.C. 363, 108 S.E.2d 629 (1959).
18251 N.C. 156, 110 S.E.2d 791 (1959).
18250 N.C. at 365, 108 S.E.2d at 632.
20249 N.C. 733, 107 S.E.2d 732 (1959).
2138 N.C.L. REv. 274 (1960).
[Vol. 38
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Arrest
In State v. Green22 defendant was convicted of driving an automobile
on a public street while intoxicated. He collided with a telephone pole,
and subsequently officers arrived at the scene and arrested him without
a warrant approximately ten minutes after his vehicle had stopped. The
Court conceded that the arrest appeared illegal under G.S. § 15-41 (a)
because the alleged offense was not committed in the presence of the
arresting officer. Even though the arrest was unlawful the trial court
had jurisdiction over the defendant, and his trial on a warrant proper
on its face issued later the same day was held to have been without
error. The Court distinguished State v. Mobley,23 where a conviction
of resisting arrest was allowed by the trial court even though the de-
fendant was found innocent of the alleged offense giving rise to the
arrest, public drunkenness. Mobley's conviction was reversed on appeal
on the ground that he had a right to resist an unlawful arrest, and since
public drunkenness was not a breach of the peace, the arrest without a
warrant was unlawful. It appears that the unlawfulness of the arrest
becomes relevant in a criminal prosecution only when it is sought to
convict the defendant of resisting such arrest, or to introduce evidence
seized by the officers incident to the arrest. It is immaterial that the
warrant on which defendant was tried was issued after the unlawful
arrest.
Warrants and Indictments
A statute authorizing the solicitor of a recorder's court to issue war-
rants has been sustained against a contention that it violates article I,
section 8 of the North Carolina Constitution which provides for the
separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. In State
v. FurmageU4 the Court adhered to the exact language of this constitu-
tional provision which prohibits encroachment on the "supreme judicial
powers." It did not attempt to define this term; but it held that since
the issuance of warrants was not an exercise of supreme judicial power
it was immaterial whether the issuance be considered a judicial or a
ministerial act. Of course the language of this decision seems to leave
the legislature free to confer the power to issue warrants on anyone it
22251 N.C. 40, 110 S.E.2d 609 (1959), also discussed in EvmENcE, Relevancy
of Injuries to Third Parties in Prosecution for Driving While Intoxicated, infra.240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E.2d 100 (1954).
250 N.C. 616, 109 S.E.2d 563 (1959). This case is also discussed under
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Separation of Powers-Issuing of Warrants by Recorder's
Court Solicitor, supra.
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chooses, but it is doubtful that the Court would go so far as to uphold
the selection of someone who was obviously inappropriate.
In State v. Banks25 it was held that an officer may radio to a fellow
officer the circumstances he has observed giving him reason to believe
that some person has liquor in his possession for the purpose of sale, and
that this is sufficient information, within G.S. § 18-13 for the clerk to
issue a search warrant to the second officer. A discussion of this case
is presented in a Note in this volume.20
In State v. Bissette27 the first count of the indictment charged that
defendant "Did unlawfully and willfully sell, offer, and expose for sale
tobacco seed not labelled in accordance with N. C. General Statutes 106-
281,"28 the statute setting forth labelling standards and procedures for
agricultural and vegetable seed. The second count charged that de-
fendant "Did unlawfully . . . sell, offer, and expose for sale tobacco
seed ... represented ... as being Bissette's 711 when in fact said seed
was not Bissette's 711 tobacco seed."'29 The jury returned a verdict of
"not guilty" on the first count and "guilty" on the second. On appeal
the Supreme Court in a split decision reversed and sustained defendant's
contention that the second count in the indictment should have been
quashed. The majority of the Court also thought the verdict incon-
gruous, since falsely labelling the seed as charged in the second count
would necessarily violate the statute named in the first count. As pointed
out by Justice Parker in his dissent, however, this incongruity was not
before the Court, since a verdict of not guilty was returned on the first
count and it was not before the Court on appeal.
The majority had reversed on the ground that the second count
failed to charge fraudulent intent and failed to name the purchaser, which
elements the majority held necessary for conviction. The statute pro-
scribes the sale, offer to sell or exposing for sale of certain seed. Where
or is used to connect phrases, they are normally considered to be stated
in the alternative.30 The second count of the indictment, however, uses
and instead of or. Apparently the majority proceeded on the theory
that the use of the word and implied that a sale was charged, since it
held the indictment insufficient because of failure to allege the name of
the purchaser. The dissent on the other hand interpreted the allegation
as also one of an offer to sell, and thus it felt the indictment would have
been sufficient without naming a prospective purchaser.
20250 N.C. 728, 110 S.E.2d 322 (1959).
2038 N.C.L. REv. 277 (1960).
27250 N.C. 514, 108 S.E.2d 858 (1959).
Id. at 515, 108 S.E.2d at 859.2 9Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
"E.g., State v. Walters, 97 N.C. 489, 2 S.E. 539 (1887); 82 C.J.S. Statutes
§ 335 (1953).
[Vol. 38
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
Sentencing Problems
In State v. Cor31 the defendant was charged under one warrant with
driving after his license had been revoked and under another warrant
with speeding. The charges were consolidated for trial and given docket
numbers 6711 and 6712 respectively. The defendant was convicted of
both charges and the judgment stated that sentence in case 6711 was to
run consecutively, and not concurrently, with sentence in case 6712.
The sentence in case 6712 said it was to run consecutively with the sen-
tence in case 6711. Nowhere did the trial judge specify which sentence
was to be served first. The Supreme Court, ex mero motu, remanded
the case for proper judgment which should be framed to indicate in what
order the sentences were to be served. This is the first time the precise
point has been decided in North Carolina. 32 The Court in the Corl
case recognized the intent of the trial judge to have the sentences run
consecutively, but refused to allow the sentences to stand with no indi-
cation of the order in which they were to be discharged. Some courts
have held in this situation that the sentences will run concurrently re-
gardless of the intent of the trial judge.33 The more modern view, how-
ever, seems to be that in the absence of a stated order the appellate
court will infer that the sentences are to be served in the order of their
docket numbers,34 i.e., the sentence here to be served first would be 6711.
Where the intent of the trial judge is clear that the sentences are to
be consecutive, it would seem to be the better rule to imply the order of
service rather than remand for another judgment. The Court in the
Corl case appeared to be concerned with the possibility of a reversal of
one sentence or some shortening of one of the sentence terms. In the
event one was shortened the Court felt that the second sentence would
take immediate effect at conclusion of the shortened term only if the trial
judge had specified that the one which was shortened was to be served
first and the second sentence was to commence upon its expiration. The
same result, however, could be reached by the suggested inference that
sentences are to be served in the order of their docket numbers.
In State v. Green 5 the defendant specifically objected to the suspen-
sion of his sentence on condition, among others, that he not drive his
250 N.C. 252, 108 S.E2d 608 (1959).
8 An oft-quoted dictum in In re Black, 162 N.C. 457, 459, 78 S.E. 273 (1913),
states that "the sentence must state that the latter term is to begin at the expira-
tion of the former one; otherwise, it will run concurrently with it." The Court in
the Cori case departs from the dictum in that it holds the sentence not to be con-
current and it requires that the order of serving be made explicit in the language
of the sentence.
SE.g., Puccinelli v. United States, 5 F.2d 6 (9th Cir. 1925).Unte States v. Daugherty, 269 U.S. 360 (1925) ; Jackson v. State, 91 Ga.
App. 291, 85 S.E.2d 444 (1954). See generally 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1996 (g)
(1941).
251 N.C. 141, 110 S.E.2d 805 (1959), also discussed in CRiuINAL LAW AND
PRocFDuRE, Motor Vehicles, supra.
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automobile upon the public highways for twelve months. Although only
the Department of Motor Vehicles may suspend or revoke an operator's
license,3 6 the court may suspend the sentence on a conviction for driving
under the influence of intoxicating liquor on condition that defendant
not drive for a specified period. Any conditional suspension of a sen-
tence must be with the consent of the defendant37 On appeal the Green
case, therefore, was remanded for proper judgment since defendant had
not consented. The Court further noted that G.S. § 15-180.1 was effec-
tive at the time of the lower court's judgment and applicable to this case.
This statute does away with the old rule that consent to the terms of a
suspended sentence operates as a waiver of the right to appeal on the
merits.38 Thus in this case defendant could have consented to the sus-
pension and still obtained review on his assignments of substantive error.
Concurrent Jurisdiction
In State v. Clayton3 9 defendant's case was pending for trial in Vance
County recorder's court, and he had given appearance bond and re-
quested a jury trial in that court. The solicitor, without notice to the
defendant, took a nolle prosequi in recorder's court and an indictment
was brought in Vance County superior court for the same offense that
had been docketed for trial in recorder's court. The two courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over the offense charged. Defendant contended
that the recorder's court had taken jurisdiction of the offense to the
exclusion of the superior court. The Supreme Court held, however, that
a nolle prosequi divests the recorder's court of jurisdiction and thus
leaves the superior court free to hear the case.
G.S. § 7-64 provides that where there is concurrent jurisdiction, it
is to be exercised exclusively "by the court first taking cognizance there-
of." In addition North Carolina has been cited4" as one of those juris-
dictions which will not permit what was done in the Clayton case. State
v. Williford4l is the case cited to support the statement that the State can-
not, after filing an indictment or information in a court having concur-
rent jurisdiction, enter a nolle prosequi and file an indictment or infor-
mation charging the same crime in another court having concurrent
jurisdiction. The Court in the Clayton case pointed out that Williford
was not authority for this proposition because no nolle prosequi had been
filed. The Court relied on the case of State v. McNeill,42 the facts of
which put it directly in point as authority for the holding in Clayton.
1 State v. Cole, 241 N.C. 576, 86 S.E.2d 203 (1955).
7 Ibid.
"8 This statute is discussed in Criminal Procedure, Comments on North Caro-
lina 1959 Session Laws, 38 N.C.L. REv. 174-75 (1960).
'p251 N.C. 261, 111 S.E.2d 299 (1959).16 C.J. Criminal Law § 789Y2 (1918).
"91 N.C. 529 (1884).
4210 N.C. 183 (1824).
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G.S. § 7-64, however, was not in effect when the McNeill case was
decided.
The Clayton case, if read literally, would permit the solicitor of the
superior court and the solicitor of recorder's court to harass a defendant
by going from court to court a number of times. Since no limit is im-
posed on the discretion of the solicitor, the solicitor of the superior court
could now take a nolle prosequi and the solicitor of the recorder's court
could bring the action again in that court. If the purpose of the change
is simply to harass, the Court will surely disallow this process, but since
the solicitor is not required to give any reason for taking a nolle prosequi
the possibility of abuse seems to be present.
Prosecutor's Mention of Death Penalty Before Jury
The Court in the cases of State v. Pugh3 and State v. Manning4
held it to be reversible error for the solicitor or the trial judge to tell the
jury that the State is seeking the death penalty in a capital case. These
cases are the subject of a Note in this volume.45
DAMAGES
EMINENT DOMAIN-INTEREST ON THE JUDGMENT
In Red Springs City Bd. of Educ. v. McMillan,' where condemnor
was a state agency, the Court held that interest on the judgment was
recoverable from the date of the taking. However, the North Carolina
cases are not in accord on the question of whether interest on a judgment
is recoverable when the condemnor is a governmental entity. Both the
present case and the North Carolina law in this area are discussed in a
Note in this volume.2
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
PARENTS' LIABILITY FOR TORTS OF THEIR CHILD
In Lane v. Chatham' the mother of a nine-year-old boy was held
liable in tort for her son's wrongful act of shooting plaintiff in the eye
with a BB gun. The evidence tended to show that although the mother
48250 N.C. 278, 108 S.E.2d 649 (1959).
" 251 N.C. 1, 110 S.E.2d 474 (1959).
" 38 N.C.L. REV. 281 (1960).
1250 N.C. 485, 108 S.E.2d 895 (1959).
238 N.C.L. REv. 89 (1959).
'251 N.C. 400, 111 S.E.2d 598 (1959). For further treatment of this case see
TORTS, Liability of Parent for Tort of Child, infra. For parents' liability for torts
of the child see Note, 19 N.C.L. Rv. 605 (1941).
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had notice of the son's propensity to shoot people with the BB gun, she
did nothing to restrict or supervise its use. This decision is consistent
with previous cases, 2 and a composite of all the North Carolina cases
indicates that although the mere relationship of parent and child will not
make a parent liable for a child's wrongful acts,3 the parent may be held
liable when (1) the child at the time of the tort is the agent of the
parent ;4 (2) the parent is negligent by failing to control a child when
the parent knows or should know that the child is conducting himself
so as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to others;5 (3) the
child injures someone while driving an automobile used for family
purposes. 6
The Court, in the principal case, reversed the lower court's holding
that the father was liable, stating that there was no evidence that he knew
of his son's misuse of the gun; plaintiff's contention that the mere act
of the parents in giving the minor a gun constituted negligence was
rejected by the Court on the ground that it is a universal rule that an
air rifle is not a dangerous instrumentality.7 justice Higgins, in a con-
2 In Taylor v. Stewart, 172 N.C. 203, 90 S.E. 134 (1916), the father was held
liable when his thirteen-year-old son, while driving the father's automobile, killed
the plaintiff's intestate. The evidence tended to show that although the father had
no knowledge of and had given no consent to the son's driving on this particular
occasion, he had allowed the son to drive in violation of the statute on numerous
occasions over a period of three years. See also dictum in Brittingham v. Stadiem,
151 N.C. 299, 66 S.E. 128 (1909).
When a nineteen-year-old son, known by his father to be a careless driver, was
forbidden to use the automobile on the day that he injured the plaintiff, the Court
rejected plaintiff's contention that the father was negligent in not locking up the
car and held the father not liable. Linville v. Nissen, 162 N.C. 95, 77 S.E. 1096
(1913).
In Bowen v. Mewborn, 218 N.C. 423, 11 S.E.2d 372 (1940), a suit for damages
the father had encouraged his son, who was under sixteen, to have illicit sexual
intercourse. The father was held not liable as a matter of law when the son
attempted to rape the plaintiff, the Court saying that the father could not have
reasonably foreseen that his advice would lead to the particular assault. This
result is criticized in Note, 19 N.C.L. REv. 605 (1941), on the grounds that thefather's advice could have resulted only in such wrongful acts as fornication,
adultery, or rape, and the father should not escape liability for failing to anticipate
which of these acts the son would happen to select.
The parents of a twenty-four-year-old boy who was discharged from a mental
institution were held not liable for a homicide committed by their son since there
was no evidence that they had notice of his homicidal tendencies. The Court went
on to say, however, that it would be possible in the event of "gross negligence"
to hold those in charge of the boy liable. Ballinger v. Rader, 153 N.C. 488, 69
S.E. 497 (1910).
'Hawes v. Haynes, 219 N.C. 535, 14 S.E.2d 503 (1941); Staples v. Bruns, 218
N.C. 780, 11 S.E.2d 460 (1940); Bowen v. Mewborn, 218 N.C. 423, 11 S.E.2d372 (1940); Taylor v. Stewart, 172 N.C. 203, 90 S.E. 134 (1916); Linville v.
Nissen, 162 N.C. 95, 77 S.E. 1096 (1913) ; Brittingham v. Stadiem, 151 N.C. 299,
66 S.E. 128 (1909).
A Brittingham v. Stadiem, 151 N.C. 299, 66 S.E. 128 (1909) (twelve-year-old
boy, while keeping store for his parents, negligently shot plaintiff with a pistol).
' Cases cited note 2 supra.
' Watts v. Lefler, 190 N.C. 722, 130 S.E. 630 (1925) ("family purpose doc-
trine!').
ith regard to giving minors dangerous weapons see Note, 22 N.C.L. REv.333 (1944). The Court has also held that an automobile is not a dangerous instru-
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curring opinion, said that "decisions that air rifles are not per se dan-
gerous weapons are as out of date as the horse and buggy.' 8
DEED BY WIFE TO HUSBAND BY WAY OF THIRD PARTY
By virtue of G.S. § 52-12 a wife cannot convey any interest in her
separate real property to her husband without taking a private examina-
tion before a certifying officer who makes a finding that the conveyance
is not unreasonable or injurious to her. It is well established that this
requirement cannot be circumvented by conveying the property to a
third person with the understanding that the third person is to convey
an interest to the husband.9 This position was followed in Brinson v.
Kirby,1 where the wife, without complying with G.S. § 52-12, conveyed
her separate property to a third party who three days later conveyed the
property back to the wife and husband as tenants by the entirety; both
deeds were recorded within a half hour of each other. The court stated
that if the purpose of the transaction was to divest the wife of her sepa-
rate estate and vest it in husband and wife by the entirety, then failure to
comply with G.S. § 52-12 rendered the deeds void. The trial court was
held in error for refusing to admit evidence of such purpose."
DEED BY WIFE OF ENTIRETIES PROPERTY TO THIRD PARTY-
TITLE BY ESTOPPEL
In Harrell v. Powell'2 a married woman executed a contract to
convey land held by the entireties to a third party; her husband did not
join in the contract.' 3 The Court held that she was estopped, after her
husband's death, to deny the validity of the contract to convey. Al-
though this rule has been applied to a wife's conveyance of her separate
estate -'4 this is the first application of the rule to an estate by the entireties.
The general rule is that "estoppel is applied against those who are
capable of acting in their own right in respect of the matter at issue,
and not against those under a specific disability in respect of it."' 5  A
married woman is prevented by the North Carolina Constitution from
conveying her separate estate to a third person without her husband's
mentality in the hands of a minor. Linville v. Nissen, 162 N.C. 95, 77 S.E. 1096(1913).
8 251 N.C. at 406, 111 S.E.2d at 603.
'Davis v. Vaughn, 243 N.C. 486, 91 S.E.2d 165 (1956), 34 N.C.L. Rav. 571
(1956).
10251 N.C. 73, 110 S.E.2d 482 (1959).
a' For further discussion of this case see REAL PROPERTY, Estates by the Entirety,infra.
1-251 N.C. 636, 112 S.E.2d 81 (1960), also discussed in REAL PROPERTY, Estates
by the Entirety, infra.13 A conveyance of an estate by the entirety by one spouse without the joinder
of the other is void. Gray v. Bailey, 117 N.C. 439, 23 S.E. 318 (1895).
14 The leading case is Sills v. Bethea, 178 N.C. 315, 100 S.E. 593 (1919).15Buford v. Mochy, 224 N.C. 235, 239, 29 S.E.2d 729, 732 (1944).
1960]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
consent.16 Therefore, so long as coverture exists she is under a specific
disability and is not estopped from denying the validity of her convey-
ance to a third party.17 But, at the termination of coverture, such as by
death of the husband, the wife is no longer under a contractual disability
and may be estopped.' 8 The principal case extends these rules to a wife's
conveyance of an estate by the entirety to a third party.19
The rule is different, however, when a wife conveys an estate by the
entirety to her husband without complying with G.S. § 52-12 (privy
examination). Even though the husband dies she is not estopped to
deny the validity of the conveyance. 20  This different result is probably
not due to the wife's being under a disability different in kind from that
imposed by article X, section 6 of the North Carolina Constitution, but
rather because allowing an estoppel in this situation would allow an
obvious circumvention of G.S. § 52-12.21
MARRIAGE HEALTH CERTIFICATE
G.S. § 51-14 requires residents of this state who marry outside the
state to file, within sixty days after their return, a health certificate show-
ing that they have conformed to the requirements of the same health
examination as is required for persons marrying within the state.22  In
Hall v. Hal2 8 two North Carolina residents went to South Carolina
where they were married; on their return to this state they failed to file
the required health certificate. The Court, interpreting the statute for
the first time, held that failure to file such a certificate did not invalidate
an otherwise valid marriage.2 4 The Court gave no hint as to the
rationale for the decision. It may be merely an outgrowth of previous
cases holding that failure to obtain a marriage license does not invalidate
an otherwise valid marriage,25 or it may have stemmed from hesitance
of the Court to allow noncompliance with a North Carolina statute to
N.C. CoNsT. art. X, § 6, supplemented by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-2 (1950).lBuford v. Mochy, 224 N.C. 235, 29 S.E.2d 729 (1944).
18 Sills v. Bethea, 178 N.C. 315, 100 S.E. 593 (1919).
19 Where there is an estate by the entirety the wife is under no constitutional
disability, Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 124 S.E. 566 (1924), since article X, sec-
tion 6 of the North Carolina Constitution applies only to the "sole and separate"
property of married women. But she is under a common law disability. See note
13, supra. The Court in the principal case found the two disabilities analogous
and therefore similarly applied the rules of estoppel to both situations.
"
0Wallin v. Rice, 170 N.C. 417, 87 S.E. 239 (1915) ; Smith v. Ingram, 130 N.C.
100, 40 S.E. 984 (1902).
'See Note, 9 N.C.L. Rxv. 216 (1931).
" As to the health examination required of persons marrying within the state
see G.S. §§ 51-9, -13.
250 N.C. 275, 108 S.E.2d 487 (1959).
' Such failure will subject the parties to criminal indictment, however, as pro-
vided by G.S. § 51-13.
2 State v. Parker, 106 N.C. 711, 11 S.E. 517 (1890) ; State v. Robbins, 28 N.C.
23 (1845). Nor is the marriage invalid when the license is procured but is illegal.
Wooley v. Bruton, 184 N.C. 438, 114 S.E. 628 (1922); Maggett v. Roberts, 112
N.C. 71, 16 S.E. 919 (1893).
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invalidate a presumably valid marriage in a sister state.2 6 Though the
Hall case would not be controlling in a case involving the validity of a
marriage performed within this state, it is reasonable to assume that the
Court would hold such marriage valid since a decision to the contrary
would produce the highly incongruous result of a marriage being held
valid when no license is procured, 27 yet invalid when a health certificate,
which is a requisite to procuring a license,28 is not filed.
PATERNITY OF AFTER-BORN CHILD
Byerly v. Tolbert,29 where the trial court was held in error for hold-
ing as a matter of law that a child born 322 days after the death of the
purported father could not be his child for purposes of sharing in his
personal estate, 0 is discussed at length in WILLS, After-born Child,
infra.
EQUITABLE REMEDIES
MISTAKE
In Wright v. McMullan' the plaintiff, who had bought savings bonds
in his sons' names without their knowledge, brought a declaratory
judgment action to determine ownership, alleging that he did not intend
to vest title in the sons. The Court ruled that mere ignorance of law
" Generally a state of residence will recognize the validity of a marriage valid
where celebrated. State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242 (1877) ; Note, 8 N.C.L. REv. 203(1930). Such marriage may be held void, however, if the parties go to another
state to evade the laws of the state of residence, State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251(1877); or where the marriage shocks the morals of the public of the state of
residence. See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251 (1877) (miscegenation) ; State
v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242 (1877) (dictum) (polygamy) ; State v. Brown, 47 Ohio St.
102, 23 N.E. 747 (1890) (incest). In the principal case no intention by the parties
to evade North Carolina laws was found by the trial court. Record, p. 28. Ap-
pellant, in his brief argued that the parties by failing to file a health certificate
violated a "distinctive policy of this State" of maintaining "biological purity of
the blood" by "permitting marriage only by those who had demonstrated their
freedom from venereal disease," and thus the marriage in question should be de-
clared void. Brief for Appellant, p. 6. Granting that such a policy exists and that
it is sound, it would appear to be wholly inapplicable to residents marrying out of
state since G.S. § 51-14 does not require the certificate until sixty days after their
return to this state following the marriage. The deadline date for filing the cer-
tificate could thus be extended so long as the parties delayed their return to the
state though maintaining their residence in this state.
As to the soundness of the theory of health certificates see Note, 13 Micn. L.
REv. 39 (1914) which suggests that the effect is more to discourage marriage than
to inhibit venereal disease.
" Cases cited note 25 supra.
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-9 (1950).
"250 N.C. 27, 108 S.E.2d 29 (1959).
"The Court noted that since there is a presumption that the term of pregnancy
is 280 days, a child born more than 280 days after the death of the purported father
has the burden of proof in proving the relationship.
249 N.C. 591, 107 S.E.2d 98 (1959), also discussed in PERSONAL PROPERTY,
Ownership of United States Savings Bonds, infra.
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without fraud or circumvention is not ground for equitable relief to set
aside conveyances or to avoid the legal effects of acts which may have
been done. The Code of Federal Regulations governing the issuance of
savings bonds provides for the correction of errors ;2 however, the plain-
tiff in the Wright case did not allege any mistake in issuance; he merely
stated that his intentional act produced a different legal consequence
from that which he had contemplated. The North Carolina Court pre-
viously has allowed the correction of an instrument which had been
executed pursuant to a prior agreement, by which both parties meant to
abide, but which instrument failed to express their true intention by
reason of a mistake of law made by both parties,3 but "a mere naked
mistake of law, unattended by any special circumstances furnishes no
ground for relief .... 4
In Smith v. Smith,5 following a divorce of the parties, there was a
proceeding by the ex-wife to partition property which had been con-
veyed to "J. B. Smith and wife, Helen W. Smith, creating an Estate by
the entirety." The defense contended that the wife's name had been put
on the deed "through error." It is well settled in North Carolina that
a mere allegation of "mistake" is not sufficient to warrant reformation.
If the deed fails to express the true intention of the parties it may be
reformed to express such intent only when the failure is due to the
mutual mistake of the parties,0 to the mistake of one party and fraud
of the other,7 or to a mistake of the draftsman.8 Further, the law pre-
sumes a deed has been correctly written and that it is the true expression
of the parties," and it must stand unless this presumption is rebutted by
clear and convincing proof of the mistake and a showing of the manner
in which the deed ought to be reformed.10 In the Smith case the Court
properly held that there could be no reformation as defendant had met
none of these requirements."
MONEY HAD AND REcE VD
The action for money had and received is a modified form of assump-
sit devised by the common law judges to allow relief from the narrow
common law procedures which afforded no remedy in many meritorious
'31 C.F.R. §315, subpart B (1959).
'Kornegay v. Everett, 99 N.C. 29, 5 S.E. 418 (1888).
'Pelletier v. Interstate Cooperage Co., 158 N.C. 403, 406, 74 S.E. 112, 113
(1912).(249 N.C. 669, 107 S.E.2d 530 (1959). This case is also discussed under REAL
PROPERTY, Deeds-Exchange of Deeds by Tenants in Common, infra, and CVIL
PROCEDURE, Pleading-Prior Action Pending, supra.
' Maxwell v. Wayne Nati Bank, 175 N.C. 180, 95 S.E. 147 (1918).
'America Potato Co. v. Jeanette Bros. Co., 174 N.C. 236, 93 S.E. 795 (1917).
Pelletier v. Interstate Cooperage Co., 158 N.C. 403, 74 S.E. 112 (1912).
, Crawford v. Willoughby, 192 N.C. 268, 134 S.E. 494 (1926).
oFinishing & Warehouse Co. v. Ozment, 132 N.C. 839, 44 S.E. 681 (1903).11See also Crawford v. Willoughby, 192 N.C. 269, 134 S.E. 494 (1926).
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cases.12 Although it is an action at law it is equitable in nature and is
said to resemble, or to be a substitute for, a suit in equity and to lie
whenever a suit in equity would lie.13 Generally, when money is paid to
another under the influence of a mistake of fact and it would not have
been paid had the paying party known the fact, it may be recovered 4
under the theory that such payment has unjustly enriched the recipient
at the expense of the paying party.15 An express promise to repay is
not necessary to support the right to recover; and the law implies such
a promise from the possession of the money and the equitable duty to
repay it.16 The fact that the party paying by mistake was guilty of
negligence in not discovering the mistake before he paid the money is
immaterial as far as the right to recover is concerned. 17
In Dean v. Mattox18 certain timber was pointed out to plaintiff by
defendant as being part of a 176.1 acre tract. Plaintiff paid a price for
the tract which included an amount for this timber. The timber was
not on the 176.1 acres, and plaintiff having cut the timber subsequently
had to pay the true owner for it. He sued defendant to recover the
money paid out to the actual owner, claiming mutual mistake of fact.
Recovery was allowed under an action for money had and received. The
Court pointed out that the remedy of recission was not available to the
plaintiff, as the parties could not be placed in statu quo. The Court
relied on Allgood v. Wilmington Trust Co.' and stated that the test
in an action for money had and received was "not whether the defendant
acquired the money honestly and in good faith, but rather, has he the
right to retain it."'20 Defendant's further contention that plaintiff was
precluded from recovering by the doctrine of caveat emptor was held not
to be applicable here as both parties mistakenly understood that the
timber in controversy was on defendant's 176.1 acre tract.
A different, but distinguishable, result was reached in Tarlton v.
Keith,21 where plaintiff was not allowed to recover either the value of
timberland, not included in his deed due to defendant's mistake, or the
commission received by defendants. Here in a sale of timberland the
defendant broker had misrepresented a boundary, and plaintiff's suit
was based on mistake. However, since the defendant was merely the
agent of the owner, and since the owner knew the correct boundary line,
there was no mutual mistake. Furthermore, after plaintiff surveyed his
" 4A. JuR. Ass"mpsit §20 (1936).
" Annot, 52 Anm. Dec. 752 (1910).
144 AM. JuR. Assumpsit § 24 (1936).
"Morgan v. Spruill, 214 N.C. 255, 199 S.E. 17 (1938).
" Bahnson v. Clemmons, 79 N.C. 556 (1878).
" Annot., 64 Am. Dec. 95 (1911).
" 250 N.C. 246, 108 S.E.2d 541 (1959).
10242 N.C. 506, 88 S.E.2d 825 (1955).
20 250 NXC. at 249, 108 S.E.2d at 544.
21250 N.C. 298, 108 S.E.2d 621 (1959).
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purchase and found that part of the timber which had been pointed out
to him was not his, he sold the timber he did own for more than he paid
for it. There was found to be no cause of action against the defendant
broker for recovery of the alleged shortage because there had been only
unilateral mistake22 on the part of the plaintiffs and no attempt had been
made to join the owner and rescind the contract; nor did plaintiff have
a cause of action to recover the commission which defendant had re-
ceived because defendant had not been unjustly enriched. The Court
stated that generally when one pays money to another under a mistake
of fact and he would not have paid it had he known that the fact was
otherwise, the money can be recovered. An exception to that rule was
applied, however, because a payment induced by mistake cannot be re-
covered if the payee, in equity and good conscience, is entitled to keep
the money so received. Here the defendant broker had performed
seriices in selling the land; and there was no action brought against the
grantors to avoid the contract. Therefore, the defendants should have
been entitled to keep the commission.
EVIDENCE
SPECIFIC ACTS OF UNCHASTITY OF PROSECUTRIX IN RAPE PROSECUTION
"It is generally accepted ...that the bad character for chastity of
the complainant in a rape charge is relevant and admissible to show the
probability of her consent to the intercourse. In evidencing this char-
acter, may particular acts of the woman's unchastity be resorted to, as
showing her to be a person more prone than another to have con-
sented?"' The courts are not in accord. The majority rule seems to be
that specific acts of unchastity of the prosecutrix with third persons are
inadmissible either to impeach or to show consent.2 However, some
jurisdictions which refuse the evidence for impeachment purposes admit
it on the issue of consent.3 Professor Wigmore takes as the better
view the one which admits the evidence to show consent. 4 He ap-
proaches the problem in this manner: The dangers are (1) that an
innocent victim of a carnal assault will be falsely accused; and (2) that
an innocent defendant will be at the mercy of an unscrupulous and
" The Court stated that North Carolina had not adopted the doctrine that uni-
lateral mistake unaccompanied by fraud, imposition, undue influence, or like cir-
cumstances of oppression is enough to avoid a contract.
'WIGMoRE, EVmENCE § 200 (3d ed. 1940).
WIGMORE, EvDENCE § 200 (3d ed. 1940) ; Annot., 140 A.L.R. 364, 380 (1942).
'E.g., State v. Wood, 59 Ariz. 48, 122 P2d 416 (1942).
'WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 200 (3d ed. 1940). Justice Cardozo takes a position in
agreement with Professor Wigrnore. CAmDozo, THE NATuim OF THE JUDICUAL
PROCESS 156 (1921).
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revengeful prosecutrix. In view of the graver consequences of con-
victing an innocent defendant and the practical frequency of either dan-
ger Wigmore concludes that the admission of the evidence is preferable.
He admits, however, that determining which danger is more prevalent
and which most needs the court's protection must depend on the expe-
rience and the sentiments of each community.
In State v. Grundler5 the defendant attempted to show by direct
examination of his witness that the prosecutrix had had relations with
the witness on the night of the alleged rape, contending that such evi-
dence was competent as tending to show consent to the alleged act of
the defendant. The Court in affirming the exclusion of the evidence
quoted reasons usually given for excluding evidence of specific acts of
misconduct offered for purposes of impeachment. 7 However, it is
apparent that the Court intended to deal with the consent issue only,
since such evidence was clearly inadmissible for impeachment purposes.8
The North Carolina Court in excluding the evidence was undoubtedly
motivated by some of the following factors: The prosecutrix would have
only her protestations of innocence on which to rely to rebut a witness'
accusations, since acts of intimacy are usually accomplished in private.
The admission of such evidence would encourage fraudulent accusations
against innocent victims of carnal assault, and would tend to discourage
victims of rape from pressing prosecution because of the fear that their
character would be specifically assailed. Innocence and virtue of the
prosecutrix is not a prerequisite to the crime of rape-prostitutes may
be the victims of rape.9 The defendant is not put to any real disadvan-
tage since he can still show the prosecutrix's reputation for unchastity.
For impeachment purposes he can cross examine her about specific acts,
and although he is bound by her answer,10 the jury will nevertheless
have an opportunity to observe her demeanor and draw its own con-
clusions.
The present law in North Carolina in rape and related offenses seems
to be that: (1) Direct evidence of specific acts of unchastity of the
prosecutrix uith the defendant is admissible to show consent to the act
in question." (2) Evidence of specific acts of unchastity with third
5251 N.C. 177, 111 S.E.2d 1 (1959).
The Court cited and relied upon State v. Jefferson, 28 N.C. 305 (1846).
Such reasons are usually stated to be: (1) unfair surprise, i.e., the witness
whose character is being attacked is unprepared to rebut specific attacks on her
character; (2) confusion of issues, i.e., the witness's character is only a collateral
issue and direct evidence on it only tends to confuse the jury; (3) unreasonable
delay, i.e., such specific evidence delays the trial and consumes an unwarranted
amount of time. See generally STANSBtuRY, EVIDENCE § 111 (1946); WIGMORE,
EvmECE § 979 (3d ed. 1940).
' STANSBuRY, EVIDENCE § 111 (1946).
State v. Long, 93 N.C. 542 (1885).
STANSBURY, EVIDENCE § 111 (1946).
1' State v. Jefferson, 28 N.C. 305 (1846) (dictum).
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parties may be brought out on cross-examination of the prosecutrix,'2
but only for purposes of impeachment,'" and the defendant is bound by
her answer.' 4  (3) The prosecutrix's reputation for the specific character
trait of unchastity may not be inquired into on direct examination of
the defendant's witnesses to impeach her ;15 however, such evidence may
be volunteered by the witness in response to an inquiry as to the prose-
cutrix's general reputation. 16 It is probably permissible on direct
examination to inqure about the specific character trait of unchastity
in order to show consent.17  (4) Evidence of a specific character trait,
brought out on cross examination, is competent both for impeachment
purposes' 8 and to show consent.19
IDENTIFICATION OF ANTIPHONAL PARTY
In Everette v. D. 0. Briggs Lumber Co.2 0 the defendant challenged
the admissibility of seven telephone conversations relied on by the plain-
tiff to establish the contract on which he sued. Two of the calls were
made by the plaintiff to defendant's place of business. In one instance
a person purporting to be the defendant answered. In the other instance
the defendant was out at the time, but a party purporting to be the de-
fendant called the plaintiff back later the same day. These two calls
were clearly admissible.21 The other five calls were made to the plain-
1 State v. Murray, 63 N.C. 31 (1868).
"State v. Grundler, 251 N.C. 177, 111 S.E.2d 1 (1959).
1 4 STANSBURY, EVIDENCE § 111 (1946).10 STANSBURY, EVIDENCE § 114 (1946).10Ibid.
17 State v. Grundler, 251 N.C. 177, 192, 111 S.E.2d 1, 11 (1959) (dictum);
State v. Daniel, 87 N.C. 507 (1882) (dictum that evidence of prosecutrix's repu-
tation for virtue, a specific character trait, can be elicited on direct examination of
defendant's witness to show consent, even though she is not called as a witness) ;
State v. Jefferson, 28 N.C. 305 (1846) (suggestion that evidence that prosecutrix
is a strumpet would be admissible to show consent). But see State v. Hairston,
121 N.C. 579, 28 S.E. 492 (1897).
By way of analogy it is noted that, where the defendant pleads self defense in
a prosecution for homicide, evidence of the deceased's character for violence may
be inquired into on direct examination of the defendant's witnesses. STANSBURY,
EVIDENCE §§ 106, 114 (1946).
's STANSBURY, EVIDENCE § 114 (1946).
10 State v. Jefferson, 28 N.C. 305 (1846) (dictum).
20250 N.C. 688, 110 S.E.2d 288 (1959), also discussed in BusINEss ASSoCIA-
TIONS, Corporations-Ultra Vires Acts, supra.
21 See International Harvester Co. v. Caldwell, 198 N.C. 751, 153 S.E. 325
(1930). See also State v. Burleson, 198 N.C. 61, 150 S.E. 628 (1929) ; STANSBURY,
EVIDENCE § 96 (1946). "According to the weight of authority, evidence is admis-
sible as to a conversation over the telephone where the witness called for a desig-
nated person or firm at his or its place of business and the person answering the
call claims to be the person called for ... and the conversation carried on is one
regarding the business transacted by such person or firm." 20 Am. Jun. Evidence
§ 367 (1939). "It has been said that telephone calls purporting to have been made
by a person are never admissible against him without some proof identifying him
as the caller. Where, however, the witness testifies that he made a call for a
designated individual and was informed that the person called was not in his office
at the time, a later call purporting to come from such person has been held admis-
sible." 20 AM. JuR. Evidence § 366 (1939).
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tiff by a party purporting to be the defendant. These calls, standing
alone, were clearly inadmissible.22 However, the plaintiff testified that
the voice was the same in all seven calls. The defendant admitted that
he was the antiphonal party in the call made by the plaintiff. Held: The
plaintiff's testimony that the antiphonal party was the same in all seven
calls, plus the defendant's testimony that he was the antiphonal party
to one of the calls, was sufficient to identify the defendant as the antiph-
onal party in the five otherwise inadmissible calls.
It would seem that there was sufficient identification of the defendant
even without his admission that he was the antiphonal party to one of
the admissible calls. Two of the calls were admissible under an accepted
rule of evidence, even though the plaintiff had never before heard the
defendant's voice. For purposes of admissibility this would seem to
have established the plaintiff's knowledge of the defendant's voice. Since
the plaintiff testified that this same party was the caller in the five calls
to the plaintiff, this would seem to identify sufficiently the defendant as
the antiphonal party to these calls. However, in the light of the de-
fendant's admission it was unnecessary for the Court to decide this point.
RELEVANCY OF INJURIES To THIRD PARTIES IN PROSECUTION FOR
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED
In State v. Green23 the defendant was being prosecuted for driving
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The evidence showed
that defendant's car had gone out of control and struck a little girl push-
ing a bicycle. The State's witnesses were allowed to testify as to the
nature and extent of the injuries sustained by the little girl, over de-
fendant's objection that such testimony was irrelevant and calculated
to prejudice his cause and create sympathy for the State's case. How-
ever, at defendant's request the trial court charged the jury not to con-
sider an injury to another person growing out of the car wreck, that the
only issue was whether defendant was driving while intoxicated. On
appeal the Court held that "the testimony that the child was injured,
that the injuries were serious and that she was hospitalized, was clearly
relevant as bearing upon the manner of operation of the automobile and
the lack of control by defendant. 2 4
North Carolina, in a manslaughter prosecution predicated on exces-
sive speeding and driving while intoxicated, has allowed evidence of the
existence of injuries to the occupants of the car with which defendant's
2 Griffin Mfg. Co. v. Bray, 193 N.C. 350, 137 S.E. 151 (1927). See also Note,
11 N.C.L. Rzv. 344 (1933) : "EW]here the witness answers a telephone call and
there is no evidence to authenticate the antiphonal speaker, except that the states
his name, the evidence is inadmissible as hearsay."
- 251 N.C. 40, 110 S.E.2d 609 (1959), also discussed in CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE, Criminal Procedure-Arrest, supra.
2' 251 N.C. at 45, 110 S.E.2d at 613.
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car collided, in order to show the speed of defendant's car.25 Decisions
in other jurisdictions are in conflict on the issue of admissibility of evi-
dence of injuries to third persons in prosecutions for driving while
intoxicated. The holdings fall into four categories: (1) Evidence of
injuries to third persons and of damage to the other vehicle is irrelevant
and immaterial to the question of whether the defendant was driving
while intoxicated. 26  (2) Evidence of injuries to other persons and the
location of these persons after the collision is admissible, but details as
to the extent of the injuries are inadmissible.2 7  (3) Evidence of the
existence of injuries to third persons is admissible, but the court so
holding expressed no opinion as to the extent the injuries may be
shown. 28  (4) Evidence of the injuries in detail, including the length
of time the injured party spent in the hospital, 29 is admissible to shed
light on the force of the collision, the speed at which defendant's car was
moving, and the manner of its operation."0 Texas8l has stated that
evidence of pain and suffering resulting from the injury would be in-
admissible, because that would shed no light upon the manner of opera-
tion of the automobile.
It should be noted that the cases allowing evidence of injury to be
admitted involve injuries sustained by occupants of cars.3 2  Ordinarily
an occupant of a car is seriously injured only when there has been an
extraordinary or forceful impact upon the car in which he is riding,
whereas a pedestrian is usually more seriously injured with much less
impact than is a person protected by the exterior of an automobile. Since
the little girl in the instant case was a pedestrian, it is questionable
whether the fact and extent of her injuries would shed much light upon
"the manner of operation of the automobile and the lack of control by
"' State v. Leonard, 195 N.C. 242, 141 S.E. 736 (1928).
2Walker v. State, 37 Ala. App. 639, 74 So. 2d 617, cert. denied, 261 Ala. 700,
74 So. 2d 618 (1954) ; Goodwin v. State, 36 Ala. App. 680, 62 So. 2d 801 (1953) ;
Phillips v. State, 25 Ala. App. 286, 145 So. 169 (1932) ; Howard v. State, 24 Ala.
App. 191, 132 So. 459 (1931) ; City of St. Louis v. Cain, 137 S.W.2d 603 (Mo.
App. 1940).
27 Bryant v. State, 302 P.2d 787 (Okla. Crim. 1956).
ZR People v. Dennis, 132 Misc. 410, 230 N.Y. Supp. 510 (Cortland County Ct.
1928).
2 Massoletti v. State, 303 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Crim. 1957). In the Green case our
Court viewed testimony recounting the witnesses' visits to the hospital to see the
child as being in the twilight of relevancy, but felt that any error, if made, was
cured by the trial court's instructions.
2" Sanders v. State, 97 Ga. App. 158, 102 S.E.2d 635 (1958) ; People v. Jeffers,
372 Ill. 590, 25 N.E.2d 35, cert. denied, 310 U.S. 638 (1940) ; Pribyl v. State, 165
Neb. 691, 87 N.W.2d 201 (1957); Massoletti v. State, 303 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Crim.
1957) ; Van Ness v. State, 159 Tex. Grim. 295, 263 S.W.2d 162 (1953) ; Atkinson
v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 556, 251 S.W.2d 401 (1952) ; Allen v. State, 149 Tex.
Crim. 612, 197 S.W.2d 1013 (1946); Brewer v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 9, 143
S.W.2d 599 (1940) ; Ladd v. State, 115 Tex. Crim. 355, 27 S.W.2d 1098 (1930).
"' Allen v. State, supra note 30.
82 Brewer v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 9, 143 S.W.2d 599 (1940), is the exception.
There the injured parties were standing around a wrecked car when the defendant
careened into them.
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defendant." It is arguable that the relevancy of the evidence is remote,
and that in the light of the obvious prejudice to defendant it should have
been excluded. 83
DEAD MAN'S STATUTE
In Lamm v. Gardner3' the plaintiff alleged that she was riding as a
passenger in A's car which collided with that of B, defendant's intestate,
and that she was injured as a result of the joint negligence of A and B.
Plaintiff's theory of A's negligence was that A failed to take proper
precautions to avoid the collision. Plaintiff alleged and A admitted that
B had zigzagged across the highway in approaching A's car. On A's
objection the trial court refused to allow plaintiff to testify as to the
manner in which B operated his car. On appeal the Court, recognizing
that such testimony was incompetent as against B's administrator under
the Dead Man's Statute, G.S. § 8-51, nevertheless held that such testi-
mony was admissible against A. The testimony was allowed under the
rule that evidence, incompetent as to one party, will not be excluded if it
is competent as to another party.3 5 The proper procedure in such a
case is to limit the evidence by instructions to the jury.
DEFINITENESS OF MEDICAL TESTIMONY
In North Carolina a medical expert is confined to stating certain or
probable consequences, as opposed to possible consequences, of the future
effects of a personal injury.36 However, a statement that a "very small
percentage" of those suffering head injuries will develop epileptic fits
as a result of such an injury was held in Fisher v. Rogers37 to be suffi-
ciently certain to be admissible. This would seem to indicate that,
though a phsyician may not state that a certain condition "might" result
from the injury, yet he may state that this condition follows from the
injury in a certain percentage, e.g., five per cent, of the cases involving
that type of injury.
11 See STANsEuRY, EVmENCE § 80 (1946) : "Even relevant evidence may, how-
ever, be subject to exclusion where its probative force is comparatively weak and
the likelihood of its playing upon the passions and prejudices of the jury is great."
"1250 N.C. 540, 108 S.E.2d 847 (1959).
" STANSBURY, EVnDENCE § 79 (1946).
" Dickson v. Queen City Coach Co., 233 N.C. 167, 63 S.E.2d 297 (1951) ; Dulin
v. Henderson-Gilmer Co., 192 N.C. 638, 135 S.E. 614 (1926) ; Alley v. Charlotte
Pipe & Foundry Co., 159 N.C. 327, 74 S.E. 885 (1912).
'251 N.C. 610, 112 S.E2d 76 (1960).
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INSURANCE
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
Liability
In Textile Ins. Co. v. Lambeth' plaintiff insurer sought a declaratory
judgment that neither of two policies of liability insurance issued by it
to the insured covered insured's liability to the defendants arising out of
a collision between the insured's truck and a tractor-trailer owned by
one of the defendants.
One of the policies involved had two endorsements which, in effect,
limited the insured's liability coverage to operation of the vehicles within
a radius of fifty miles from the place at which they were principally
garaged or operations authorized by the insured's permit or certificate
of public convenience and necessity covering transport of goods between
all points throughout North Carolina issued by the North Carolina
Utilities Commission. The collision occurred in North Carolina, but
more than fifty miles from the place at which the insured's truck was
principally garaged while it was engaged in an interstate operation. The
Court held that the policy did not cover the accident because: (1) it had
occurred more than fifty miles from the place at which the vehicle in-
volved was principally garaged, and (2) the insured was engaged in
interstate commerce and the endorsement issued by the insurer to meet
the requirements of the Utilities Commission did not extend the policy
coverage to the accident in question because the Utilities Commission
was neither authorized nor empowered to authorize interstate operation.
This holding is in accord with the general rule that a policy endorse-
ment issued to comply with the requirements of a regulatory agency
will provide coverage to the public only with respect to operations
validly authorized by the insured's permit or certificate of public
convenience.2
The other policy involved in Lambeth covered the interstate opera-
tion of one of the vehicles of the insured but not the one involved in the
accident. The defendants offered clear, cogent, and convincing evidence
showing that an agent of the insurer, possessing the requisite authority,
had orally agreed with the insured to extend the policy coverage to the
vehicle involved. The Court, on the basis of this evidence, allowed
the insurance policy to be reformed so as to cover the vehicle in question
on the ground of mutual mistake.
In State Farn Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shaffer3 the Court for the first
time was called upon to interpret the replacement provision in an auto-
250 N.C. 1, 108 S.E.2d 36 (1959).See, e.g., Simon v. American Cas. Co., 146 F.2d 208 (4th Cir. 1944).
8250 N.C. 45, 108 S.E.2d 49 (1959).
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mobile liability insurance policy. The insured owned two automobiles,
one of which was covered by plaintiff insurer and the other by defendant
insurer. The insured traded the car covered by defendant for another
car, and subsequently the insured's nineteen-year-old son, while driving
the newly acquired car, negligently injured several persons. Both poli-
cies' replacement provisions were substantially similar in that each
provided that a replacement automobile must be newly acquired and
must replace the automobile covered by the policy. The Court held that
the provision meant that such replacement vehicle must be actually
acquired after issuance of the policy and that the previously covered
vehicle must be out of the operational control of the insured. Thus,
since the insured still owned the automobile covered by the plaintiff, the
newly acquired car could not be a replacement of that car. Accordingly it
held that the newly acquired automobile was covered by the defendant
insurer.4 The Court rejected the contention of the defendant insurer
that since the insured and his son had treated the newly acquired auto-
mobile as a replacement for the car covered by the plaintiff, this ex-
pressed intent should be determinative of the question. The defendant
argued that this intent was shown by the facts that the policy it issued
was under a Class 1-B rating 5 whereas the policy plaintiff issued was
under a Class 2-A rating covering male drivers under twenty-five years
of age and that the insured permitted his son to use the newly acquired
car regularly. The Court held that the fact that the car was covered by
a policy with a permium rating of Class 1-B did not affect the liability
of the insurer even though the operator at the time of the accident was
a male member of the insured's household under twenty-five years of
age. The Court stated that in order to exclude liability when a male
under twenty-five years of age is driving the car, such exclusion must
be stated in plain and explicit terms in the policy, and it will not be
implied from a premium rating excluding such drivers.6 The Court
'This holding is similar to that in Mitcham v. Travelers Indem. Co., 127 F.2d
27 (4th Cir. 1942), where the policy provided automatic coverage for a newly
acquired replacement vehicle. The insured bought a new car to replace the de-
scribed automobile and left his old car with the dealer for storage and sale. The
court held that the new car was not covered under the policy because to so hold
would be to subject the insurer to liability on the operation of two vehicles at the
same time for one premium, since there was nothing to prevent the insured from
getting back his old car and using it at any time.
' Class 1-B means:
"(b) the Named Insured is not a male operator of the automobile under 25 years
of age, and there is no male operator of the automobile under 25 years of age
resident in the same household as the Named Insured ...
Class 2-A means:
"(b) There is a male operator of the automobile under 25 years of age resident
in the Named Insured's household ... '
'This decision is in line with the general construction of exclusionary policy
terms. See, e.g., Sutton v. Hawkeye Cas. Co., 138 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1943) ; 45
C.J.S. Insmramwe § 585 (1946): "Clauses of warranty, condition, exclusion, and
forfeiture contained in a liability policy must be explicit"
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
thus held that the fact that the premium was paid under a 1-B rating did
not affect the insurer's liability under the policy.
In Squires v. Textile Ins. Co.7 an employee of the insured, while in
the scope of his employment, negligently injured the plaintiff. The
employee was operating his own automobile. Plaintiff sought to recover
under a garage liability insurance policy issued by defendant to the
employer. The policy contained conflicting provisions. It covered em-
ployees driving any automobile which, though not owned by the insured,
was being used in connection with his business. However under the
definition of "insured" the policy excluded any employee when driving
his own automobile. The Court, in holding that the policy covered the
employee, determined that the terms of the policy were conflicting and
ambiguous and followed the settled rule8 that in such case the ambigui-
ties and conflicts are to be resolved against the insurer.
In LeCroy v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co." the Court held that a three-
wheeled motor scooter of the type used by the United States Postal
Service was an "automobile" within the terms of a comprehensive lia-
bility policy, and accordingly the insured was entitled to a recovery. It
refused to accept defendant's contention that the so-called "mailster"
was similar to a motorcycle which has seldom been classed as an
"automobile." 0
Settlement by Insurer
The Court held in Beauchamp v. Clark" and Lampley v. Bell' 2 that
the exercised policy right of the insurer to investigate and settle claims
against the insured as it deems expedient will not bar the right of the
insured or his agent to sue for their personal injuries or property dam-
age because the insurer has no right to compromise the insured's or his
agent's claims without their consent. This rule was reiterated in Camp-
bell v. Brown.'8 Beauchamp and Lampley are the subject of a Note in
this volume.' 4
Subrogation of Paying Insurer
In Southeastern Fire Ins. Co. v. Moore1 the Court held that pay-
ment by an insurer of the damage done to insured's car, less fifty dollars
deductible under the policy terms, did not entitle the insurer to sue the
third party tort-feasor in his own name when the insured had received
1250 N.C. 580, 108 S.E.2d 908 (1959).8 See, e.g. Johnson v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 234 N.C. 25, 65 S.E.2d 347
(1951).
p251 N.C. 19, 110 S.E.2d 463 (1959).1 029A Am. Jtm. Insurance § 1239 (1960).
11250 N.C. 132, 108 S.E.2d 535 (1959).
12250 N.C. 713, 110 S.E.2d 316 (1959).
13251 N.C. 214, 110 S.E.2d 897 (1959).
1438 N.C.L. tRv. 81 (1959).
15250 N.C. 351, 108 S.E2d 618 (1959).
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the money in the form of a "loan" repayable only in the event of recovery
from the tort-feasor. The case is the subject of a Note in this volume.1"
LIFE INSURANCE
Death on Premium Due Date
A question of first impression in North Carolina was presented to
our Court in Long v. Pilot Life Ins. Co.17 The insured had a life
insurance policy which provided for annual payments of the premiums
in advance on or before the eighth day of October of each year. Also
there was a provision for thirty-one days of grace, and in the event of
death within the grace period the unpaid premium for the current year
would be deducted from the proceeds payable to the beneficiary. The
insured died on the premium due date and the insurer deducted the
amount of the annual premium from the proceeds paid to the beneficiary.
The Court upheld this deduction on the reasoning that the due date was
the beginning of a new policy year and the coverage for that date and
the grace period was not a gratuity to the insured, but that the insured
incurred liability for the annual premium due if death occurred on the
due date or within the period of grace. This places North Carolina in
line with the weight of authority on the question. s
Payment of Premium As Creating Lien on Policy
The Court reaffirmed 9 in Harrison v. Winstead2 0 its position that in
the absence of an enforceable contract entered into between the claimant
and the insured, the payment of premiums alone is insufficient to create
a lien on the policy and its proceeds in favor of such claimant.
1- 38 N.CL. REv. 99 (1959).
250 N.C. 590, 108 S.E.2d 840 (1959).
'8 See 29 Am. Jua. Insurance § 513 (1960), which states: "[W]here an insured
dies on the day the annual or periodic premium is due under his life insurance
policy, the insurer may require the payment of the premium by the beneficiary and
deduct the amount of such premiums from the amount paid to the beneficiary underthe p olicy."
"See e.g., Sorrell v. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World, 209 N.C. 226,
183 S.E. 400 (1936).
-0 251 N.C. 113, 110 S.E.2d 903 (1959). The facts in the case were that the
mother of the deceased was the original beneficiary, but the insured had exercised
his right to change the beneficiary in favor of his wife. The mother alleged that
she had loaned money to her son with the policy as security and that she had paid
the premiums on the policy, but the Court would not allow this evidence because
to do so would be a violation of North Carolina's Dead Man Statute, G.S. § 8-51.
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LABOR LAW
UNION'S LIABILITY TO MEMBER FOR FAILURE To SEEK JUDICIAL
ENFORCEMENT OF REINSTATEMENT ORDER
In Glover v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks,' a case of first impression
in North Carolina, the Court considered whether a union member has a
cause of action for damages against his union when it fails to prosecute
fully his claim against a railroad for wrongful discharge. Pursuant to
the Railway Labor Act 2 the union carried plaintiff's claim to the National
Railroad Adjustment Board3 which ruled in plaintiff's favor and ordered
his reinstatement. The railroad refused to reinstate plaintiff or pay his
lost wages. Plaintiff alleged that he had agreed to refrain from seeking
enforcement of the Board's order in the United States District Court in
reliance on the union's promise that it would do so. 4 He further alleged
that the union had failed to seek enforcement of his claim and that, as
a consequence, the two-year statute of limitations on the enforcement
action 5 had run, leaving him with no means of enforcing his claim. The
union demurred on the ground that plaintiff, as a member of an un-
incorporated association, was a co-principal with the other members, all
of whom were equally responsible for the acts of their mutual agents.'
The trial court sustained the demurrer, but the Supreme Court re-
versed. The Court acknowledged the validity of the co-principal doctrine
as applied in the cases cited by defendant,7 but held that the principle did
1250 N.C. 35, 108 S.E.2d 78 (1959), also discussed in CIVIL PROCEDURE, Par-
ties-Real Party in Interest, supra.
2 Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63
(1958).
'The Board is provided for in 44 Stat. 578 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C.
§ 153(i) (1958).
'44 Stat. 578 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §153(p) (1958), reads in part,
"If a carrier does not comply with an order of... [the] Board ... the petitioner
[union], or any person for whose benefit such order was made, may file in the
District Court of the United States . . . a petition . . . . The District Courts
are empowered. . . to make such order ... as may be appropriate to enforce or
set aside the order of the ... Board."
'44 Stat. 578 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 153(q) (1958).
'There were two other grounds for demurrer, both involving the same issue,
which the Court dismissed rather summarily.
The co-principal rule is applied in a number of cases. It is based on the
rationale that an unincorporated association is not a separate entity but has its
existence in the totality of its membership, all members being co-principals and
equally responsible for the acts of their mutual agents. Therefore, if a member
sues a union for the act of its agent, he either divorces himself from the union, in
which case he is not suing the union but only a part thereof, or he considers himself
a part of the union, in which case he is suing himself-a legal incongruity. See
discussion of cases cited by defendant, note 7 infra.
'Several of the cases which the Court mentioned actually involved failure of a
union to represent its members in claims against a railroad. Kordewick v. Brother-
hood of M.R. Firemen, 181 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1950) ; Marchitto v. Central R.L,
9 N.J. 456, 88 A.2d 851 (1952); McClees v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive
Eng'rs, 59 Ohio App. 477, 18 N.E.2d 812 (1938); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen
v. Allen, 148 Tex. 629, 230 S.W.2d 325 (1950). Of these cases only Kordewick
[Vol. 38
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not apply in this case because plaintiff alleged a contractual obligation
on the part of the union to pursue his claim. The Court stated that the
complaint was sufficient against a demurrer since a valid contract and
breach thereof were alleged. In a concurring opinion Justice Bobbitt
discarded the co-principal rule and reasoned that under the Railway
Labor Act the union, not its individual members, became the exclusive
bargaining agent and a separate entity while representing employees;
thus, when the union as a separate entity assumes contractual obligations
to employees regarding representation, it is liable as a separate entity
if it breaches such a contract.
The North Carolina Court is the first to hold that there is a cause of
action in favor of a railroad employee arising out of the failure of his
union to pursue fully his statutory remedy under the Railway Labor
Act. Both the New Jersey and Rhode Island courts have applied the
co-principal rule and held that no cause of action exists.8  However, the
Glover case appears to be distinguishable on its facts from these cases.
In the New Jersey and Rhode Island cases the plaintiff based his claim
on the union's duty to him as a member,9 as distinguished from the
Glover claim, based on express contract. Further, both the New Jersey
and Rhode Island courts indicated, by way of dicta, that, if the action
was based on a promise, undertaking or agreement by the union to act
in some specific manner for the benefit of the member as an individual,
the member would have a cause of action for its breach. 10
It should be noted that under the holding of the majority in the
Glover case the plaintiff must prove a specific contractual undertaking."
mentions what appears to be a strong factor in denying a member the right to sue
his union for failure to pursue his claim: that a union must be left free to make
policy decisions concerning the bringing and pressing of members' claims. Most of
the remaining cases recognized by the Court were personal injury actions based
on negligence of union agents. E.g., Duplis v. Rutland Aerie, No. 1001, 18 Vt.438, 111 A.2d 727 (1955) ; Carr v. Northern Pac. Beneficial Ass'n, 128 Wash. 40,
221 Pac. 979 (1924) ; Bromek v. Gemeinde, 238 Wis. 204, 298 N.W. 587 (1941).8 Marchitto v. Central R.R., 9 N.J. 456, 88 A.2d 851 (1952); Cabral v. Local
41, Int'l Moulders Union, 82 RI. 178, 106 A.2d 739 (1954). See also Kordewick
v. Brotherhood of R.R. Firemen, 181 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1950) ; McClees v. GrandInt'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, supra note 7.
SIn 1cClees v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, supra note 8, an Ohio
case, plaintiff alleged that, through the constitution and rules of the defendant
union, the union owed him a contractual duty to determine and enforce his seniority
rights. The court held that, though cases where a union owes a member a duty as
an individual might arise, here plaintiff was predicating his right solely on his
membership in the union. Therefore, it applied the co-principal rule and affirmed
the lower court's dismissal.
" See also McClees v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, supra note 9.
Compare DiMaio v. Local 80-A, United Packinghouse Workers, 29 N.J. Super.
341, 102 A.2d 480 (1954) (defamation) ; Taxicab Drivers' Local Union No. 889 v.
Pittman, 322 P.2d 159 (Okla. 1959) (wrongful interference with member's job).
"Though the implications of his concurring opinion are not fully ascertainable,
it seems likely that Justice Bobbitt would hold that the union would be liable solely
because of the membership relationship if that relationship is contractual, since
otherwise his opinion is virtually the same as that of the majority.
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The complaint and briefs in the principal case are not definite as to the
details of the alleged contract,' 2 but the Court stated that when liberally
construed the complaint alleges a contract of agency whereby the union
had "exclusive authority to prosecute the claim."
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
DEDICATION
In City of Salisbury v. Barnhardt' the Court held that when a street
has been dedicated and used for many years, although the use may not
have been extended to the full width of the street, the unused part does
not lose its character as a street. Here a new street was constructed
beside the original street. The old street was not closed but only a small
part of it continued to be used. This action was to require the removal
of a granite wall which had been built upon an unused part of the
original strip over twenty years before this suit was brought. The Court
found no evidence to the effect that opening the new street constituted
a relocation of the existing street or an abandonment of any portion
thereof; therefore, G.S. § 136-96, providing for withdrawal by the dedi-
cator after fifteen years nonuse, was held not to apply.2  The Court
relied in part upon G.S. § 1-45, which provides that no one may acquire
any exclusive right to a public way by reason of occupancy or of en-
croachment upon it. Two exceptions to this latter statute were recog-
nized by the Court: (1) where a street has been dedicated and the munici-
pality has never accepted the dedication, and (2) where the dedicated
street, if accepted, was later abandoned. Neither exception was appli-
cable in the Barnhardt case, and the Court properly affirmed the trial
court's order that the wall be removed.
Withdrawal of certain streets whose dedication was found never to
have been accepted was allowed under G.S. § 136-96 in Steadman v.
Town of Pinetopss which is discussed under REAL PROPERTY, Dedica-
tion, infra, and BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, Corporations-Effect of Disso-
lution, supra.
ZONING--STATUTES AND ORDINANCES CONSTRUED
In Chambers v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment4 the defendant had
granted a permit to construct a multi-family dwelling project. This
action was based on a decision by the planning board that the project
"
2 Brief for Appellant, pp. 3, 9, 10; Record, pp. 5-10.
-249 N.C. 549, 107 S.E.2d 297 (1959).
'See also Spicer v. City of Goldsboro, 226 N.C. 557, 39 S.E.2d 526 (1946).
'251 N.C. 509, 112 S.E.2d 102 (1960).
'250 N.C. 194, 108 S.E.2d 211 (1959).
[Vol. ,38
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
was properly located and "the provision for on-street parking along the
wide (34-foot) paved roads was adequate." 5 The defendant's decision
was made pursuant to a municipal ordinance which authorized the issu-
ance of such permits, provided that "(5) garage or other satisfactory
automobile storage space is provided on the premises, sufficient to accom-
modate one car for each building unit. .. *"6 The superior court
affirmed defendant's findings and ordered the permit issued. On appeal
to the Supreme Court the issue was whether there had been substantial
compliance with the automobile storage provisions of the ordinance. In
reversing, the Court stated that not only was there no provision for
garages, on-street parking not qualifying as a garage, but such parking
did not qualify as "other satisfactory automobile storage space." Con-
struing the ordinance the Court said that when enumerations by spe-
cific words or terms are followed by general words or terms, the general
shall refer to the same classification as the specific. The Court also
stated that even if there were no provision for a garage in the ordinance
it would be hard to treat on-street parking as "satisfactory automobile
storage space."
In Penny v. City of Durham7 plaintiffs contended that a rezoning
ordinance passed by the city council, with less than a three-fourths
majority, was void under a statute8 which required the affirmative vote
of three-fourths of the council to change a zone when the owners of at
least twenty per cent of the lots "directly opposite" the area made written
protests against such change. The plaintiffs owned more than twenty
per cent of the footage directly across the street from the land owned
by defendant; however, there was a 150 foot "buffer strip" of defendant's
land between the street and the area defendant wanted rezoned. The
ordinance was upheld, the Court stating that "directly opposite" was
to be defined as those tracts of land on opposite sides of the street with
only the street intervening.9
TAXATION AND FINANCE
In Lewis v. Beaufort County'° a referendum had approved a bond
issue not to exceed 650,000 dollars to finance the erecting and equipping
of "a new building or buildings to be used as a public hospital, and the
'Id. at 197, 108 S.E.2d at 213, quoting from the board's report.
Winston-Salem, N.C., City Code §48-13(c) (1953).
7249 N.C. 596, 107 S.E.2d 72 (1959).
' "In case, however, of a protest against such change signed by the owners of
twenty percent or more ...of the area of the lots ...directly opposite thereto
extending one hundred feet from the street frontage of such opposite lots, such
amendment shall not become effective except by favorable vote of three-fourths of
all the members of the legislative body of such municipality." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160-176 (Supp. 1959).
'Accord, Montebello Land Co. v. Frank Novak Realty Co., 167 Md. 185, 172
Atl. 911 (1934).
"0249 N.C. 628, 107 S.E2d 77 (1959).
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acquisition of a suitable site therefor .... 11 A fully equipped hospital
was erected, and a surplus of over 14,000 dollars in authorized bonds
remained unissued. The Board of Commissioners passed a resolution to
expend this amount for constructing a clinic in the town of Aurora.
The plaintiff, a resident and taxpayer, brought suit to enjoin the use of
any part of the proceeds for this purpose. An injunction was granted
by the superior court, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court
relied on the provisions of the bond issue that the issue was to acquire a
site and build and equip a hospital, and applied the test of whether the
project was included within the general purpose for which the bonds
were authorized. The proposed clinic was not considered part of the
original project as approved by the electors, but an additional one.
The Lewis case is in accord with an earlier case, Worley v. Johnston
County, 12 where the same test was applied, though the result was dif-
ferent. In the Worley case the trustees had wanted to expend funds
for the erection of a nurses' home on the hospital grounds. It was held
that this was not in excess of, or a departure from, the general purpose
declared in the original resolution of the county commissioners as ap-
proved by the electorate. An additional expenditure in excess of bond
issue funds was disapproved in Rider v,. Lenoir County'3 where a bond
issue not to exceed 465,000 dollars had been authorized for expenditure
on a hospital. In the Rider case more money was needed in order to
accept the lowest construction bid; however, the Supreme Court stated
that the stipulation fixing the maximum created a limitation on subse-
quent official acts based upon the referendum and could not be materially
varied. Consequently the proposed supplemental appropriation from
the general treasury to supplement the bond issue funds was held to be a
material variance and was not permitted. As is shown by these cases,
the wording of the bond ordinance is very important if a controversy
arises.
ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE
Rhyne v. Town of Mount Holly14 involved an action by plaintiff to
recover for damage to his property caused by defendant's alleged tres-
pass upon a vacant city lot in bulldozing and scraping away almost all
the living trees and other vegetation growing thereon, including over
one hundred oak trees. Defendant answered that plaintiff had allowed
his lot to become overgrown with weeds in violation of a duly enacted
city ordinance which authorized the defendant in such circumstances to
enter and cut down the weeds. The jury found that there had been a
trespass and damage to plaintiff's property. On appeal the Supreme
11Id. at 629, 107 S.E.2d at 78.
12231 N.C. 592, 58 S.E.2d 99 (1950).
18236 N.C. 620, 73 S.E2d 913 (1953).
14251 N.C. 521, 112 S.E.2d 40 (1960).
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Court affirmed, stating that when private property is taken for a public
use or purpose just compensation must be paid its owner. In addition
to the contention that it had authority to clean the lot by virtue of the
municipal ordinance' 5 defendant contended that it had been abating a
nuisance. It also claimed sovereign immunity. While the Court recog-
nized these defenses it set forth the test of liability: "whether, notwith-
standing its acts are governmental in nature and for a lawful public
purpose, the municipality's acts amount to a partial taking of private
property. If so, just compensation must be paid."' 6 Thus although the
power to abate nuisances is a governmental function, when the munici-
pality enters upon and damages private property it is liable for the pay-
ment of just compensation "unless its acts were in fact necessary to
remove or abate a nuisance."1' 7 Conceding that the weeds constituted a
nuisance which could properly be abated, the Court pointed out that
the lot could have been cleared without destroying the trees thereon.
Apparently this is a case of first impression in North Carolina, and it
seems from the case that a declaration by a municipal corporation that
something is a nuisance is not a final determination. The municipality's
actions are subject to review both as to their reasonableness and as to
whether in fact a nuisance did exist.'8
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
NOTE OF THIRD PERSON AS PAYMENT OF ORIGINAL NOTE
In F. D. Cline Paving Co. v. Southland Speedways, Inc.' the Court
reaffirmed its position2 that a note of a third person given by the debtor
to his creditor is not payment and discharge of the debtor's obligation
unless there is a clear and special agreement between the creditor and
debtor to that effect. The burden of proof of such agreement is on the
debtor. The holding is clearly in the majority3 which treats such pay-
ment as conditional or as collateral security. The effect of this in prin-
cipal case was to hold the endorsers on the original note liable after the
makers of the original note and the makers of the new note given had
defaulted.
"
5 Town of Mount Holly, Code, art. III, § 3, as authorized by N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160-55 (1952).
18251 N.C. at 527, 112 S.E.2d at 45.
Id. at 528, 112 S.E.2d at 46.
18 See generally 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 279 (1949).
250 N.C. 358, 108 S.E.2d 641 (1959), also discussed in CREDIT TRANSACTIONS,
Substituted Note as Payment of Original Note, supra.
'Grady v. Pink Hill Bank & Trust Co., 184 N.C. 158, 113 S.E. 667 (1922).
' See -BRITroN, BmLs & NOTES § 263 (1943) ; 40 Am. JuR. Payment § 87 (1942);
70 C.J.S. Payment §29 (1951).
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BANK AS "OWNER" OF DEPOSITED PAPER
In State Planters Bank v. Courtesy Motors, Inc.4 a bank was
allowed to waive the stipulations on its deposit slip that it was collection
agent only and sue on deposited paper, against which it had allowed
withdrawals, as "owner" and holder in due course. This case is the
subject of a Note in this volume.5
PERSONAL PROPERTY
OWNERSHIP OF UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS
Our Court in two recent cases has recognized the conclusive pre-
sumption of ownership arising from the face of United States savings
bonds. The first of these is Wright v. McMullan,' where a father
purchased bonds and had his sons registered as the owners, intending
to make a subsequent gift of the bonds to the sons. They died without
ever having had possession of the bonds, and the father sought to have
himself declared the owner of the bonds. In deciding that the bonds
belonged to the sons' estates, the Court said: "[S]tate laws fixing the
requirements for a valid gift have no application to these bonds." 2
Ownership in such bonds is fixed by the federal regulations in effect
when the bonds were issued.3 While this subject is not a new one to
our Court, it does seem that this decision is the most direct answer
yet given to the simple question of bond ownership under the federal
statutes and regulations.4
The second case is Tanner v. Erwin,5 in which the Court faced an
unusual factual situation in that the bonds, registered jointly in the names
of both husband and wife, had formed part of a separation property settle-
ment in the husband's favor. Survivorship left the legal title in the
widow according to the federal regulations. Conceding that legal title
'250 N.C. 466, 109 S.E.2d 189 (1959).
38 N.C.L. Rmv. 621 (1960).
1249 N.C. 591, 107 S.E.2d 98 (1959), also discussed in EQuITABx REmwEEs,
Mistake, supra.2 Id. at 595, 107 S.E.2d at 101.
*Id. at 593, 107 S.E.2d at 99.
'The statutory authority for the sale of United States savings bonds under
regulations laid down by the Secretary of the Treasury is found in 49 Stat. 21(1917), 31 U.S.C. § 757(c) (a) (1958). The regulations in effect when these
bonds were sold provided that the bonds are issued only in registered form, that
the name of the owner or beneficiary must be inscribed on the bonds at the time of
issue, and that the form of registration must express actual ownership and will be
conclusive of such ownership. The current equivalent is 31 C.F.R. § 315.5 (1959).
3250 N.C. 602, 109 S.E.2d 460 (1959).
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was in the widow by force of the regulations,6 our Court prevented the
widow's unjust enrichment and protected the husband's estate by means
of a resulting trust. This aspect of the case is discussed in a Note in
this volume.7 The result of this decision seemingly serves to circum-
vent the non-transferability provision of the federal regulation,8 as Jus-
tice Rodman points out in the dissenting opinion. There is apparently
no North Carolina precedent for the decision, which is, however, sup-
ported by substantial foreign authority.9
WRONGFUL EXECUTION
Until the case of Mica Indust., Inc. v. Penland'° arose, the North
Carolina Supreme Court had apparently not passed on the question of
whether a cause of action will lie against the individual who procures a
wrongful seizure of personalty to be made. Defendant in this case was
a judgment creditor of a third party company, pursuant to whose judg-
ment the sheriff was directed to seize certain property (the nature of
which does not appear in the record), some of which belonged to the
plaintiff. Before this decision there had been a dictum in one North
Carolina case to the effect that even if the judgment creditor had not
procured the wrongful execution, he still might be liable if he received
any of the proceeds and thereby ratified the sheriff's act.11 In holding
that a cause of action would lie against both the sheriff and the person
wrongfully inducing the seizure, our Court adopts the rule generally
recognized in most American jurisdictions.12
PUBLIC UTILITIES
RATE MAKING
In State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. State' twenty-five railroads had
applied for an increase in freight rates, which the Commission granted.
Various protestants appealed. The superior court reversed because the
631 C.F.R. § 315.61 (1959) provides: " [I]f either co-owner dies without the
bond having been presented and surrendered for payment .... the survivor will
be recognized as the sole and absolute owner." A similar provision was in effect
at the time in question.
*38 N.C.L. Rzv. 111 (1959).
8 31 C.F.R. § 315.15 (1959) contains the current equivalent provisions.
'Silverman v. McGinnes, 259 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1958); Roman v. Smith, 228
Ark. 833, 314 S.W2d 225 (1958) ; Katz v. Driscoll, 86 Cal. App. 2d 313, 194 P.2d
822 (1948) ; Tharp v. Besozzi, 128 Ind. App. 73, 144 N.E.2d 430 (1957) ; Annot.,
51 A.L.R.2d 163 (1957).
10249 N.C. 602, 107 S.E.2d 120 (1959), also discussed in Crvii PaOCEDURE,
Pleading-Amendment, supra.
Draper v. Buxton, 90 N.C. 182 (1884).
1221 Am. JuR. Execution § 641 (1939); Annot., 91 A.L.R. 922 (1934); 33
C.J.S. Execution § 456 (1942).
1250 N.C. 410, 109 S.E.2d 368 (1959).
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Commission had taken no evidence on the fair value of assets used by
the railroads in their intrastate business, as is required by G.S. § 62-124.
The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's reversal.2 In denying
a rehearing3 the Court expanded its original opinion by saying that
whether or not the rate increase would be fair and reasonable was still
an open question.
The railroads then petitioned the Utilities Commission for a reopen-
ing of the case, which petition was granted. A committee of four major
railroads which haul eighty-seven per cent of the intrastate freight sub-
mitted evidence in regard to the fair value of assets they used in intra-
state transportation. The twenty-one minor railroads agreed to be
bound by the proof furnished by the committee. The Commission again
granted the rate increase and protestants appealed. The superior court
affirmed generally but remanded the case for proof as to the fair value
of intrastate assets used by the minor companies. Protestants and the
minor railroads appealed.
On appeal protestants urged that the Commission had erred in re-
jecting a plea of res judicada made in answer to the railroads' petition
to reopen the case. In rejecting this argument the Court held that this
was not a new action before the Commission, and the Court's previous
determination had left the Commission free to determine a reasonable
rate in accordance with statutory requirements.
The Commission had accepted the evidence concerning the four rail-
roads as typical of the rest. The Court accepted petitioners' argument
that since the protestants did not raise their objection to the Commis-
sion's treating four railroads as representative of all before the Commis-
sion itself, the objection came too late in the superior court. The Court
pointed out that G.S. § 62-26.10 required, at the time applicable to this
case, that all grounds for relief, in order to be used on appeal, must be
set out in the petition for rehearing which is filed with the Commission
previous to the appeal. Moreover, the case had been tried on the theory
that the evidence concerning the four was typical of the rest. The Court
concluded that the Commission's order was accordingly supported by
competent evidence as to all the railroads.
In State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Carolina Power & Light Co.4
the Commission had approved rates to be charged to a class of large
users of electricity. There was a base rate which varied upward with
the increase in coal prices over six dollars per ton. After the rate had
been in effect for several years the petitioners brought an action before
the Commission to have the coal clause eliminated. The Commission
denied the requested relief, finding that petitioners had not shown the
2243 N.C. 12, 84 S.E.2d 727 (1955).
243 N.C. 685, 91 S.E.2d 899 (1956).
'250 N.C. 421, 109 S.E.2d 253 (1959).
[Vol. 38
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
coal clause to be unjust, unreasonable or discriminatory. It was found,
however, that the earnings of the power company were not sufficient to
justify elimination of the clause but were sufficient to justify a raise in
the base coal price from six dollars to seven. The Commission ordered
the change in base coal price which had the effect of lowering the rate
legally chargeable by the power company.
On appeal the superior court reversed, holding that the Commission's
finding that the fuel clause rate was not unjust, unreasonable, or dis-
criminatory precluded, as a matter of law, the further finding in regard
to the company's financial condition, upon which the rate reduction was
predicated.
The Supreme Court reversed the superior court and affirmed the
order of the Commission. The Court approved the theory of the two
lower tribunals that the case was a complaint proceeding under G.S.
§ 62-72, which involves a single rate or a small part of the rate structure,
and not a general rate case under G.S. § 62-124, which involves fixing
all or a substantial part of the company's rates. The Court pointed out
that G.S. § 62-72 provides that where the Commission finds a rate to be
unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory, or insufficient the Commission
shall determine the just, reasonable and sufficient rate.
The Court held that the Commission's determination as to the over-
all financial condition of the company bore on the sufficiency of the rate
and went on to say that if the Commission may increase certain rates
without making the detailed findings required by G.S. § 62-124 "it may
also reduce these same rates without reference thereto. Furthermore,
if the Commission may consider the insufficiency of a rate it must neces-
sarily consider the sufficiency thereof." 5
It is submitted that the Court has construed the word insufficient in
G.S. § 62-72 as though it means more than adequate and inadequate in
the alternative, whereas the standard definition of the word is only the
latter.
It is further submitted that the superior court correctly ruled that a
finding by the Commission that the overall financial condition is such
that the company can afford to charge a lower rate to this class of users
is irrelevant. Although the rate reduction would not cause the company
to show an overall loss it could cause a loss on the particular service
upon which the rate is being reduced. The Commission should have
been required to make findings that the particular rate was more than
sufficient to pay a fair proportion of the total fair return to the company
before raising the base figure for coal and, in effect, lowering the par-
ticular rate.
5Id. at 433, 109 S.E.2d at 263.
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COMMON CARRIERS
Respondent, who carried oil by barge upon the inland waters of
North Carolina, was served with a show-cause order in State ex rel.
Utilities Conm'n v. Gulf Atl. Towing Corp.' The undisputed evidence
before the Commission was that the respondent carried for large shippers
and only by contract negotiated with the particular shipper by submit-
ting bids.7 Upon this evidence the Commission found that respondent
was a common carrier and ordered it to apply for a certificate of con-
venience and necessity, and if that were issued, to file tariffs and other-
wise comply with Commission regulations. The superior court affirmed
the Commission's order.
The Supreme Court said that what constitutes a common carrier is
a question of law and whether or not a particular carrier is a common
carrier is a question of fact. The Court reiterated that under G.S.
§ 62-26.10(e) a finding of fact by the Commission is conclusive if it is
supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence, in view of
the entire record.8 In reversing, the Court held that, in view of the
entire record, the undisputed evidence did not support a finding that
respondent was a common carrier.
In the principal case the Court purported to be dealing with a ques-
tion of fact in determining whether respondent was a contract or a com-
mon carrier. It is submitted, however, that this was a question going to
the jurisdiction of the Utilities Commission, which must be subject to
judicial review and therefore would have been more properly referred
to as a question of law.'
REAL PROPERTY
ABANDONMENT
The growth of our cities and the improvement of their streets fre-
quently give rise to a conflict of interests between the individual land
owner and the municipality where small strips are isolated and forgotten
about for a time. Such a conflict arose recently in the case of City of
Salisbury v. Barnhardt,1 where a triangular shaped piece of land was
6251 N.C. 105, 110 S.E.2d 886 (1959).
"'The distinctive characteristic of a common carrier is that he undertakes as
a business to carry for all people indifferently or to take anybody's freight."
Parker, J., speaking for the Court in the principal case, 251 N.C. at 109, 110 S.E.2d
at 889.
8 State ex rel. Utilities Conm'n v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 238 N.C. 701, 38
S.E.2d 780 (1953); State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Fox, 236 N.C. 553, 73
S.E.2d 464 (1952).
' See, e.g., Beach v. McLean, 219 N.C. 521, 14 S.E.2d 515 (1941).
-249 N.C. 549, 107 S.E.2d 297 (1959).
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left unused in the street adjacent to the two defendants' lots. Defendants
made improvements in the form of shrubbery and a rock wall on the
strip over the years after 1925. In 1956 the city demanded that the
obstructions be removed in prospect of further street improvements for
traffic purposes. The defendants claimed that the city had abandoned
the property. This issue was resolved in favor of the city at the trial
level, and the Court affirmed, saying that mere non-user by the city
does not constitute abandonment.
Abandonment is one of two judicially recognized exceptions to G.S.
§ 1-45, which provides that no exclusive right to parts of streets shall
be acquired by encroachment. 2 The other exception applies to a situa-
tion where a street has been dedicated but never accepted by the city.3
Having introduced the concept of abandonment into this area of the
law, the Court has had little opportunity to tell us more precisely what
it means. In Lee v. Walker4 the Court found that any public interest in
an alleyway had been relinquished by resolution of the Board of Com-
missioners. There is a dictum in the Lee case indicating that something
less than official affirmative action, for instance allowing the property to
be listed for taxes, might be enough.
In other jurisdictions which have considered the problem there is an
apparent split of authority,5 and our Court takes the view expressed in
the Virginia case of Sipe v. Alley,6 where defendant had enclosed part
of a public street with a fence and this condition had existed for some
years. In that case it was said that mere non-user of a portion of a
street was not an abandonment thereof by the public. "Some private use
of the public way is not infrequently accorded abutting owners until the
public use requires its surrender."
7
BETTERMENTS
The case of Pamlico County v. Davis8 restates the three requirements
necessary to invoke the protection of our betterments statute.9 The
claimant must establish (1) that he made permanent improvements,
(2) bona fide belief in good title when the improvements were made, and
(3)reasonable grounds for such belief.10 The claimant here was a pur-
Lee v. Walker, 234 N.C. 687, 68 S.E.2d 664 (1952).8Ibid.
'234 N.C. 687, 68 S.E.2d 664 (1952).825 Am. JTuR. Highways § 112 (1940).
8 117 Va. 819, 86 S.E. 122 (1915).
7 Id. at 824, 86 S.E. at 123.
8249 N.C. 648, 107 S.E.2d 306 (1959).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-340 (1953).
"0 Pamlico County v. Davis, 249 N.C. 648, 651, 107 S.E.2d 306, 309 (1959).
See also Rogers v. Timberlake, 223 N.C. 59, 25 S.E.2d 167 (1943) ; Pritchard v.
Williams, 176 N.C. 108, 96 S.E. 733 (1918). The "good title" referred to in the
principal case seems to be the equivalent of "colorable title" in Rogers v. Timber-
lake, supra.
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chaser at a judicial sale; he had no deed but only a contract to convey
from the county. Claimant paid part of the purchase price, went into
possession, and spent in excess of twenty-five hundred dollars over a
period of three years in ditching, clearing, and building roads on the
deteriorated farm land. Some of the heirs of the original owner were
not served with process before the sale, and in this action they chal-
leged the claimant's bona fide belief in good title and the basis for such
a belief. Under the facts outlined above, our Court held that there was
"plenary" evidence of bona fide belief. Nor was the claimant lacking
reasonable grounds for such belief since one who bids at a judicial sale
may rely on the legality of such official proceedings."1
DEDICATION
Where a private developer lays off streets and blocks on a map of a
subdivision and has this map registered, the legal consequences are dif-
ferent for the public and for the individual who buys a lot with reference
to this map. The case of Steadman v. Town of Pinetops12 illustrates
primarily the operation of the dedication rule as it concerns the public.
In 1917 a private development corporation registered its map showing a
plat of blocks and streets. A few lots were sold, and one street was
actually opened and used for a few years after 1936. The area did not
develop, however, and most of it had been used by plaintiff for pasture
since the 1930's. The original land company became defunct, and the
plaintiff who purchased land from that company filed a "Withdrawal
Declaration" as provided for by G.S. § 136-96's with regard to the earlier
dedication by registration of the map. The city later in 1958 resolved to
open the streets, and plaintiff filed suit for a restraining order, which was
denied below. The Court held that the plaintiff was, by force of the
statute, entitled to assert rights in the streets since the land company's
corporate existence had lapsed.14 The Court stated the rule to be that
as far as the city was concerned the dedication was only a revocable
offer which could be withdrawn, and if after fifteen years no acceptance
had been made the offer would be presumed to have been withdrawn.Yr
Thus the city in this case could assert no rights in the unopened streets
(i.e., those whose dedication had never been accepted by the public),
whereas it was free to re-open the one street which had been opened
and used by the public in the 1930's.
" Cherry v. Woolard, 244 N.C. 603, 94 S.E.2d 562 (1956) ; Jeffreys v. Hocutt,
195 N.C. 339, 142 S.E. 226 (1928).12251 N.C. 509, 112 S.E.2d 102 (1960).
This statute creates a presumption of abandonment where a piece of land has
been dedicated and not opened or used for fifteen years, provided that a declaration
is filed withdrawing it from public use.14 This aspect of the case is treated under BusINEss AssocIATIoNs, Corpora-
tions-Effect of Dissolution, supra.
'" The statute provides that the declaration may be filed by the dedicator or by
those claiming under him.
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The reason underlying this "offer and acceptance" idea of dedication
referred to in this case is that "neither burdens nor benefits with at-
tendant duties may be imposed on the public unless in some proper way
it has consented to assume them." 16
DEEDS
Boundaries
In Harris v. City of Raleigh'7 the plaintiff in resisting a paving
assessment brought an action to try title to a strip of land along the
front of his lot. The description in plaintiff's deed read as follows:
Beginning at a point in the western side of Butler Street...
Alonza Haywood's northeast corner, and running thence westerly
along said Haywood's northern boundary line, 260 feet; thence
northwardly 60 feet; thence eastwardly in a line parallel with said
Haywood's line 260 feet to the western boundary line of Butler
Street; thence southwardly with said Butler Street, 60 feet to the
Beginning.
Plaintiff sought to establish "Alonza Haywood's northeast corner" by
starting at the southwest corner of the lot and then measuring eastwardly
260 feet. This was held improper, because it was an attempt to reverse
the calls for a terminus which was the only known reference point in
the description. A nonsuit was allowed.
This is in accord with North Carolina's general rule that lines should
be run with the calls in the regular order from a known beginning, and
they may be reversed only where it is not otherwise possible to establish
the terminus of a call.' 8 In the recent case of Batson v. Bell9 calls were
reversed only to allow an unknown corner to be established from a fixed
corner not contested.
Exchange of Deeds by Tenants in Common
North Carolina has long had the rule, relating to an exchange of
deeds by tenants in common allotting to each his share in the land, that
no new estates were created by the deeds, since they serve only to sever
the unity of possession.20 The corollary to this rule is that if any such
deed names the tenant and his spouse as grantees, the presumption is
" 251 N.C. at 515, 112 S.E.2d at 107. Accord, Irwin v. City of Charlotte, 193
N.C. 109, 136 S.E. 368 (1927) ; Wittson v. Dowling, 179 N.C. 542, 103 S.E. 18(1920).1251 N.C. 313, 111 S.E.2d 329 (1959).
" Powell v. Mills, 237 N.C. 582, 75 S.E2d 759 (1953).
10249 N.C. 718, 107 S.E.2d 562 (1959).20Elledge v. Welch, 238 N.C. 61, 76 S.E.2d 340 (1953) ; Duckett v. Lyda, 223
N.C. 356, 26 S.E.2d 918 (1943); Wood v. Wilder, 222 N.C. 622, 24 S.E.2d 474(1943); Borroughs v. Womble, 205 N.C. 432, 171 S.E. 616 (1933); Crocker v.
Vann 192 N.C. 422, 135 S.E. 127 (1926) ; Garris v. Tripp, 192 N.C. 211, 134 S.E.
461 (1926) ; Speas v. Woodhouse, 162 N.C. 66, 77 S.E. 1000 (1913) ; Sprinkle v.
Spainhour, 149 N.C. 223, 62 S.E. 910 (1908) ; Harrison v. Ray, 108 N.C. 215, 12
S.E. 993 (1891).
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that no estate by the entirety is created in tenant and his spouse.21 That
this presumption can be overcome and an interest vested in the tenant's
wife by provisions in the deed is well illustrated in the case of Smith v.
Smith.22 Mother and son were tenants in common of a 26.25 acre tract
of land. The son married. Son and wife executed a deed of their
interest conveying it to the mother, who responded with a deed of gift
for 7.14 acres in fee to son and wife, using the phrase "creating an estate
by the entirety." Son and wife were divorced; wife brings suit for
partition of her undivided one-half interest in the 7.14 acres. The wife
was successful on appeal; the Court held that an estate by the entirety
had been created in the son and his wife. The effect of the divorce was
to transform the entirety into a tenancy in common. It is apparent from
this decision that a mere exchange of deeds by tenants in common will
not be determinative. Rather the Court will look to the intention of the
parties as evidenced by the deeds and the surrounding circumstances.
In this case two factors are of critical importance: first, the fact that the
deed in favor of the tenant and spouse used express language "creating
an estate by the entirety"; secondly, that equal shares or moieties in the
land were not exchanged, and there was no evidence before the Court
that the smaller tract was equal in value to the larger tract.2 3
Delivery
Delivery of a deed of conveyance in North Carolina is still a transac-
tion which retains a large measure of its primitive formality. Our Court
in the case of Elliott v. Goss24 has once again added gloss to the patina
of that rule which from antiquity has required the grantor to put the
deed out of his reach-physically as well as legally. After Ballard v.
Ballard2 5 there had been a faint hope that physical delivery might
gradually be relegated to the museum along with livery of seizin. In
that case there was clear dictum to the effect that the grantor's intention
to put the deed into operation could be manifested without relinquishing
physical control of the instrument. That hope seems clearly to have
disappeared with the decision in the Elliott case. Here there had been
a signing and an acknowledgment of the deed, but grantee had agreed
that grantor should retain possession of the deed until the purchase
price was paid. The grantee died owing twenty-three dollars on the
price, and his heirs were not permitted to take up his equity since there
2 1Elledge v. Welch, supra note 20.
2249 N.C. 669, 107 S.E.2d 530 (1959).
'SThis case is also discussed in EQUITABLE REMEDIEs, Mistake, supra, and
CIVIL PROCEDURE, Pleading-Prior Action Pending, supra.
2-250 N.C. 185, 108 S.E.2d 475 (1959), also discussed in Civm PROCEDURE,
Pleading-Demurrer, supra.r 230 N.C. 629, 55 S.E.2d 316 (1949), 28 N.C.L. REV. 229 (1950).
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had been no "delivery" during grantee's life. The Court quotes ap-
provingly from the older case of Barnes v. Aycock :26
[T]o constitute delivery there must be a parting with the pos-
session of the deed and with all power and control over it by the
grantor for the benefit of the grantee at the time of delivery. To
constitute delivery the papers must be put out of the possession
of the maker.
ESTATES BY THE ENTIRETY
There are three recent cases which deserve especial mention in con-
nection with the estate by the entirety. The first one is Edwards v.
Arnold,27 in which the existence of such an estate served to defeat the
county's tax enforcement proceedings against the husband. The land
in question was listed for taxes in the name of the husband. Taxes had
been in default for a number of years. The tax collector's certificate was
docketed with the clerk of court and it became a valid judgment in
accordance with the provisions of G.S. § 105-392.28 The failure to join
the wife in the judgment, the execution, and advertisement for sale was
fatal to the whole procedure. The sheriff's deed was held to have passed
no title, because the husband taxpayer had no separable interest in the
land. This holding seems to be in accord with previous decisions of
our Court.2 9 The rule announced in those cases is that lands held by
the entirety are not subject to levy under execution on a judgment
against one spouse alone. And this rule seems quite valid and in con-
sonance with the incidents of what our Court has called the "anomalous"
estate of entireties.30 Nevertheless none of these cases involved tax
liens of our relatively new tax enforcement statute.31 It should be
pointed out that the Court was apparently construing G.S. § 105-392
in this type application for the first time. Its interpretation of sections
(a) and (c) of the statute seems to be that the docketed tax collector's
certificate is a judgment against the taxpayer and not a lien on the
land for which taxes are in default. This result is questionable in light
of the language of the statute as follows: "It is hereby expressly de-
clared to be the intention of this section that proceedings brought under
it shall be strictly in rem." "Immediately upon said docketing and
2 219 N.C. 360, 13 S.E.2d 611 (1941).
27 250 N.C. 500, 109 S.E.2d 205 (1959).
28 This statute provides a method of tax collection alternative to the mortgage
type foreclosure in G.S. § 105-391.
" Winchester-Simmons Co. v. Cutler, 199 N.C. 709, 155 S.E. 611 (1930);
Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 N.C. 682, 125 S.E. 490 (1924) ; Hood v. Mercer, 150 N.C.
699, 64 S.E. 897 (1909).
20 Hood v. Mercer, svpra note 29.2 1G.S. § 105-392 was enacted in 1939. The prospective operation of the statute
was considered in Abbott, Summary Procedure for Foreclosure of Taxes in North
Carolina, 22 N.C.L. REv. 226 (1944).
1960]
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indexing, said taxes . . . shall constitute a valid judgment against said
property.. . ." (Emphasis added.)
Another incident of our estate by the entirety is illustrated by the
case of Brinson v. Kirby,32 where a tobacco crop produced on the land
was sold to satisfy a judgment against the husband. The theory behind
such an execution was that since the husband was entitled to the rents
and profits, the usufruct, of the land held by both husband and wife by
the entirety, the crops were his. Such a theory is well recognized in
North Carolina.3 3  In this case, however, the Court held that the wife
could save the crop in this action by proving that the land was not
after all held by the entirety, but was really her own since her deed to the
"straw man" and the latter's deed to husband and wife were void for
failure to comply with G.S. § 52-12.84
An unusual entireties problem was presented in Harrell v. Powell,"5
in which husband and wife had contracted to convey to and actually
executed a deed in favor of the defendants. The husband subsequently
died. The widow brought this action to remove cloud from her title in
the land on the theory that the instruments were void because the hus-
band lacked mental capacity to execute instruments. The defendants'
demurrer was sustained below; and on appeal a reversal followed only
because the defendants' demurrer was based on estoppel and, as neither
the deed nor the contract were incorporated in the pleadings so that they
could be read in light of the estoppel plea, estoppel could not be taken
advantage of by demurrer. The opinion contained rather clear language
to the effect that where the widow has joined in a warranty deed she
would be treated as a feme sole and could be held estopped to claim title
in the locus in quo. No North Carolina case in point was cited; how-
ever the Court cited a dictum from Hood v. Mercer: "[W]here the
husband had conveyed the land by deed with warranty without the
joinder of the wife, and survived her, his grantee acquired title, but
this by way of estoppel."' 36 Several foreign authorities are cited.87
Tiffany lists as the most important incident of a tenancy by the entirety
the right of survivorship which cannot be defeated by a conveyance from
82251 N.C. 73, 110 S.E.2d 482 (1959), also discussed in DomEsTIc RELATiOxs,
Deed by Wife to Husband by Way of Third Party, supra.8 Taylor v. Taylor, 243 N.C. 726, 92 S.E.2d 136 (1956) ; Nesbit v. Fairview
Farms, Inc., 239 N.C. 481, 80 S.E.2d 472 (1954) ; Atkinson v. Atkinson, 225 N.C.
120, 33 S.E.2d 666 (1945) ; Lewis v. Pate, 212 N.C. 253, 193 S.E. 20 (1937).84There was no finding in the case of either deed that the conveyance was not
unreasonable or injurious to the wife.
8-251 N.C. 636, 112 S.E.2d 81 (1960), also discussed in DomEslic RELATIONS,
Deed by Wife of Entireties Property, supra.
150 N.C. 699, 700, 64 S.E. 897, 898 (1909).
In re Brown, 60 F.2d 269 (W.D. Ky. 1932); Columbian Carbon Co. v.
Knight, 207 Md. 203, 114 A.2d 28 (1955); Mount Washington Co-op. Bank v.
Bernard, 289 Mass. 498, 194 N.E. 839 (1935) ; Demerse v. Mitchell, 187 Mich. 683,
164 N.W. 97 (1915) ; Simon v. Chartier, 250 Wis. 642, 27 N.W.2d 752 (1947).
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the other tenant to a third party. "The title of the grantee, however,
may become good by estoppel if the grantor is the survivor."38  This
concept finds ready acceptance in other jurisdictions.39 Apparently
North Carolina does recognize a broad principle of transfer of after-
acquired title by estoppel, although we seem never to have had just such
a case as this, i.e., one involving tenancy by the entirety where the wife
is the survivor against whom an estoppel is pleaded.40  Such a result
seems to satisfy the demands of justice, particularly when as in two
earlier North Carolina cases 41 there were acts by the grantor after the
death of the husband.
POSSESSORY WRITS
When both the writ of possession and the writ of assistance are
available to the litigant, which shall he use? The Court in Hill v. Resort
Dev. Co.4 2 points out that the two writs are essentially the same, the
objects of both being to put the person entitled to the property into
possession. One distinction is that writs of possession are legal and
follow judgments in ejectment, while writs of assistance are equitable
and are used to enforce decrees of equity. To obtain the benefit of
either writ, there must first be a judgment which determines that the
party seeking the court's aid is the owner and entitled to possession.
In this case there had been no such determination in the earlier partition
suit. The Court held that without a prior trial of title the plaintiff was
entitled to no writ of possession.
DOWER IN REMAINDER IN FEE
In In re Will of Smith 43 the remainderman in fee, by agreement fixed
in a consent judgment, was to convey his interest to the caveator of the
will, but he declined to do so on the ground that his wife did not sign
the consent judgment. Held: the wife of the remainderman had no
dower interest and the husband was free to convey at will. That the
remainderman may convey his interest without joinder by his wife is
supported by authorities from other jurisdictions. 44 That a vested re-
mainder is not subject to dower so long as the life estate is in existence
is a rule already established in North Carolina.45
s TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 291-92 (abr. ed. 1940).
"19 Am. JuR. Estoppel §§ 12-20 (1939).Cf. Mills v. Tabor, 182 N.C. 722, 109 S.E. 850 (1921) (widow accepted pay-
ments on the land from the grantee) ; Sills v. Bethea, 178 N.C. 315, 100 S.E. 593(1919) (widow advertised the land for sale).
"' Mills v. Tabor, supra note 40; Sills v. Bethea, supra note 40.
12251 N.C. 52, 110 S.E.2d 470 (1959).
4249 N.C. 563, 107 S.E.2d 89 (1959).
"Geldhauser v. Schulz, 93 N.J. Eq. 449, 116 AUt. 791 (1922) ; 28 C.J.S. Dower
§27 (1949).
Redding v. Vogt, 140 N.C. 562, 53 S.E. 337 (1906); Houston v. Smith, 88
N.C. 312 (1883) ; Royster v. Royster, 61 N.C. 226 (1867) ; Weir v. Humphries, 39
N.C. 264 (1846).
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SALES
IMPLIED WARRANTIES
The uncontradicted evidence in Jones v. Siler City Mills, Inc.1
showed that the defendant sold the plaintiff chicken feed for the particu-
lar use of feeding laying chickens. The plaintiff, through poultry experts,
proved that the laying mash he had purchased contained a chemical
which is fed only to broilers, and that the feed had a poisonous effect on
his laying hens. The Court held that under these circumstances there
was an implied warranty that the chicken feed was reasonably fit for the
use contemplated by both the seller and purchaser. The principal case
establishes in North Carolina the common law view that implied war-
ranties can arise when foodstuff is sold for animal consumption. 2 Al-
though the instant case failed to mention it, there is, in addition to the
implied warranty, a statutory warranty that foodstuff sold for animals
is reasonably fit for the purpose intended and that it is not composed of
harmful or deleterious substances that will produce injury or death.3
In Southern Box & Lumber Co. v. Home Chair Co.,4 where the
action was to recover the contract price for plywood sold and delivered,
the defendant set up as a defense the breach of an implied warranty
that the plywood delivered was suited to the making of chair seats for
which it was purchased. The trial court found that the seller had no
knowledge of the particular type of chair seat made by the buyer nor of
the manufacturing method he used. The plywood was unfit for the par-
ticular chair seats and manufacturing method, but the weight of the
evidence did not show it was unsuitable for other types of chair seats
made by other manufacturing methods. The Court, in affirming a
judgment for the seller, held that there is no implied warranty of fitness
for a particular use if the seller does not know of the intended use.5
In Adams v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.6 the plaintiff brought a
1250 N.C. 527, 108 S.E2d 917 (1959).
1 See also Poovey v. International Sugar Feed Number Two Co., 191 N.C. 722,
133 S.E. 12 (1926) ; 77 CJ.S. Sales § 331b (1952).3 N.C. GEn. STAT. §§ 106-93, -95 (Supp. 1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-100
(1952).
1250 N.C. 71, 108 S.E.2d 70 (1959), also discussed in Cnm PROcEDURE, Plead-
ing-Counterclaim, supra.
I Accord, Stokes v. Edwards, 230 N.C. 306, 310, 52 S.E.2d 797, 800 (1949).
"When a buyer purchases goods for a -particular purpose known to the seller and
relies on the skill, judgment, or experience of the seller for the suitability of the
goods for that purpose, the seller impliedly warrants that the goods are reasonably
fit for the contemplated purpose, and is liable to the buyer for any damage proxi-
mately resulting to him from the breach of this warranty." See also Thomason
v. Ballard & Ballard Co., 208 N.C. 1, 179 S.E. 30 (1935); Farquhar Co. v. Hardy
Hardware Co., 174 N.C. 369, 93 S.E. 922 (1917).
p251 N.C. 565, 112 S.E.2d 92 (1960). This case reaffirms North Carolina's
position that when a retail merchant sells food in a sealed package to a customer
there is an implied warranty of fitness for human consumption. Rabb v. Covington,
215 N.C. 572, 2 S.E.2d 705 (1939). See also Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63
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damage action for the loss of a tooth allegedly caused by the breach of
an implied warranty that a box of corn flakes, sold in the original sealed
container by the defendant retailer to the plaintiff, was wholesome and
fit for human consumption. Chemical analysis showed that the "object"
causing the injury was part of a grain of corn that had been partially
crystalized. In affirming a judgment of nonsuit, the Court held that the
substance causing the injury was natural to the corn flakes, and there-
fore a consumer of the product might be expected to anticipate the
presence of the substance in the food. The determining criterion of
liability established by the instant case, and by the authorities cited,7
is whether the object causing the injury is "foreign" to the food con-
sumed. While the Court's position in the instant case is defensible, it
appears to the writer that the Court might also have been justified in
adopting the plaintiff's contention that the corn kernel, after it had gone
through its "metamorphosis" had become a foreign object.9
S.E.2d 822 (1951), holding that where the vendee sues the retailer for damages due
to breach of an implied warranty that goods sold are wholesome and fit for human
consumption, the retailer may have the wholesaler and manufacturer joined as
codefendants upon an allegation that the wholesaler or distributor or manufacturer
is primarily liable upon the warranty.
In the instant case the plaintiff made no attempt to hold the manufacturer
liable. There being no contractual relationship between the manufacturer and the
plaintiff to which an implied warranty could have attached, any action against the
manufacturer would have to sound in negligence, or perhaps in express warranty.
Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard Co., 208 N.C. 1, 179 S.E. 30 (1935). On warranty
and tort claims see generally Notes, 32 N.C.L. Rav. 351 (1953) ; 30 N.C.L. REv.
191 (1952) ; 19 N.C.L. Rnv. 551 (1941) ; 15 N.C.L. Rxv. 430 (1937).
The following cases, all cited in the principal case, held that there had been no
breach of an implied warranty: Shapiro v. Hotel Statler Corp., 132 F. Supp. 891(S.D. Cal. 1955) (fish bone in fish dish); Lamb v. Hill, 112 Cal. App. 2d 41, 245
P.2d 316 (1952) (chicken bone in chicken pie) ; Sliva v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,
28 Cal. App. 2d 649, 83 P.2d 76 (1938) (turkey bone in roast turkey and dressing) ;
Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936) (chicken bone in
chicken pie) ; Goodwin v. Country Club of Peoria, 323 Ill. App. 1, 54 N.E.2d 612(1944) (chicken bone in creamed chicken); Brown v. Nebiker, 229 Iowa 1223,
296 N.W. 366 (1941) (splinter of bone in pork chop) ; Courter v. Dilbert Bros.,
19 Misc. 2d 935, 186 N.Y.S2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (prune pit in prune butter).
See Annots., 147 A.L.R.2d 1027 (1949); 171 A.L.R. 1209 (1947); 168 A.L.R.
1054 (1947); 143 A.L.R. 1421 (1943); 105 A.L.R. 1939 (1936); 104 A.L.R. 1033(1936) ; 98 A.L.R. 687 (1935) ; 50 A.L.R. 231 -(1927) ; 47 A.L.R. 148 (1927) ; 35
A.L.R. 921 (1925) ; 5 A.L.R. 1115 (1920) ; 4 A.L.R. 1559 (1919). See also Note,
17 TEMP. L.Q. 203 (1943).
' A foreign substance is defined as a not organically connected or naturally
related substance occurring in any part of the body or organism where it is not
normally found, usually introduced from without, O'Hara v. Petersen, 174 Misc.
481, 21 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Mun. Ct. 1940).b Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 10-11.
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TAXATION
INCOME TAX
Loss Carry-over
In Royle & Pilkington Co. v. Currie' plaintiff had operated at a loss
for the years 1953, 1954 and 1955. Until 1957 the North Carolina
Revenue Act had allowed an operating loss to be carried forward as a
deduction for only the two tax years next following the year of the loss.2
An amendment by the 1957 General Assembly, now codified in G.S.
§ 105-147(9) d, allows a loss to be set off against income for the next
five years beginning with the tax year 1957. When plaintiff prepared
its 1957 North Carolina income tax return it deducted an unused loss
for the year 1953. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction and
assessed a deficiency which plaintiff paid under protest. When plain-
tiff's demand for a refund was refused, it sued the Commissioner and
had judgment in the superior court.
On appeal the Commissioner's contention that the amendment was
prospective in effect was rejected. The Court, in affirming for the tax-
payer, reasoned that the intent of the legislature was to enlarge rather
than diminish the right to deduct losses for previous years, and that if
the Commissioner's contentions were upheld no loss occurring before
1957 could be carried over, since the two-year carry-over provision
had been repealed. This decision is in accord with the view taken by
the United States Supreme Court in Reo Motors, Inc. v. Commissioner,
where the Court said that the amount of the loss, for federal tax pur-
poses, is determined by the law in effect during the year the loss
occurred, while the amount of the carry-over is determined by the law
in effect at the time of the attempted carry-over.
The loss carry-over provision in G.S. § 105-147(9)d was also the
subject of litigation in the recent case of Good Will Distribs. (Northern),
Inc. v. Currie.4 Plaintiff corporation had absorbed two other corpora-
tions in a merger. All three corporations were theretofore owned by
the same stockholders and carried on the same sales operation in dif-
1250 N.C. 726, 110 S.E.2d 339 (1959).
'N.C. Sess. Laws 1939, ch. 158, §§ A, B; N.C. Sess. Laws 1941, ch. 50, § 1.
338 U.S. 442 (1950).
'251 N.C. 120, 110 S.E.2d 880 (1959), also discussed in CIVIL PROCEDURE,
Pleading-udgment on the Pleadings, supra. The principal case had been before
the Court in Good Will Distribs., Inc. v. Shaw, 247 N.C. 157, 100 S.E.2d 341(1956), where a judgment on the pleadings for the taxpayer was reversed. There
it was held that the taxpayer must show itself to be "substantially the same tax-
payer" that had incurred the loss, in order to claim the loss carry-over deduction.
The Court said that the allegations of the complaint were insufficient to demon-
strate such identity. This case was commented on in Survey of the Decisions of
the North Carolina Supreme Court-Taxation, 36 N.C.L. REv. 449 (1958). Plain-
tiff failed to amend its complaint, but the Commissioner stipulated certain pertinent
facts, the import of which appears in the text above.
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ferent territories. At the time of the merger one of the absorbed
corporations was showing a small profit for the year against which it
applied part of a net operating loss for the previous year. The plaintiff
took the unused portion of that corporation's loss as a deduction against
plaintiff's gross income for North Carolina tax purposes. The Com-
missioner disallowed the deduction and refused plaintiff's demand for
the refund of an assessment paid under protest. Plaintiff sued for a
refund and had judgment in the superior court. On appeal the Court
looked to cases arising under the related federal income tax section and,
in reversing, relied on Lisbon Shops v. Koehler.5
In the Lisbon case the taxpayer had absorbed sixteen separately
incorporated ready-to-wear shops. Three of those shops had substantial
pre-merger losses which the taxpayer sought to take as a loss carry-over
deduction. The government's argument that the taxpayer seeking to
deduct the loss was not the same entity that had suffered the loss was
side-stepped in favor of the alternative argument that "the prior year's
loss can be offset against the current year's income only to the extent
that this income is derived from the operation of substantially the same
business which produced the loss." The significant fact in this case
seems to be that in the year of the attempted deduction all three of the
business units, for which the pre-merger loss was claimed, were still
operating at a loss. The Court said that had there been no merger,
there would be no deduction available to the absorbed corporations
because they had no incomes against which to set off the losses. The
Court said that a holding for the taxpayer would allow a windfall to it
simply because it had merged.
In the Good Will case the North Carolina Court quoted the final
sentence of the Lisbon case: 7 "'We conclude that petitioner is not
entitled to a carry-over since the income against which the offset is
claimed was not produced by substantially the same businesses which
incurred the losses.' ",8 The North Carolina Court went on to say: "By
reason of the merger a new and more extensive enterprise has emerged.
This new enterprise did not suffer the loss and cannot claim a deduction
therefor."9 It seems that the Court has interpreted the Lisbon case as
holding that the taxpayer must be substantially the same corporation
that incurred the loss in order to take the carry-over deduction.
It is submitted that Lisbon is more readily suceptible of being inter-
preted to mean that the loss carry-over will be limited to the contribu-
tion made to the income of the taxpayer by the assets of the absorbed
'353 U.S. 382 (1957).
Id. at 386. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 390.
8251 N.C. at 125, 110 S.E.2d at 884.
Old. at 127, 110 S.E.2d at 885.
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corporation that had shown the loss. This view is supported by the
approval the United States Supreme Court gives to the government's
alternative contention that the deduction can be taken "only to the
extent" that income is derived from the same business which incurred
the loss. It would seem that the quoted words imply that merger limits
rather than extinguishes the deductibility of an acquired loss. This
interpretation gains strength when the government's alternative con-
tention is read with the Court's statement of the issue to be decided in
Lisbon:
The issue before us is whether . . . a corporation resulting
from a merger of 17 separate incorporated businesses, which had
filed separate income tax returns, may carry over and deduct the
pre-merger net operating losses of three of its constituent cor-
porations from the post-merger income attributable to the other
businesses.10
The theory of Lisbon seems to be that a taxpayer should not be
entitled to acquire a corporation and use a loss that would have been
unavailable to the acquired corporation were it still independent. In
the Good Will case the North Carolina Court has denied a carry-over
where the acquired business unit was contributing at least some profit
to the total enterprise during the tax year for which the plaintiff claimed
the deduction. In Good Will it appears that the Court was not asked
to consider allowing a deduction "to the extent" of the contribution made
by the acquired corporation to plaintiff's total income. It is hoped that
if in the future a taxpayer can prove that setting off a pre-merger loss
against post-merger income would not amount to a tax windfall the
Court will allow the deduction to that extent.
PROCEDURE
Real Party in Interest
Petitioner received notice of assessment for income taxes against the
estate of her deceased husband in Brauff v. Commissioner." She
attempted to enter a special appearance before the Commissioner, where
she moved to vacate the notice on the ground that she had been removed
as executrix of the assessed estate. The Commissioner, after stipu-
lating the fact of her removal, overruled the motion, holding that notice
was given in accordance with the provisions of G.S. § 105-241.1. That
section provides for notice to the "taxpayer" and makes no provision for
notice to the estate when it has succeeded to the obligation of the tax-
payer. The Board of Tax Appeals and the superior court affirmed the
action of the Commissioner.
10353 U.S. at 382. (Emphasis added.)
:-251 N.C. 452, 111 S.E.2d 620 (1959).
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On appeal the Court reversed, holding that petitioner was not the
proper party. The Court relied on G.S. § 28-176 which provides that
actions or proceedings where an estate is the real party in interest must
be brought by or against the executor or administrator in his repre-
sentative capacity. The Court said that notice to petitioner, who had no
power to act for the estate was insufficient notice to the estate.
Period of Limitations on Refund
In Kirkpatrick v. Currie'2 plaintiffs-administrators sued the Com-
missioner of Revenue in the superior court alleging that they had paid
inheritance taxes under protest in July 1955 and that their demand for
a refund in February 1957 had been wrongfully denied. On the basis
of G.S. § 105-267,13 which allows a direct suit for the refund of taxes
paid under protest if demand made within thirty days of such payment
is not honored, the Commissioner's motion for nonsuit was granted.
On appeal the Court reiterated 14 that a timely demand is a condition
precedent to the institution of an action under G.S. § 105-267. Plain-
tiffs urged that the action was maintainable under G.S. § 105-266.115
which provides for an administrative remedy with right of appeal to
the superior court. The administrative remedy is available until three
years after the tax becomes due or six months after payment is made,
whichever is later. In rejecting plaintiffs' argument, and affirming the
trial court, it was held that plaintiffs had the right to choose between
the remedies offered by the two statutes and "having chosen, they are
bound by the limitations fixed for that route."' 8  The Court seems to
leave unanswered the question whether, assuming that there was enough
time remaining, plaintiffs could still pursue the administrative remedy.
It would seem that since in ordinary civil cases a nonsuit does not pre-
clude the bringing of another action,' 7 the remedy under G.S. § 105-
1250 N.C. 213, 108 S.E2d 209 (1959).18
"Whenever a person shall have a valid defense to the enforcement of the
collection of a tax... such person shall pay such tax... and such payment shall
be without prejudice to any defense or rights he may have .... At any time
within thirty days after payment, the taxpayer may demand a refund ... ; and if
the same shall not be refunded within ninety days thereafter may sue the Commis-
sioner of Revenue ...." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-267 (1958).
" Wiliamson v. Spivey, 224 N.C. 311, 30 S.E.2d 46 (1944); Nantahala Power
& Light Co. v. Clay County, 213 N.C. 698, 197 S.E. 603 (1938); Blackwell v. City
of Gastonia, 181 N.C. 378, 107 S.E. 218 (1921).
"(a) Any taxpayer may apply to the Commissioner of Revenue for refund
of tax ... paid by him at any time within three years after the date set by statute
for filing of the return ... or within six months from the date of payment ....
The Commissioner shall grant a hearing thereon . .. ."' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-
266.1 (1958).16 250 N.C. at 216, 108 S.E.2d at 211.
",N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-25 (1953) ; Bourne v. Southern Ry., 224 N.C. 444, 31
S.E.2d 382 (1944).
G.S. § 1-25 allows the plaintiff to bring a nev action within one year after a
nonsuit, thus tolling the statute of limitations or any time condition annexed to
the cause of action. It seems, however, that this rule does not apply when a new
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
266.1 would still be available. It is hoped that the Court will treat the
unsuccessful pursuit of one of the statutory remedies as a waiver of the
right to proceed under the other.'8
SALEs TAX
In Campbell v. Currie"9 plaintiff sold lumber which was used in the
buyer's mine shafts and tunnels for bracing. G.S. § 105-164.5 provides
that sales of "mill machinery or mill machinery parts and accessories to
manufacturing industries and plants" shall be taxed at the wholesale
rate of one twentieth of one per cent. Regulation No. 420 stated that:
"Sales of... property used in direct production or extractive processes
inside the mine shall be considered sales of mill machinery ... ." The
same regulation said that materials used in the construction of buildings
would be taxed at the retail rate. In reliance upon Regulation No. 4
plaintiff returned the tax on its sale to the mining company at the
wholesale rate. The Commissioner, maintaining that the retail rate of
three per cent applied, assessed a deficiency. Plaintiff brought this
action to recover a payment made under protest and prevailed in the
trial court.
On appeal the Commissioner contended that the materials were used
to build "housing" in which the miners worked; thus, under Regulation
No. 4 the retail rate should apply. The Commissioner also contended
that in classifying mill machinery Regulation No. 4 went beyond the
power granted by the legislature.2' The Court ignored the first argu-
ment, and, as to the second, held that the regulation was within the
Commissioner's statutory power. In affirming, the Court said that since
the regulation had been in effect some fifteen years, had never been
cause of action is pleaded in the second suit. See, e.g., Woodcock v. Bostic, 128
N.C. 243, 38 S.E. 881 (1901). Whether the nonsuit in the principal case would
stop the running of the statute of limitations as to the second remedy would depend
upon whether the two remedies were held to provide a single cause of action or
separate and distinct causes of action.8 In the principal case the Court said that the two review statutes afforded
due process of law. In Bowie v. Town of West Jefferson, 231 N.C. 408, 57 S.E.2d
369 (1950), the Court held that a tax valuation statute was invalid for failure to
afford due process because it did not contain a -provision for notice and hearing.
The two review statutes discussed in the principal case provide for a hearing on
the question of liability but they are separate from the sections imposing the
income, inheritance and gift taxes. Apparently the separate provision for hearing
involved in the princiapl case does not come within the rule of the West Jefferson
case because of the exception pointed out therein by Seawell, J.: "Not all tax
procedures, of course, are subject to the rule we have outlined, that is the presence
in the statute of a provision requiring notice and permitting hearing; in some of
them the tax is imposed on a declaration or report of the taxpayer, and the amount
of the tax is merely a matter of mathematical computation." 231 N.C. at 411, 57
S.E.2d at 371.
19251 N.C. 329, 111 S.E.2d 319 (1959).
o N.C. Sales & Use Tax Reg. No. 4 (1944).2 1 G.S. § 105-262 authorizes the Commissioner of Revenue to promulgate regu-
lations necessary to implement the provisions of the Revenue Act.
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changed by the legislature, and was by statute made prima facie cor-
rect,22 the regulation controlled.
The Court pointed to an amendment added to G.S. § 105-264 by the
1957 General Assembly which allows a taxpayer to rely on rulings and
regulations of the Commissioner. Since the decision for the taxpayer
had already been affirmed, the Court found it unnecessary to decide
whether or not the amendment would be retroactive.
In the case of In re Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp.28 the Court had
held in effect that the Commissioner was without power to make a retro-
active regulation increasing taxes. The principal case seems to announce
a sound corollary rule, that a regulation of the Commissioner, unless
clearly contrary to a statute, cannot be repudiated retroactively.
TORTS
NEGLIGENCE
Insulating Negligence1
The doctrine of insulating negligence was held inapplicable in Friday
v. Adams.2 There defendant A parked his truck on the highway at night
without flares or proper warning devices. Defendant B, with plaintiff
as a passenger, was proceeding at excessive speed and without his glasses
and collided with the rear of the parked truck. A verdict was rendered
against both A and B, and defendant A appealed. The Court, without
citing any principles of the doctrine of insulating negligence, said, "[I]t
may not be held that the allegations are so fatally defective as not to
allege concurring negligence. . . . [T]he evidence offered upon the
trial in Superior Court is of sufficient probative value to take the case
to the jury and to support the verdict."'3
The Court cited Riddle v. Artis4 as a comparable case. In the
Riddle case defendant A skidded across the centerline and collided with
plaintiff's car, and defendant B negligently ran into the rear of plain-
tiff's car. On the theory that it was foreseeable that should plaintiff
have to stop for any reason B would be unable to avoid a collision, the
Court held that defendant B's negligence in following too closely and
speeding was not insulated by defendant A's negligence.
" G.S. § 105-264 makes regulations interpreting the Revenue Act prima facie
correct.
2-248 N.C. 531, 103 S.E.2d 823 (1958).
1 Insulating negligence is the subject of Comments, 38 N.C.L. REv. 104 (1959)
and 33 N.C.L. REv. 498 (1955).
2251 N.C. 540, 111 S.E.2d 893 (1960).
'Id. at 549, 111 S.E.2d at 900.
'243 N.C. 668, 91 S.E.2d 894 (1956), discussed in Comment, 38 N.C.L. REv.
104 (1959).
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The defendant trucker in the Friday case cited and relied on the
following cases as authority for contending that his negligence in parking
the truck on the highway was insulated by the active negligence of the
other defendant who was speeding and driving without his glasses:
(1) Smith v. Grubb:r There defendant A negligently parked on the
highway. Plaintiff, observing defendant A's parked car, stopped behind
him. Defendant B then crashed into the rear of plaintiff's truck. The
Court held that defendant A's negligence was insulated by the negligence
of defendant B. The Court spoke of defendant B's active negligence
and combined the but for and foreseeability tests in insulating A's negli-
gent parking on the highway.
(2) Potter v. Frosty Morn Meats, Inc.:( There defendant A negli-
gently parked his truck on the highway. Defendant B, in whose car
plaintiff was a passenger, collided with the rear of defendant A's truck.
The Court held that it was the active negligence of defendant B in failing
to observe the truck which proximately caused the collision.
(3) Howze v. McCall:7 There defendant A left his automobile parked
in the highway with no lights. Plaintiff, upon observing A's parked
vehicle, applied his brakes and was struck from behind by defendant B
who was driving negligently. The Court held that, conceding defendant
A's negligence in parking on the highway, there would have been no
collision but for the negligence of defendant B.
After reading the above decisions which the defendant trucker relied
on in support of his plea for insulating negligence, it is difficult to under-
stand how the Court can say, "Decisions cited and relied upon by de-
fendant Dulin [trucker] have been duly considered and found readily
distinguishable in factual situations.""
Another recent decision on facts somewhat similar to those in the
Friday case reached the opposite result. In Rowe v. MurphyO defendant
A parked his disabled automobile partially on the highway. Plaintiff
stopped to offer aid and parked his car in front of defendant A's car.
Plaintiff was standing between the two parked automobiles when de-
fendant B, driving while intoxicated, collided with the rear of defendant
A's automobile crushing the plaintiff between the parked vehicles. The
Court held that defendant A's car was not negligently parked. But the
Court went on to indicate that even conceding that defendant A was
negligently parked, the negligence of defendant B was the proximate
cause of the collision.
-238 N.C. 665, 78 S.E.2d 598 (1953).0242 N.C. 67, 86 S.E.2d 780 (1955), discussed in Comment, 38 N.C.L. Rw.
104"(1959).l 249 N.C. 250, 106 S.E.2d 236 (1958), discussed in Comment, 38 N.C.L. Rv.
104 (1959).8251 N.C. at 549, 111 S.E.2d at 900. (Emphasis added.)
- 250 N.C. 627, 109 S.E.2d 474 (1959).
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Though the holdings of both the Friday and Rowe cases seem sound
on their facts, a comparison of these with other rear-end collision cases
leads one to agree that "any effort to reconcile the North Carolina law
on the subject of insulating negligence seems futile."'1
Effect of Removal of Stop Signs by Vandals
In Tucker v. Moorefield" plaintiff's intestate was proceeding north
on X street, and the defendant was proceeding west on Y street. A
collision occurred at the intersection resulting in the death of plaintiff's
intestate. Stop signs had been placed on Y street, but the sign facing
the defendant as he approached the intersection had been removed by
vandals some two months before; however, the metal post remained.
Plaintiff's intestate had been used to traveling along X street for several
years, but the defendant was not familiar with the interesection. The
Court said that evidence of the existence, at the time of the collision, of
the metal post on the north side of Y street and the stop sign on the
south side facing west was admissible as circumstances to be considered
by the jury in determining whether the defendant exercised due care.
In awarding a new trial for the defendant, however, the Court held that
the fact that the stop sign had been on the north side of Y street was
irrelevant as to the duty of either party absent a showing that the de-
fendant knew it had been there or that the plaintiff's intestate knew it
had been removed. The Court said that the duty of both parties must
be determined by conditions as they existed at the time of the collision,
and if in fact there was no stop sign facing the defendant, the plaintiff's
intestate was not legally entitled to act as if there were.
Speed Exemption Statute
G.S. § 20-145 provides that vehicle speed limits "shall not apply to
vehicles when operated with due regard for safety' 2 under the direction
of the police's in the chase or apprehension of violators of the law ....
This exemption shall not, however, protect the driver of any such vehicle
from the consequences of a reckless disregard of the safety of others."
In Goddard v. Williams'4 an action was brought against a police officer
10 Cronenberg v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 693, 699 (E.D.N.C. 1954).
11250 N.C. 340, 108 S.E.2d 637 (1959).
1" Various courts have interpreted the "due regard"' portion of similar statutes
as essentially satisfied (1) when the driver of the emergency vehicle has by suitable
warning given the user of the street or highway an opportunity to yield the right
of way and (2) if having discovered the peril in which another has knowingly or
negligently become involved despite the operation of the required warning devices
the driver reasonably exercises any last clear chance to avoid the accident. Duff
v. Schaefer Ambulance Serv., 132 Cal. App. 2d 665, 283 P.2d 91 (1955) ; Lakoduk
v. Cruger, 48 Wash. 2d 642, 296 P.2d 690 (1956).
" The statute applies equally to other emergency vehicles (fire department
vehicles and ambulances) providing they are on official business. N.C. GBn,. STAr.
§ 20-145 (1953).21251 N.C. 128, 110 S.E.2d 820 (1959).
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for negligence in the operation of his patrol car. The plaintiff alleged
that he was proceeding down a city street and attempted to make a left
turn when the officer approached from the rear at approximately seventy
miles per hour in a thirty-five mile speed zone. The two vehicles col-
lided when the officer attempted to pass the turning plaintiff. The offi-
cer filed a cross-action alleging negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
The officer also alleged that at the time of the collision he was pursuing
the plaintiff for running a stop sign, and that his siren was turned on.
The jury returned a verdict for the officer, and on appeal the Court
granted a new trial. The trial court had charged that the officer would
not be negligent unless he acted wilfully and wantonly and for the pur-
pose of injuring the plaintiff. Although the language of the Court is not
clear,' 5 it apparently held that the charge was erroneous, and that "in
such situation, an officer is liable for his negligent acts as well as for
his wilful and wanton acts."' 6
As to the standard of care required of an officer in pursuit of an
offender the Court quoted two authorities to the effect that he is to exer-
cise the care which a reasonable and prudent man in discharge of official
duties of a like nature under like circumstances would exercise.17 The
Court said, however, that "mere speed alone, unaccompanied by any
recklessness or disregard of the rights of others, would be insufficient to
support an allegation of negligence on the part of the [officer] .... ",8
Thus, under the speed exemption statute, it appears that in order for
speeding to constitute negligence on the part of the officer the plaintiff
must not only show the speed of the officer but must go further and show
circumstances under which such speed would constitute a reckless dis-
regard of the safety of others.
Unexplained Automobile Accidents
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was held not applicable to unex-
plained automobile accidents in Lane v. Dorney,'9 and the judgment of
nonsuit was sustained. The Court "carefully" distinguished the case of
Etheridge v. Etheridge20 which apparently heretofore had been assumed
to have applied the doctrine.21 However, a petition to rehear the Lane
1 The Court stated: "There is no exemption granted by G.S. § 20-145 from
reckless and negligent conduct by an officer unless such reckless and negligent
conduct is wilful and wanton, intentional and purposeful, and made for the purpose
of injuring the person the officer was seeking to arrest." Id. at 133, 110 S.E.2d
at 824.
0 Ibid.
1 McKay v. Hargis, 351 Mich. 409, 88 N.W.2d 456 (1958); 60 C.J.S. Motor
Vehicles § 375 (1949).1s251 N.C. at 133. 110 S.E.2d at 824; accord, McKay v. Hargis, supra note 17.
1250 N.C. 15, 108 S.E.2d 55 (1959).
20 222 N.C. 616, 24 S.E.2d 477 (1943.)
' "The Supreme Court of North Carolina recently applied the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur in a civil action for personal injuries arising out of an unexplained
automobile accident." Note. 21 N.C.L. Rnv. 402 (1943).
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case was granted, and the Court reversed the nonsuit by a four-to-three
decision.22 The Court affirmed its prior holding that res ipsa was not
applicable to unexplained automobile accidents but held that there was
sufficient evidence of negligence to require submission of the case to the
jury.3
Proximate Cause
In Williamson v. Bennett24 plaintiff was driving her automobile
down a one-way street when the defendant, operating a small foreign
sports car, pulled into the street from her driveway and struck the
plaintiff's automobile near the center on the driver's side. The plaintiff
did not see what made contact with her car, and all that she heard was
a "grinding sound on the left side." About a month before the time in
question a little girl riding a bicycle was killed when she ran into the
side of the plaintiff's brother-in-law's car. Plaintiff testified that when
she heard the grinding sound all she could think of was that she had
killed a child on a bicycle. There was no physical injury to the plaintiff,
but she later developed a severe nervous disorder resulting in pseudo-
paralysis. In denying the plaintiff damages for personal injury the Court
said the plaintiff's condition was not proximately caused by what actually
happened but by what might have happened. The defendant was under
no duty to anticipate or take precautions against the mere possibility
that the plaintiff or others might imagine a state of facts which did not
exist.
Owners and Occupiers of Land
In Hood v. Queen City Coach C0.25 the plaintiff, desiring to pur-
chase a ticket for transportation on the defendant bus line, entered the
rear of the station by a driveway provided as the exit for buses and taxi-
cabs instead of following the sidewalk to the front of the station. The
defendant maintained an office building adjacent to and parallel with
the driveway. There was a considerable upgrade from the street en-
trance of the driveway to the rear of the station. To provide a level
walkway from the street to the side entrance of its building the de-
fendant excavated the grade and installed a retaining wall. The wall
was capped by a concrete curbing which extended a few inches above
the level of the driveway. The walkway was three feet below the level
of the driveway at one end and flush with the sidewalk at the other.
After purchasing his ticket, the plaintiff proceeded from the rear
entrance of the station back down the driveway. In order to avoid a
22 252 N.C. 90, 113 S.E.2d 33 11960). Denny, J., joined by Winborne, C.J.,
and Moore, J., concurred with the majority in holding res ipsa inapplicable, but
dissented in the finding of sufficient evidence to carry the case to the jury.2 But see Boyd v. Harper, 250 N.C. 334, 108 S.E.2d 598 (1959).
24251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960).
25 249 N.C. 534, 107 S.E2d 154 (1959).
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bus which had started up behind him, the plaintiff stepped upon the
curb above the excavation and fell into it, sustaining injuries.
The accident occurred at night, and lights from the street, the rear of
the station, and other buildings illuminated the drive but did not illumi-
nate the excavation below the surface of the drive. In affirming the
judgment for the plaintiff the Court held that the evidence permitted
the finding that the plaintiff was an invitee, and that the duty was thereby
imposed upon the defendant to maintain the premises in a reasonably
safe condition and to provide safeguards against injury by reason of
depressed holes, pitfalls, or other hidden dangers. 26
The Court relied on two factors in determining that the evidence
supported a finding that the plaintiff was an invitee. First, it was to the
mutual benefit 27 of the parties for the plaintiff to enter the station for
the purpose of purchasing a ticket on the defendant bus line. Second, the
plaintiff knew the public had used this approach for a long period of
time, and the defendant had not given notice to the public that the ap-
proach was not to be used. The evidence of inadequate lighting was
found sufficient to support a finding of negligence.
In Powell v. Deifells, Inc.28 the plaintiff entered the defendant's de-
partment store around eleven a.m. to make a purchase. At the time
plaintiff entered the store it was raining and there had been flurries of
snow. The plaintiff sustained injuries when she slipped on the asphalt
tile floor which was wet because of water which the customers had
tracked in. The plaintiff appealed a judgment of involuntary nonsuit
and the Supreme Court reversed. The Court held the jury should de-
cide the question of negligence since: (1) the floor was of asphalt tile,
impervious to water, and known by the defendant to be slippery when
wet; (2) it was customary for the defendant to mop the floor and put
mats at the entrances on rainy days, and the defendant had neglected to
do either; (3) the defendant gave the plaintiff no warning of the danger
and failed to remove the danger.
This is the first case before the Court where the fall of the plaintiff
was due to water tracked in by the defendant's customers. The rule is
well established in North Carolina that where the dangerous condition
was not created by the defendant the plaintiff must establish that the
condition existed for such a length of time that the defendant knew, or
in the exercise of reasonable care should have known of its existence.20
The store had been open for less than three hours and the plaintiff fell
some twenty-five feet from the store entrance. There was no showing
28 Accord, Batts v. Home Tel. & Tel. Co., 186 N.C. 120, 118 S.E. 893 (1923).22Mutual benefit is necessary to designate one an invitee. Pafford v. J. A. Jones
Constr. Co., 217 N.C. 730, 9 S.E.2d 408 (1940).28251 N.C. 596, 112 S.E.2d 56 (1960).
Harris v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 230 N.C. 485, 53 S.E.2d 536 (1949);
Note, 31 N.C.L. REv. 134 (1952).
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that the defendant had actual knowledge of the existing condition, and
the case appears to be a relatively liberal application of constructive
notice. This could be explained however by the fact that the case does
not fit squarely into the cases where the defendant created the danger,80
nor those where the independent agency created the danger. 3 Here the
danger was created partially by the defendant in having floors which he
knew became slippery when wet and partially by the independent
agency's tracking in the water.3 2
In Witherspoon v. Owen88 North Carolina apparently recognized for
the first time a duty of a proprietor of a public business establishment to
protect patrons from assaults by other patrons.8 4 The plaintiff was a cus-
tomer in the defendant's tavern and when he attempted to leave he was
assaulted and knocked down a flight of stairs by an irate patron. The
Court conceded the duty of the defendant proprietor to protect his patrons
against foreseeable assaults, but affirmed the nonsuit on the ground that
apparently nothing had transpired which would indicate that the plaintiff
could not proceed down the steps safely. The authorities are in accord
that a proprietor of a public place of business may be liable for harm to
patrons caused by other patrons. By the majority rule liability will be
imposed if the proprietor by the exercise of reasonable care could have
discovered that such acts were being done or were about to be done and
could have protected the patron by controling the conduct of the assault-
ing patron or by giving a warning adequate to enable the assaulted patron
to avoid harm.85
Attractive Nuisance Doctrine
In Matheny v. Stonecutter Mills Corp. 6 plaintiff's intestates, ages
nine and ten years, were drowned in an industrial reservoir owned by
the defendant. The reservoir was enclosed by a six foot mesh fence
" Hughes v. Anchor Enterprises, Inc., 245 N.C. 131, 95 S.E.2d 577 (1956)
(soapy substance left by employee); Brown v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 217
N.C. 368, 8 S.E.2d 199 (1940) (oil dripped from machine on display).31 Cooke v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 204 N.C. 495, 168 S.E. 679 (1933)
(plaintiff slipped on a banana peeling) ; Fox v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 209
N.C. 115, 182 S.E. 662 (1935) (plaintiff slipped on a beet in the aisle).
" Two other cases in this area of business visitors were recently before the
Court. In Garner v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 250 N.C. 151, 108 S.E.2d 461(1959), the plaintiff was denied a recovery when she slipped leaving a store
allegedly because of an optical illusion created by defendant's step. In Little v.
Wilson Oil Corp., 249 N.C. 773, 107 S.E.2d 729 (1959), recovery was denied when
the plaintiff tripped on the edge of a protruding portion of the concrete slab in
front of the defendant's filling station.
33251 N.C. 169, 110 S.E.2d 830 (1959).
8" North Carolina has recognized this duty of protection with respect to com-
mon carriers. See Mills v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 172 N.C. 266, 90 S.E. 221(1916) ; Pruett v. Southern Ry., 164 N.C. 3, 80 S.E. 65 (1913).
"
3 Sidebottom v. Aubrey, 267 Ky. 45, 101 S.W.2d 212 (1937) ; Peck v. Gerber,
154 Ore. 126, 59 P.2d 675 (1936) ; Weihert v. Piccione, 273 Wis. 448, 78 N.W.2d
757 (1956) ; Annot., 106 A.L.R. 1003 (1937) ; RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 348 (1934).
" 249 N.C. 575, 107 S.E.2d 143 (1959).
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topped with barbed wire. There was no gate in the fence. The reser-
voir was so constructed that once in the water one could not get out
without assistance. Children for many years had frequented the reser-
voir to swim and fish, and an officer of the defendant corporation had
been notified of this fact some years prior to the time in question. The
children usually gained entrance by climbing over the fence with the
assistance of the vines which covered it.
It is settled law in North Carolina that one who maintains even an
unenclosed pond is not guilty of negligence per se.87 However, if the
pond owner knows or should know that children of tender years are
frequenting the premises, the owner must exercise reasonable care to
provide for their protection.8 8 In Matheny the Court held that the
defendant had erected a suitable safeguard, and that the motion for non-
suit was properly granted.8 9
The attractive nuisance doctrine was again before the Court in Dean
v. Wilson Constr. Co.40 where a fourteen year old boy entered a street
construction site, after work for the day had ceased, climbed upon a
bulldozer, and started it. The boy was then told by a neighbor to leave
and was warned to stay off the equipment. The boy then proceeded to
a crane which was also on the site, opened the unlocked cab door,
climbed into the cab, started the engine, and began to operate the crane.
He caused the boom of the crane to come into contact with some high-
tension wires and was electrocuted. The Court, noting that the boy
was a trespasser in climbing into and operating the crane,41 said that
since there was no evidence of wilful and wanton negligence on the part
of the construction company, the plaintiff based his right to recover on
the so-called attractive nuisance doctrine. The Court refused to apply
the doctrine, however, since the evidence showed that the boy knew he
was a trespasser, was conscious of the danger, and deliberately risked the
consequences of his wrongful conduct.
The fact that the boy was fourteen years old seemed to weigh heavily
with the Court. The Court noted that the doctrine was designed to
protect children of tender years who are too young to understand and
appreciate the danger and quoted from Brisco v. Henderson Lighting
& Power Co.42 where it was said: "[I]n the numerous cases which we
"
7 Stribbling v. Lamm, 239 N.C. 529, 80 S.E.2d 270 (1954) ; Fitch v. Selwyn
Village, Inc., 234 N.C. 632, 68 S.E.2d 255 (1951).
" Barlow v. Gurney, 224 N.C. 223, 29 S.E.2d 681 (1944). See also Notes, 13
N.C.L. Rxv. 340 (1935), 26 N.C.L. R-v. 227 (1948).
" Compare Price v. Atchison, 58 Kan. 551, 50 Pac. 450 (1897), where the de-
fendant had erected a fence, but knew boys habitually climbed it to gain access.
The court held it was the duty of the defendant to expel the intruders or adopt
other measures to avoid accident.
"-251 N.C. 581, 111 S.E.2d 827 (1960).
The duty owed to a trespasser is that he must not be willfully or wantonly
injured. Jessup v. High Point, T. & D.R.R., 244 N.C. 242, 93 SXE.2d 84 (1956).
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have examined we do not find any in which a boy of thirteen years, 'with
the usual intelligence of boys of that age,' has been permitted to rely upon
the attractive allurements of machinery to children."
43
Manufacturer's Liability-Defective Machinery
In Tyson v. Long Mfg. Co.44 the plaintiff was working as a looper
on a tobacco harvester. As the machine lurched the plaintiff lost her
balance and caught her thumb in a partially covered perforated sprocket.
Plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer and the retailer alleging
that the harvester was negligently constructed in that it had a sprocket
with holes large enough to catch one's finger, and that the sprocket was
inadequately guarded. She also alleged that the sprocket and guard were
so constructed as to constitute a concealed danger. On appeal the
judgment of nonsuit was affirmed.
With respect to the duty of a manufacturer owed to a user of its
product, the Court quoted from a New York decision,45 stating that
"'the manufacturer of a machine, . . . dangerous because of the way in
which it functions, and patently so, owes to those who use it a duty
merely to make it free from latent defects and concealed dangers.'"46
The Court stated: (1) There was no latent defect or danger concealed
from the plaintiff. (2) The machine was not inherently dangerous to
the plaintiff. (3) There was no evidence of negligence in the design or
construction of the machine. (4) The evidence was insufficient to show
that the injury to the plaintiff was foreseeable. The Court said that
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.47 was distinguishable in that there the
defect in an automobile was concealed from the plaintiff.
With respect to the seller, the Court held that absent an express
warranty, no greater duty rested upon the seller than upon the manu-
facturer.
48
Liability of Parent for Tort of Child
The question of the liability of parents for injuries inflicted by their
minor son with an air rifle was presented in Lane v. Chatham.49 The
plaintiff was shot in the eye with a "BB" gun by the defendants' nine
-- 148 N.C. 396, 62 S.E. 600 (1908).
'
8 Id. at 414, 62 S.E. at 607. See also 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 29, at p. 469(1950) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 339 (1934) ; Wilson, Limitations on the Attractive
Nuisance Doctrine, 1 N.C.L. REv 162 (1922).
" 249 N.C. 557, 107 S.E.2d 170 (1959).
" Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950). Plaintiff was feed-
ing onions into an onion topping machine and was injured when his hand became
caught in the machine's revolving steel rollers. See also Stevens v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 151 Kan. 638, 100 P.2d 723 (1940).
48249 N.C. at 559, 107 S.E.2d at 172.
'7217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
"'Accord, Kientz v. Carlton, 245 N.C. 236, 96 S.E.2d 14 (1957).
"251 N.C. 400, 111 S.E2d 598 (1959), also discussed in DoMEsTic RELATiONS,
Parents' Liability, supra.
1960]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
year old son. There was evidence that the son had on two prior occa-
sions shot other persons with the air rifle, and that this was known by
the feme defendant. The Court said that the parents entrusting an air
rifle to their minor son would be liable "based on their own negligence,
if under the circumstances they could and should, by the exercise of due
care, have reasonably foreseen that the boy was likely to use the air
rifle in such a manner as to cause injury, and failed to exercise reason-
able care to prohibit, restrict or supervise his further use thereof."' 0
The feme defendant was held liable because of her knowledge of the
prior misuse and her failure to restrict or supervise the child's further
use of the rifle. The defendant father, however, was excused from
liability, having no knowledge of the prior misuse. It might be argued
that the knowledge of the wife should be imputed to the husband. 51
However, the only cases in which knowledge of one spouse has been
imputed to the other in North Carolina have been cases in which a
clear principal-agent relationship appeared. 2
The rule of the instant case appears to be in accord with that of other
jurisdictions which have considered the question and allowed recovery.
In the cases denying recovery54 the plaintiff apparently failed to show
that the parent had knowledge of any dangerous propensities of the
child or of any prior misuse of the air rifle.
It should be noted that the Court in the instant case held that an air
rifle was not a dangerous instrumentality per se. Thus, liability could
not be imposed merely upon showing that the parent gave the air rifle
to the child.55 Though it appears to be the universal holding that air
rifles in general are not per se dangerous, it would seem that these deci-
sions are based largely on precedent rather than sound reasoning, espe-
cially in view of the modem advances in the power and precision of
50 Id. at 405, 111 S.E.2d at 603.
"' It would seem that this is analogous to the situation wherein knowledge of the
wife of the dangerous propensities of their dog is imputed to the husband. SeeBenke v. Stepp, 199 Okla. 119, 184 P.2d 615 (1947) ; Barber v. Hacstrasser, 136
N.J.L. 76, 54 A.2d 458 (1947).
" Tomlins v. Cranford, 227 N.C. 323, 42 S.E.2d 100 (1947) ; Francis v. Reeves,
137 N.C. 269, 49 S.E. 213 (1904). Both of these cases involved deed transaction.
"' Gudziewski v. Stenolesky, 263 Mass. 103, 160 N.E. 334 (1928) ; Sullivan v.O'Ryan, 206 Misc. 212, 132 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup. Ct. 1954) ; Johnson v. Glidden, 11
S.D. 237, 76 N.W. 933 (1898).
"Martin v. Barnett, 120 Cal. App. 2d 625, 261 P.2d 551 (1953); Norlin v.Connolly, 336 Mass. 553, 146 N.E.2d 663 (1957) ; Fleming v. Kravitz, 260 Pa. 428,
103 Atl. 831 (1918); Highshaw v. Creech, 17 Tenn. App. 573, 69 S.W.2d 249(1933) ; Harris v. Cameron, 81 Wis. 239, 51 N.W. 437 (1892).55 It is negligent to give a dangerous weapon to a minor child incompetent to
hardle it. Dickens v. Barham, 69 Colo. 349, 194 Pac. 356 (1920) (riffle) ; Parman
v. Lemnon, 119 Kan. 323, 244 Pac. 227 (1926) (shotgun). In Brittingham v.
Stadier, 151 N.C. 299, 66 S.E. 128 (1909), the feme defendant who employed her
twelve year old child as a clerk in her pawn shop was held liable, on the theory of
respondeat superior and on the theory of her negligence in entrusting the child with
a dangerous instrumentality, for the negligent act of her son in shooting a customer
with a pistol.
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pneumatic arms. 56 In spite of the view that air rifles are not inherently
dangerous, some courts have indicated that one would be negligent in
giving a minor child an air rifle knowing him to be incompetent to
exercise judgment in its control and use. 57 Statutes in some states make
it unlawful to give an air rifle to children under certain ages.58
TORT CLAIMs ACT
The State as a Joint Tort-Feasor
In Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Wilson County Bd. of Educ. 9
a child was struck and killed after alighting from a school bus by a
motorist who had passed the stopped bus. Suit was brought for wrong-
ful death against the county board of education before the Industrial
Commission pursuant to the provisions of the Tort Claims Act.60 The
plaintiff alleged various acts of negligence on the part of the bus driver in
failing properly to supervise the discharge of the child. The action was
dismissed by the Commissioner, and the full Board and the superior
court affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Commis-
sion committed error in concluding as a matter of law that the affidavits
and stipulations of the parties showed that the negligence of the motorist
insulated any negligence on the part of the bus driver.6 "
The defendant's motion to dismiss was based on its contention that
no public agency covered by the Tort Claims Act could be liable for the
negligence of its employees unless that negligence was the sole proximate
cause of the injury. The Court held that interpretation to be erroneous.
The Act provides:
The Industrial Commission shall determine whether or not each
individual claim arose as the result of a negligent act of any...
" In the view of Mr. Justice Higgins in a concurring opinion in the Lane case,
such holdings are "as out of date as the horse and buggy." 251 N.C. at 406, 111
S.E.2d at 603.
" Mazzocchi v. Seay, 126 W. Va. 490, 29 S.E.2d 12 (1944). Here plaintiff
alleged that the parents of a four year old child negligently gave their infant son an
air rifle, knowing that because of his infancy he was incapable of exercising proper
judgment, care, and discretion in the use and control of it. The court sustained
the demurrer and said that even though an air rifle cannot be said to be inherently
dangerous it could be a dangerous instrumentality in the hands of an infant and
the parents thus liable for giving it to him. This case is reviewed in Note, 22
N.C.L. REv. 333 (1944).
11 N.Y. PENAL CODE § 1896 (misdemeanor to give or sell any air rifle to a child
under sixteen); PA. STAT. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 3-841 to -848 (Supp. 1958) (unlawful
to give or sell a minor under eighteen an air rifle under certain circumstances).
251 N.C. 603, 111 S.E.2d 844 (1960), also discussed in ADmIsmRATIVE LAW,
Pleading and Evidence, supra.
o N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-291 to -300.1 (1958).
61 While the state is not liable for the negligent omissions of its employees,
Flynn v. North Carolina State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 244 N.C. 617,
94 S.E.2d 571 (1956), G.S. § 143-300.1 provides that a county board of education is
responsible for the negligent omissions of its school bus drivers.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
employee.. . of the State62 while acting within the scope of his ...
employment . . . under circumstances where the State of North
Carolina, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the laws of North Carolina. If the Commission
finds that there was such negligence on the part of an . . . em-
ployee ... which was the proximate cause of the injury ... the
Commission shall determine the amount of damages which the
claimant is entitled to be paid .... 11
The Court said that the agency being sued under the act is liable
under the same circumstances as a private person would be liable. Thus
since the negligent acts of a private person need only be one of the
proximate causes of the injury to impose liability, the Court felt it was
not the intent of the legislature to limit liability under the act as con-
tended by the defendant.
Apparently, in view of the Court's interpretation of the act, the state
may become liable as a joint tort-feasor should the negligence of its
employees concur with that of a third person to produce an injury. If
this is true, it raises some interesting, but unanswered questions con-
cerning the contribution statute 4 viewed in the light of the Tort Claims
Act. In attempting to answer these questions it must be kept in mind
that our Court has said that since the Tort Claims Act is in derogation
of the sovereign immunity from liability for torts the act should be
strictly construed.65
The question is raised as to whether in the joint tort-feasor situation
the plaintiff could maintain an action against both the state and the third
person and obtain a joint judgment. The answer would seem to be in
the negative. Since the Tort Claims Act created the Industrial Com-
mission as the court for hearing tort claims against the state, it would
seem unlikely that the plaintiff would be allowed to join the state in a
superior court action or the third person before the Industrial Com-
mission.
The next question is, does the right to contribution exist where the
state is a joint tort-feasor? The contribution statute provides that in
any case where judgment has been or may be rendered against two
persons liable jointly and severally for its payment as joint tort-feasors
but only one joint tort-feasor was made defendant, the tort-feasor against
" An employee of a county or city board of education is not an employee of the
State Board of Education or of the state. Turner v. Gastonia City Bd. of Educ.,
250 N.C. 456, 109 S.E.2d 211 (1959). However, this action was brought under
the provisions of G.S. § 143-300.1 allowing claims against the county and city boards
of education for accidents involving school buses under rules of liability and pro-
cedure as provided with respect to tort claims against the State Board of Edu-
cation.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
",N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-240 (1953).
' Floyd v. North Carolina State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 241 N.C.
461, 85 S.E.2d 703 (1955).
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whom the action was brought may enforce contribution in a separate
action or join the other tort-feasor in the original action.60 The Court
has said that the intent and purpose of the contribution statute is to
permit a defendant who has been sued in a tort action to bring into the
action for the purpose of enforcing contribution any joint tort-feasor
against whom the plaintiff could have originally brought suit in the
same action. 7  Thus it could be argued that the contribution statute
contemplates the ability to obtain a joint judgment, and where that
ability does not exist the right of contribution does not exist.
Assuming that the Court would construe the contribution statute
liberally and hold that the right of contribution exists where the state is
a joint tort-feasor, there is still the problem of exercising that right.
The statute provides for the enforcement of contribution by a cross
action or by bringing a separate suit therefor. The apparently exclusive
jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission would seem to preclude the
state from being a defendant in the superior court and the third person
from being a defendant before the Industrial Commission. As to bring-
ing a separate suit, the state would probably be allowed to bring its
contribution action in the superior court after having judgment rendered
against it in the Industrial Commission.68  However, should the third
person be sued in the superior court, it is questionable whether he could
bring his contribution action before the Industrial Commission. The
Tort Claims Act states that the Commission is a court "for the purpose
of hearing and passing upon tort claims" against the state.69 Thus it
could be argued that a claim for contribution is not a tort claim but a
statutory claim not existing at common law. On the other hand it could
be argued that though the claim is not a tort claim, it nevertheless is a
claim arising out of a tort as it "arose as the result of a negligent act of
[a state employee] .... ,70
It would seem wise for the third person joint tort-feasor seeking
contribution from the state to stress the language in the Tort Claims
Act making the state liable as if it were a private person. This language
was relied on in the instant case in indicating that the state would be
liable for the concurring negligent acts of its employees. This language
was also stressed in Lyon & Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina State Bd. of
11 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-240 (1953).
17 Wilson v. Massagee, 224 N.C. 705, 32 S.E.2d 335 (1944).
" State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n v. Cobb, 215 N.C. 556, 2 S.E.2d 565
(1939). The state was denied a recovery of expenditures made in recapturing the
defendant who had escaped from prison. However, the Court held that the in-
firmity of the state's case did not consist in an inability to sue, but in its inability
to maintain that particular suit. The Court said that a sovereign may bring an
action for tort in its individual capacity and with respect to its individual and
proprietary rights.
SN.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (1958).70 Ibid.
19601
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Educ.71 holding that the right of subrogation against the state existed
under the Tort Claims Act. To be sure, the state, if a private person,
would be liable to the third person for contribution.
It is submitted that a liberal construction of both the contribution
statute and the Tort Claims Act is desirable. As was stated by Cardozo,
J., in Anderson v. John L. Hayes Constr. Co.,72 "The exemption of the
sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where consent has been
withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construction
where consent has been announced. '73
TREsPAss
The Court for the first time applied the "ownership of space"1 4 and
the "lawfulness of flight" 75 statutes in Wall v. Trogdon. The defendant
flew his crop-spraying airplane over the plaintiff's fishing pond at an
altitude of from seventy-five to one hundred feet while emitting a fluid
used for spraying crops. An oily substance was observed on the pond
shortly after the flight. The plaintiff brought an action for trespass and
negligence allegedly resulting in the death of his fish. The Court held
the nonsuit was proper as to the trespass of the airplane because plain-
tiff failed to show the causal relationship between the death of the fish
and the operation of the airplane necessary to establish an unlawful
flight under the statutes. Similarly, the absence of the causal connection
defeated the plaintiff's action for negligence. Although the decision on
the trespass by the airplane and negligence in its operation is not ques-
tioned, it would seem that had plaintiff been allowed all the reasonable
inferences to which he was entitled on a motion for nonsuit the jury
should have been allowed to determine the question of a technical tres-
pass. The Court said plaintiff could not recover for trespass merely by
showing the flight over the pond with a liquid streaming from the air-
plane without showing the liquid "landed on the plaintiff's property
rather than somewhere else." At an altitude of seventy-five to one
hundred feet it would seem reasonable to infer that some of the liquid
landed on the land below.
'-238 N.C. 24, 76 S.E.2d 553 (1953). See also Note, 32 N.C.L. REv. 242 (1954).72 243 N.Y. 140, 153 N.E. 28 (1926).7 1Id. at 147, 153 N.E. at 29.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-12 (1960). The statute provides: "The ownership of
the space above the lands and waters of this State is declared to be vested in the
several owners of the surface beneath, subject to the right of flight described in§ 63-13."
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-13 (1960). The statute provides: "Flight in aircraft
over the lands and waters of this State is lawful, unless at such a low altitude as
to interfere with the then existing use to which the land or water, or the space over
the land or water, is put by the owner, or unless so conducted as to be injurious to
the health and happiness, or imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully
on the land or water beneath. .. ."
" 249 N.C. 747, 107 S.E.2d 757 (1959).
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MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Will one who makes a mistake of law in his decision to prosecute
another criminally thereby subject himself to a suit for malicious prose-
cution? An affirmative answer was clearly implied in the recent case
of Gray v. Bennett.77 There the plaintiff in the malicious prosecution
action entered into a contract with the defendant by which the plaintiff
was to collect and deliver laundry for the defendant's business. Plain-
tiff's only compensation was a certain percentage of all sums collected
by him from laundry customers, and his agreement with the defendant
required him to make a bi-monthly accounting of the sums he collected,
less the commission. The laundry company did not maintain customer
accounts, and the defendant and his company looked to the plaintiff for
their money. The plaintiff was responsible for any loss he sustained
by extending credit. He established his own laundry route and fur-
nished his own delivery truck. The defendant caused a warrant to be
issued and plaintiff was arrested for embezzlement of funds due on the
account. The criminal trial resulted in a directed verdict of not guilty.
Plaintiff thereafter brought an action for malicious prosecution. Appeal
was taken from the granting of defendant's motion of nonsuit and the
Supreme Court reversed.
The Court determined that the relationship between the plaintiff and
the defendant was that of debtor and creditor, and that therefore the
plaintiff could not be convicted of embezzlement. 78 The Court's reversal
was apparently on the theory that since the plaintiff could not as a
matter of law have been convicted on these facts, the defendant did not
have probable cause to have the plaintiff prosecuted for embezzlement.
Want of probable cause, malice, and favorable termination of the
proceeding upon which plaintiff's action is based are essential elements
of the tort of malicious prosecution.79 Malice may be inferred by the
jury from a want of probable cause, but the existence of malice does not
create an inference that probable cause was lacking. 0 The weight of
authority appears to follow the rule that a mistaken belief in regard to
the facts may furnish probable cause for initiating criminal proceedings.8'
If, however, through ignorance of the law, the accuser erroneously
believes that the acts of the accused are such as to constitute the offense
charged, his mistaken belief as to the legal consequences of the acts of
the accused does not furnish probable cause.8 2  Some courts hold that
"1250 N.C. 707, 110 S.E.2d 324 (1959).
"8 The Court also said that even if the relationship of employer-employee existed,
the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of want of probable cause.
Taylor v. Hodge, 229 N.C. 558, 50 S.E.2d 307 (1948).8 0 Rouse v. Burnham, 51 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1931); Iotsinger v. Sink, 168
N.C. 548, 84 S.E. 847 (1915).
:' Motsinger v. Sink, supra note 80.
'Vasser v. Berry, 85 Ga. App. 435, 69 S.E.2d 701 (1952); Smith v. Deaver,
49 N.C. 513 (1857); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 662, comment " (1938); 54 CJ.S.
Malicious Prosecution § 31 (1948).
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mistake of law based on advice of counsel does afford protection.8 3
North Carolina has held that advice of counsel is only evidence on the
issue of probable cause and malice.8 4
It has been said that this rule concerning a mistake of law is appar-
ently based on the antique and questionable theory that one is required
at his peril to know the law.8 5 It is submitted that the better view
would be that a reasonable mistake of law should be placed on the same
basis as mistake of fact, since probable cause is determined by examining
the impressions the plaintiff's conduct made upon the defendant.
MALICIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
In Johnson v. Grayes8 plaintiff schoolteacher alleged that the princi-
pal of her school made false charges about her to the school superin-
tendent. The allegations were that the false charges (1) reflected
directly upon plaintiff's professional efficiency, ability, character, and
attitude, (2) were made maliciously for the unjustifiable and unlawful
purpose of having her contract with the school board terminated and
her renewal contract denied, and (3) were material in forcing her dis-
charge and in preventing a renewal of her contract. The lower court
granted the defendant principal's motion to dismiss on the ground that
plaintiff's action was for slander or libel, and that in either case the
applicable statute of limitations had run.s7 The Supreme Court, in re-
versing, stated that the gravamen of the cause of action alleged was mali-
cious intereference with plaintiff's contractual relationship with the
school board and that the three year statute would apply.88
It is well settled in North Carolina that an action may be main-
tained against one who knowingly,80 intentionally," and unjustly9 ' in-
duces a party to a contract to breach it to the damage of the other party. 2
Similarly, a cause of action may arise against one who interferes with
the making of a contract as distinguished from one who interferes with
an existing contract. 93 Where defamation is the means used to induce
the breach or to interfere with the making of the contract, it would seem
88 Paulk v. Buczynski, 106 So. 2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
"Downing v. Stone, 152 N.C. 525, 68 S.E. 9 (1910).
" PROSSER, TORTS § 98 (2d ed. 1955).
88251 N.C. 448, Ill S.E.2d 595 (1959).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-55 (1953) (slander-limitation six months) ; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-54 (1953) (libel-limitation one year).8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(5) (1953).
88 Morgan v. Smith, 77 N.C. 37 (1877).
"0 Holder v. Manufacturing Co., 135 N.C. 392, 47 S.E. 481 (1904).
" Winston v. Williams & McKeithan Lumber Co., 228 N.C. 786, 47 S.E.2d 19
(1948). The defendant would be without justification if he had no sufficient law-
ful reason for his conduct, and it is not necessary to show malice in the sense of
ill will to maintain the action. Childres v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176
(1954).
2 Haskins v. Royster, 70 N.C. 601 (1874).
" Coleman v. Whisnant, 225 N.C. 494, 35 S.E.2d 647 (1945).
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that the plaintiff would have a choice of bringing either an action for
defamation or an action for malicious intereference with the contract.
The Johnson case did not preclude this possibility, but stated that
whether the plaintiff could or could not bring a suit for defamation was
immaterial since plaintiff's complaint did not contain the words "libel,"
"slander," or "defamatory." If either action could be established, bring-
ing one instead of the other might prove advantageous. In addition to
actual damage suffered, in both actions exemplary damages may be
recovered where actual malice is shown.94 However, defamation which
is calculated to injure one in his trade or profession is actionable per se,
with legal malice and damage conclusively presumed. 95 Thus punitive
damages could be assessed by the jury in the slander or libel suit upon
a showing of actual malice without the necessity of proving actual
damages. 6 If the action is for malicious interference with the contract
the plaintiff must prove actual damage to be entitled to any recovery.9 7
On the other hand, as pointed out by the Johnson case, plaintiff would
have a longer time in which to bring his malicious interference action
due to the different statutes of limitations applicable.
TRIAL PRACTICE
PROCESS
Several questions of importance relating to process were passed
upon in Morton v. Blue Ridge Ins. Co.1  Summons was issued by the
clerk of the superior court of Carteret County on March 17, 1959 and
directed to the sheriff of Cleveland County. The sheriff of Cleveland
County returned the summons to the clerk without any notation thereon
but accompanied with a letter stating that the defendant was not in
Cleveland County but in Mecklenburg County.
Under the provisions of G.S. § 1-95, as most recently amended in
1955, when a defendant is not served with the summons within the time
allowed for service, twenty days from the date of issue, it is not neces-
sary that new process issue, but the clerk, within ninety days of the
issuance of the summons, may endorse on the original summons an
extension of time within which to serve it or may issue an alias or
pluries summons returnable in the same manner as the original process.
", Wade v. Culp, 107 Ind. App. 503, 23 N.E.2d 615 (1939) ; Reichman v. Drake,
890 Ohio App. 222, 100 N.E.2d 533 (1951) (malicious interference with the con-
tract) ; Roth v. Greensboro News Co., 217 N.C. 13, 6 S.E.2d 882 (1940) ; Broad-
way v. Cope, 208 N.C. 85, 179 S.E. 452 (1935) (defamation).
' Broadway v. Cope, supra note 94.
,Ibid.
"Childress v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176 (1954).
1250 N.C. 722, 110 S.E.2d 330 (1959).
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In the Morton case, on receipt of the unserved summons and the
accompanying letter from the sheriff of Cleveland County, the clerk did
not make an endorsement on the summons nor did he issue an alias or
pluries summons. Instead he scratched out, in the line on the original
summons reading "To the Sheriff of Cleveland County," the word
"Cleveland" and inserted the word "Mecklenburg." He made no other
change and mailed the summons to the Mecklenburg sheriff who served
it on March 25, 1959. Thereafter on motion of the defendant the
superior court vacated the judgment and dismissed the action on the
ground that the summons was void.
In reversing the action of the superior court, the Supreme Court held
that, in the absence of an extension of time on the original summons or
the issuance of an alias, the action had been discontinued. The Court
further said that the act of the clerk in striking out "Cleveland" in the
summons and inserting "Mecklenburg" and then sending it to the
sheriff of Mecklenburg County "worked a discontinuance of the action
commenced on 17 March, 1959, by issuance of summons to Cleveland
County and instituted a new action at the time of the issuance of the
summons to Mecklenburg County."2
It will be noted that the Court states on the one hand that a discon-
tinuance resulted because of the failure of the clerk to endorse an exten-
sion of time or issue an alias summons and then proceeds to declare
that the act of the clerk in changing the name of the county and sending
the summons as changed to the sheriff of Mecklenburg also "worked a
discontinuance." Since the plaintiff had ninety days from the date of
the issuance of the summons to obtain an extension or the issuance of
an alias, it is difficult to see how the action was discontinued prior to the
expiration of the ninety day period by either the failure of the endorse-
ment or issuance of an alias or the action of the clerk in changing the
county name and sending the changed summons to Mecklenburg. At
the time judgment was entered, plaintiff could have had an endorsement
made on the original summons or an alias issued since the ninety day
period had by no means expired.
After finding that the original action was discontinued the Court
then holds that a new action was instituted when the clerk inserted
Mecklenburg County in the original summons in place of Cleveland
County. When was this "new action" instituted? Since the summons
bears the date of March 17, 1959, the clerk not having changed the
date when he changed the county, the Court holds that the new action
was prima facie begun on the same date as the original, March 17, 1959,
but adds that if time is of importance the court may hear evidence and
determine the true date of issuance, presumably of the "second" summons.
2 Id. at 724, 110 S.E.2d at 331-32.
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If the court were to take evidence and determine that the true date
of issuance of the "second" summons was March 24, 1959, and if, for
the purpose of discussion, the statute of limitations expired March 20,
1959, the plaintiff would be deprived of his action by the conduct of the
clerk when, as a matter of fact, the plaintiff had ninety days from March
17, 1959, the date of the issuance of the original summons within which
to have an endorsement extending the time for service made or an alias
summons issued. For these reasons, it is submitted that the language
of the Court declaring there had been a discontinuance by reason of
the clerk's action is unfortunate and declares a questionable rule of law.3
SERVICE OF PROCESS ON NON-RESIDENT LABOR UNIONS
Melton v. Hill4 points up what would appear to be serious deficiencies
in our statutes relating to the service of process on non-resident labor
unions. The plaintiff had sued two individuals and two unincorporated
labor unions. The decision on appeal relates only to the validity of the
service made on the defendant International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
a non-resident unincorporated labor union. Two summonses had been
issued for service on International. One of them was served on A. L.
Gunter, trustee or agent for the collection of money for International,
and the other was served on the Secretary of State of North Carolina
as statutory process agent.
On motion to dismiss the action against International for want of
proper service the superior court judge made findings of fact and denied
the motion. He found as a fact that A. L. Gunter was trustee of a local
of International and in complete control of all assets and affairs of the
local as agent and representative of International. He also found that
International had not appointed a process agent in North Carolina.
The Supreme Court declared that the service on A. L. Gunter was
ineffective because he had not been designated as the International's
'The court cites Phillips v. Holland, 78 N.C. 31 (1878), as being in point. It
is submitted that the situations in the two cases are not comparable. In the Phillips
case process in a claim and delivery proceeding had been issued by the clerk of
Davie County directing the sheriff of Davidson County to seize two mules. The
sheriff failed to execute the process, informing the plaintiff and the clerk that the
mules were in Forsyth County. At the request of the plaintiff, the clerk struck
Davidson County from the process, inserted Forsyth and sent the process to the
sheriff of Forsyth. That sheriff was unable to execute the process because the mules
had, in fact, never been taken to Forsyth. Plaintiff instituted an action for damages
against the sheriff of Davidson for his failure to execute the process. While that
action was pending he applied to the trial court for an order striking out Forsyth
in the process and reinstating Davidson. The trial court granted the motion. The
Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the sheriff of Forsyth and the sheriff
of Davidson had acquired rights that the process remain as it was when delivered
to the sheriff of Forsyth. As to the effect of the original change in the county
names, the Court said nothing about a discontinuance but said the effect of it was
the same as if when the process was originally issued it had been directed to the
sheriff of Forsyth instead of to the sheriff of Davidson. Whether this alteration
relieved the Davidson sheriff from liability the Court did not say.
'251 N.C. 134, 110 S.E.2d 875 (1959).
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process agent and noted that G.S. § 1-97(1), which permits service on a
managing agent of a foreign corporation, does not apply to foreign
unincorporated associations. However, the Court found the trial judge
refused to dismiss because of the service on the Secretary of State and
that he did not base his refusal on the service on Gunter.
G.S. § 1-97(6) provides that every unincorporated association, be it
resident or non-resident, which desires to do business in this state shall
appoint an agent for the service of process in this state and shall certify
the name and address of that agent to the clerk of the superior court of
each county in which the association wishes to carry on its business. The
same statute also provides that upon failure to make such an appointment
process may be served upon the Secretary of State. It is to be noted that
there is no requirement compelling the association to certify the name
and address of its process agent to the Secretary of State and appointing
the Secretary its process agent in the event of its failure so to do.0
As to whether International had complied with G.S. § 1-97(6), which
is the only statutory provision prescribing the manner of service on
nonresident unincorporated associations, no evidence had been offered
except a certificate of the Secretary of State certifying that, according
to the Secretary's records, International had not appointed a process
agent in North Carolina.
Since no provision of G.S. § 1-97(6) or any other statute required
a certification by International to the Secretary of State, the Secretary's
certificate was of no value. The evidence failed to disclose whether
International had certified the name of a process agent to the clerk of
any superior court and the Supreme Court finds that apparently no
inquiry was made into that material fact. Rather, the Court finds that
the trial judge had held the Secretary of State's certificate was enough
to warrant service of process on him. Since no statute so authorizes, the
order denying the motion to dismiss was vacated and the case was re-
manded for a hearing de novo at which time, presumably, facts might
be found as to whether International had complied with G.S. § 1-97(6).
It seems clear that present provisions for service on non-resident
unincorporated associations are inadequate. It is suggested that the
statutes be amended so as to provide for service on such associations in
a manner similar to that provided for service on foreign corporations
under G.S. § 1-97(1) (b).0 It is also suggested that G.S. § 1-97(6) be
amended by dispensing with the requirement of the certification of the
name and address of the agent appointed for the service of process to
the clerk of the superior court of each county in which the association
;_Compare the provisions relating to foreign corporations appearing in G.S.
§ 55-143 to -146.
Under such a provision service on an officer or managing agent, etc. of Inter-
national in this state would have been adequate.
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wishes to carry on business and by providing instead that such certifica-
tion be made to the Secretary of State and that in default of such certifi-
cation service may be made on the Secretary of State.7
TRUSTS
POWER OF TRUSTEE To CONVEY
In Callaham v. Newsom' the trustee was given all the shares of a
corporation whose only asset was real estate, with full power to sell the
stock and reinvest the proceeds, pay the net income to grantor while he
lived, and at grantor's death divide the corpus into thirteen parts "what-
ever may then be the nature and character of the property . . . and he
shall hold and administer each part .... *"2 After grantor's death the
corporation was dissolved and the trustee received the real property as
a dissolution dividend. The trustee entered into a contract to sell this
land to defendant who subsequently refused to purchase it. In an
action to recover damages the Court was presented with the ques-
tion of whether the power of the trustee to sell the corpus should be
continued when the trust property was changed from corporate stock to
real estate. The Court held that the change in character of the corpus
did not "exhaust" the trustee's power and that he could convey good
title to the land. No authority was cited by the Court, and no case
exactly in point has been found; however, other authorities indicate
that the Court properly found this action to be within the trustee's
authorized power.3
RESULTING TRUSTS
Tanner v. Ervin4 held that pursuant to treasury regulations a wife,
as surviving owner, might cash United States Savings Bonds issued to
her and her husband as co-owners, although she had transferred all of
TIt is obviously a distinct advantage if plaintiff need only make inquiry to one
office rather than being compelled to make inquiry to the county clerks of various
counties to determine if the non-resident association has made the necessary certi-
fication.
1251 N.C. 146, 110 S.E.2d 802 (1959).
2 Id. at 148, 110 S.E.2d at 803.
'Authority to sell personal property and execute conveyances implies power to
sell real estate. In re Hardenbugh's Will, 144 Misc. 248, 258 N.Y.Supp. 651
(Surr. Ct. 1932). When grantor authorizes trustee to sell shares of stock and invest
the proceeds and dividends are paid trustee in the form of shares of another cor-
poration, the trustee has authority to sell such shares and invest the proceeds.
Delaware Trust Co. v. DuPont, 22 Del. Ch. 115, 194 AtI. 31 (1937). The vesting
of the legal title in the trustees with a power of sale creates a power coupled with
an interest which survives the death of the grantor. Eisel v. Miller, 84 F.2d 174
(8th Cir. 1936). See generally BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRusTEEs § 741 (2d ed. 1960).
'250 N.C. 602, 109 S.E.2d 460 (1959).
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her interest to her husband for a valuable consideration during his life-
time. The Court, however, required that a resulting trust be impressed
on the proceeds for the benefit of the deceased husband's estate. This
case is discussed in a Note in this volume.5
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
AFTER-BORN CHILD
In Byerly v. Tolbert,' where the action was to determine whether a
child born 322 days after his purported father's death could share in
wrongful death proceeds, the Court held that when a child is born more
than ten lunar months (280 days) after the death of its alleged father,
a rebuttable presumption is created that no parenthood exists. The
Court further held that the statute2 stating the ten lunar month rule,
apparently as a matter of law, applies only to the descent of realty and
intimated that it is not conclusive even as to that. Distinguishing Brit-
ton v. Miller,3 where a child born more than ten lunar months after the
intestate's death was found not in posse at the time of death and there-
fore not entitled to share in the intestate's real property, the Court said:
"Since no contention was made that . . . [the child in question] was
born or en ventre sa mere when . . . [intestate] died, the reference to
the statute, now G.S. 29-1, Rule 7, may not be regarded as the basis of
the decision." 4
The Court also pointed out that no provision of the North Carolina
chapter on administration5 mentions the ten lunar month rule nor does
the statute on after-born children. 6
Under the provisions of the new intestate succession law regarding
after-born children,7 the ten lunar month rule is stated in a fashion
similar to the present real property rule. Since the new act abolishes
the distinction between real and personal property for inheritance pur-
poses,8 whatever interpretation the Court gives to the new provision
138 N.C.L. REv. 111 (1959).
250 N.C. 27, 108 S.E.2d 29 (1959).
2 G.S. § 29-1 (7) provides: "No inheritance shall descend to any person, as heir
of the person last seized, unless such person shall be in life at the death of the
person last seized, or shall be born within ten lunar months after the death of the
person last seized."
863 N.C. 268 (1868).
'250 N.C. at 33, 180 S.E.2d at 34.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-1 to -201 (1950), as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-1
to -201 (Supp. 1959).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-154 (1950).
G.S. § 29-9 provides: "Lineal descendants and other relatives of an intestate
born within ten lunar months after the death of the intestate, shall inherit as if
they had been born in the lifetime of the intestate and had survived him."N.C. GEN. STAT. §29-3 (Supp. 1959).
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must be applied to both real and personal property. Adherence to the
rule which the Court has established for personal property and which it
has intimated would be applicable to realty under the present law would
seem to be preferable to an interpretation establishing a conclusive pre-
sumption.
The apparent fairness of establishing a rebuttable presumption, as
the Court has clearly done with personal property, is that in proper cases
it will allow representatives of a child carried by its mother more than
280 days to assemble and present medical evidence in support of its
claim as an after-born child.
SON'S ADOPTED CHILD AS "GRANDCHILD"
In Bullock v. Bullock,) where the testator left life estates to his sons
with remainders to "my grandchildren from my sons," the Court held
that he intended only natural children to take and excluded children
adopted by one son prior to testator's death but after execution of his
will.
In a 1953 case the Court in applying the adoption statutes' 0 said:
[They] have no bearing . . . except so far as they establish and
define the parent and child relationship between the adoptive
parents and the adopted child. When an adopted child is entitled
to take under a will is usually dependent upon whether such child
comes within a particular class designated by the testator as "chil-
dren," "issue," "descendants," or "heirs of the body," etc., of a
designated person. And whether an adopted child comes within
such class must be determined by ascertaining the intent of the
testator."-
This construction, in effect, restricted application of the adoption statutes
to cases of intestacy only.
In 1955 the legislature amended G.S. § 48-23 and added the liberal
provision that "an adopted child shall have the same legal status, in-
cluding all legal rights and obligations of any kind whatsoever, as he
would have had if he were born the legitimate child of the adoptive
parents."
Notwithstanding the liberal language of the new statute the Court
in the principal case said that the primary question was still one of the
intent of the testator to include the infant and thereby refused to accord
the infant what seemingly would be "all legal rights . . . whatsoever, as
he would have had if he were born the legitimate child of the adoptive
parents."
- 251 N.C. 559, 111 S.E.2d 837 (1960).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §28-149(10) (1950); N.C. GEN. STAT. §29-1, Rule 14(1950); N.C. GEN. STAT. §48-23 (1950).
"rdodv. Johnson, 237 N.C. 572, 578, 75 S.E.2d 632. 636 (1953).
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